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CHAPTER I 
KOREA: "SHUTTLECOCK AMONG NATIONS" 
In the light of events too reoent to be properly 
. 
termed "history," the peninsula of Korea, off in a far corner 
of the world, has assumed an importanoe which few people sus-
pected. Lord Curzonts description of Korea as a "shuttlecook 
among nations •••• a sort of Tom Tiddler's ground between China, 
Russia, and Japan," s~ems as true today as when it was first 
pronounoed. l ~ar, to be sure, is not new to Korea. Standing as 
she does at the very gateway between Japan and greater Asi. t 
Korea, by virtue of her unique geographical position, has for 
centuries provided a meeting place and battleground of the Chi-
nese and Japanese Empires. :rhe Korean question, however, was 
1 George N. Curzon, Problems of the Far East, Revised 
Edition, London, 1896, 188-189. From time ~trme in ita long 
history the peninsula known to us today as Korea has assumed va 
ious names, several of which will reour in this thesis. It is 
best known to its own people as Chao-hsien, or in the contracted 
form of Chosen or Choaun, a term of Japanese origin signifying 
"Morning calm." The name Korea, derived from the native pro-
nunciation of Kao-li (or Ko-rai), supposedly the name of a pre-
historic kingdom in Manchuria, is that adopted by the Royal Geo-
graphic Society and the United States State Department. Since 
this name, Korea, enjoys the most general usage today, it will 
be employed in the following pages, except in quoted passages 
where t~e terms Chosen or Chiao-hsien are used in the source of 
the que Let t'.>n. 
1 
2 
not one that concerned China and Japan alone. In the latter 
half of the nineteenth century Russia, Great Britain, and the 
United States joined the powers to whose strategy Korea had pro-
vided an historic fulcrum. 
Russla In partlcular saw in Korea the fulfl11ment ot 
. 
the need and desire for an ice-free, all-year-round port, which 
centuries of history had impressed upon her. As early as 1881 
she had made an unsuccessful attempt to acqulre such a port in 
Korea. In later years she sought to reallze her ambitions by 
the use of military force. These attempts culminated in the 
1890's In a concerted drive to the Paciflc, which was related to 
the construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, then the chief 
single factor in Russian Far Eastern pollcy .• 2 
The purpose of this thesis, brlefly stated, .is to 
trace the historleal backgrounds of Russian interest In Korea, 
to discover the considerations which motlvated this particular 
interest, and to outline Russian attempts to acquire a foothold 
on the Korean peninsula, against the broad background of Russian 
imperialistic expansion in the If'arEast. 
Writlng in 1894 Lord Curzon descrlbed the internation-
al position of Korea In these words: 
A more anomalous polltical condition certainly did not 
exist in the world than that of a country which Itself 
2 David J. Dallln, !a!.!!!!.!. g.! Russla !!l!!!,!., New 
Haven, 1949, M. 
claimed to be both independent and dependent, and could 
produce powerfUl evidenoe in support of either hypothe-
sis; and as to which outside Powers advanced pretensions 
of suzerainty, control, protectorate, alliance, most-
favoured-nation treatment, or teohnical equality, for 
all o! which there was a considerable show of justifica-
tion. 
This state of affairs had arisen, aocording to Curson, first, 
out of the peculiar geographica-l posl tion of Korea, secondly, 
out of the inconSistent, sometimes nirectly contradiotory pol-
ioy pursued by China with respeot to Korea." Hence .. before pro'" 
ceeding to a consideration of Russian designs on Korea, it is 
necessary to arrive at some understanding of Korea's positIon 
both with regard to China and Japan, and also with respect to 
the Western powers which in the last deoade of the nineteenth 
century suoceeded in nopening upll Korea as they had Japan a deo-
ade before • 
. To any such understanding an appreCiation of Korea's 
unique geographical position is a necessary preoondition. Sit-
uated between the Yellow Sea and that of Japan, the peninsula 
of Korea, despite its exposed condition, had until the time ot 
its so-called ftopening" come less into contaot with other nation. 
than any other oountry 1n the world. 5 Surrounded on three sides 
3 Curzon, Problems £! ~ !!£!!!l, 188. 
4 Ib1d., IS8-189. 
-
5 Alexis Krausse, ~!!£!!!i, !l! Hlsto£Z ~ !1! Quest1on, London, 1900, 6. 
4 
by sea, Korea's sole land frontier is that supplied by the Tiu-
men and Yalu rivers which, flowing northeast and southwest re-
spectively, delimit Korean territory from that of Russia and Man-
churia. The peninsula is six hundred miles long and one hundred 
thirty-five miles wide on the average; its total area is about 
86,000 square miles. The Korean coastline, all out of propor-
tion to the size of the peninsula itself, is largely indented 
with bays and harbors, thereby affording great possibil~.ties for 
naval and commercial purposes. The strategic value of the penin-
sula is thus self-evident: situated at the entrance to the Gult 
of Pechli, the gateway between Japan and Asia, Korea commands 
the approaches to Tietsin and to Peklng itself. 6 Vladivostok 1s 
but a hundred mlles from Korean territory to the east; Port Ar-
thur 1s but twice that distance to the west of Korea. Perhaps 
even more important for the purposes of the present study is 
the fact that whereas the harbors and inlets on the west coast 
of Korea are frozen in the winter months, those on the east coast 
remain open all year round. 
While the traditions of the founding of the Korean 
Kingdom go back to primaeval times, these early aceounts are 
largely of a superstitious character.7 It is known, however, 
6 W111iam L. Langer, The Di~lomaci of Imeerialism, 
!§gQ-~, Second Edition, New York, 951, 687 
7 M. F'rederick Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders in 
Eastern !.!l!., Saton Rouge, 1946, 21. - - - -
5 
that owing to her situation midway between China and Japan, 
Korea was viewed with covetous eyes by both, and at various 
times in her long history had occasion to try her strength 
against the forces of each.8 Though for centuries ruled by 
successive dynasties of monarchs, there was scarcely a time in 
her history when she did not acknowledge a greater or lesser de-
pendence on either China or Japan. The claims of the latter 
power, dating from the nebulous days of the early Ohristian era, 
were both earlier in point of origin and were exercised over the 
longer period of time'. In modern times, however, Japanese claims 
to Korea were allowed to shrink into a virtual state of desuetude 
during the last years of the Shogunate, and it was not until the 
revolution of 1868 that any oonoerted attempt was made to rees-
tablish Japanese hegemony. Thenoeforward, Japan, by virtue of 
her own political reSUSCitation, was to reestablish a powerful 
influence in Korea though, as Curzon observes, at the expense ot 
"the feudatory relationship which for so many centuries it had 
been her boastful pretension to maintain. n9 
Several factors combined to militate against the immed-
iate restoration of Japanese overlordship in Korea. Not the 
. 8 An acoount of several such attempts, inoluding the 
famous expedition of Hideyoshl to Korea in the late 15th century, 
is to be found in Krausse, The Far East: Its Histo£f and Its 
~uest1on, 61-84. For a more-deti!l~reatment see rthUr-,udson 
Brown,.1he Mastery .2! !!l!. .!!.t!!.!1, New York, 1919, 20-25. 
9 CurBon, Problems .2! ~ ~!!!!, 191 
6 
least of these was the fact that the Koreans themselves were not 
well disposed to such control. The reasons for this are not far 
to seek. In October of 1866 a French fleet had been sent to Ko-
rea for the purpose of exacting compensation for the murder of 
several F'rench eoo1esiastics engaged in missionary activities In 
Korea. In thls crisis the Korean government had applied to Ja-
pan for aid ~nd assistance. Japan had her hands full at the 
tlme,. and no material aid was forthcoming. The Koreans resisted 
the F)rench Invaslon with such energy that the French admlral, 
reallzing the expediency of a hasty retreat, returned to China 
without having accomplished his purpose. 10 The Koreans. for 
their own part, never forgot Japan's failure to come to their 
aid. Consequently, when in 1868 a Japanese embassy arrived in 
Seoul to present the formal announcement of the Restoration of 
the Meiji and to invite from the Koreans a renewal of their an-
cient friendship, the reply was an insolent re fusal. l1 
In 1871, in reply to a similar Japanese proposal, the 
Tai-Wen-K~~. acting as Regent on behalf of the young Korean king, 
returned an answer which left little doubt as to Korean sentiment 
in the matter. His reply runs in part al folloWII ' "In your dis-
10 Krausse, The Far East, 87; for an account of the 
expedl tlon see Joseph r.-Longf~ !!!!. Stotz S!.! Korea, New York, 
1911, 237. 
11 Curzon, Problems .2.! !h! !!!:!!.!!, 191. 
7 
patch you have made many insinuations of your having adopted 
aign customs; we oan assure you that Japan is Japan, Korea 18 
Korea--but Korea has its own customs." The document specificall 
mentions Japan's failure to come to Korea's aid in the French in 
vasion • 
•••• According to our old treaty of friendship, when-
ever either is attacked by barbarians, the other is 
to help_ To show our honesty, when the barbarians 
went into your country, we immediately wrote to you 
that we had made every preparation to help you. 
During the French attack on Korea we day and night 
expected that you would come with your forces to our 
aid; but not having received your assistance we wrote 
and informed you of our distress, informing you of 
our pOSition, and asking for immediate help. You 
have neither sent us aid, nor any answer to our dis-
patch. From that day our treaty of friendship was at 
an end. We no longer consider each other friends but 
enemies, ••• Not only have you broken the treaty as a-
bove described, but you have also broken another very 
chief point of treaty in adopting the manners and cus-
toms of the Western barbarians •••• It is useless to go 
into any correspondence, because the wrong you have 
doneus is so great, that your apologies wl11 not avail. 
The only alternative is a bloody war--a war that wl11 
cost Japan all its warriors; and then we will bring 
you to terms. 12 
Although some assert that this version of the reply 1s not a 
true copy, there is no doubt that the Tal Wen Kun made a reply 
that was regarded by the Japanese as insulting and oontemp· 
tuous. 15 Japan, however, was too poor and too much hampered by 
complications consequent on lts internal revolution to maintain-
12 Longford,!h!. Stou .2! Korea, 297-298. 
13 Ibid. 
-
8 
its claim by the use of force. The Samurai party especially 
were infuriated, and it was ohief1y to satisfy their belligerent 
disPositions that the government undertook the expeditions to 
Formosa and the Liu-Kiu Islands in 1874. 14 Two suocessive mis-
sions were dispatched to Korea in 1873 and 1874 in an effort to 
reestablish Japanese author! ty 'by peace tal me,ans; both proved 
completely unsuccessful. However, the Japanese statesmen of the 
time wisely concluded that Japan's interests would best be se~d 
not by a polioy of aggression, but rather by a peaceful policy 
of economio penetration and oommercial control. 15 
In her relationship to China, Korea has stood for cen-
turies as what has been called "the most perfect example of the 
peculiar Confuoian order of Far Eastern international relations 
which preoeded the Western state sy~tems.ft16 In modern times, 
Chinese influenoe in Korea oan be traced baok to the inoeption 
at the most reoent Korean dynasty some six oenturies ago. Under 
the patronage of the Ming Dynasty, Li Tan, a soldier ot fortune 
known in history as Tai-cho, raised himself to the Korean throne 
in 1392. Breaking completely with the previous Wang liynas;t;;y, 
Tai-cho established his Court and capital at Aan-Yang, popularly 
· xiv. 
14 Langer, Diplomaoy ~ Imperialism, 16S. 
15 Curzon, ..;.P.;;.r.;;.o.;;.b.-l_em;;;;;;;.s .2.! !h! !!..t!!ll, 192. 
9 
... . 
known as Seoul. 17 Chinese became the official spoken language, 
as well as the language of Korean literature. Confucianism was 
substituted for Buddhism as the official religion, and govern-
mental reorganization was undertaken on the Chinese model, which 
until 1894 was faithfully reproduoed in the Court at Seoul. 
However, though possessed of far more natural and basic 
conditions for Korean alleglance--in the form of common language, 
religion, customs, philosophy, as well as territorial conneotion.--
than oould be advanced by Japa.n, China t s position in Korea i8 
rather more difficult of analysis and description. The diffl-
culty is largely one of terminology. In most Western llterature 
on the subject, the international status of Korea Is described 
as that of a "vassal" to China. But 11ke so many terms, pecul-
iarly western in origln and connotation, which have 'Qeen seized 
upon by hlstorians to describe Far Eastern politlcal and soolal 
institutions, the term "vassal" carries with it many attributes 
which were in no way characteristic of the relationship of Korea 
to China. Indeed, it was a misunderstanding arising from the use 
of this very term "vassal" which stood as the first and moat for-
midable obstacle to the establishment of amicable relations be-
between Korea and the Western powers in their first contacts in 
17 
capital." 
Ibid., 71. 
-
The name Seoul means literally "the 
10 
the latter half of the nineteenth century.lS Hence the practical 
necessi ty of v1ewing the relationship in terms of the non-legal, 
familistic Confucian order, rather than in those of Western in-
ternational law. 19 
While a detailed analysis is necessarily beyond the 
scope of this study, it might ~e well at this point to mention 
several historical traditions which testify to Korea's depend .... 
ence upon China. Particularly notable among these. was the annual 
Tribute Mission from Seoul to Peking, conveying a specified trib-
ute, and receiving in return the Calendar for the next year whicb 
it was the imperial prerogative to prepare, an outward mark ot 
Korean dependence to receive. Through the years the tribute had 
been gradually reduoed and the·mission had assumed a more or le81 
ceremonial character to which, in the early years of the nine-
teenth century, a practical and mercantIle aspect was lent by 
its being used for the export to China of the King's red gine-
sin&.20 Another practice, carried on since the time of the Man-
chu invasions in the early seventeenth century and indicative of 
1S W. W. Rockhill, Chinats Intercourse with Korea from 
!h!. !Ylh Centll;!:l 12.~, London, t§05, 3. - -
xv-xvi. 19 Nelson, Korea ~ !h! ~ qrders !a Eastern !!!!, 
20 Curzon, Problems of the Far East, 198-199. Gin.sini 
was a plant greatly vAlaea fOr me~iurr ~reouperative pur-
poses in the Orient, and Korea was one of the principla areas at 
its production. On the subject of Tribute MiSSions, cf. also 
Nelson, Korea ~ ~ ~ Orders in Eastern !!!!, 17-19; 94ff. 
11 
the same relationship, was the investiture of the Korean monarch 
with the patent of royalty by the Chinese Emperor. These and ' 
other evidences of Korea's dependence upon China survived until 
July, 1894, and stood in mute testimony to the reality of that 
relationship. 
These evidences of dependence upon China did not, how-
ever, preclude the possibility of Korea's retaining a practical 
measure of independence in her internal relations, The reason 
for this lies deep at the roots of the ConfUcian system, the pa-
ternalistic nature of which is perhaps best characterized by M. 
Frederick Nelson as "that of a Chinese father or elder brother, 
while Chao-hsien, the lesser nation, maintained the attitude ot 
a filial son and respectful younger brother toward China, the 
central nation •••• As with the natural son, the father nation was 
by Confucian theory discouraged from exercising its control ex-
cept in times of crisis. n21 ThiS, in turn, would serve to ex-
plain many of the seeming inconsistencies in Chinese policy with 
respeot to Korea, whlch were interpreted by Western observers as 
the fruits of diplomatic indioision. The over-all relationship 
of Korea to China is well summed-up by Nelsons 
But being thoroughly Confucian Chao-hsien ••• 
viewed dependenoy upon China as an ~onor or mark of 
oivilization whioh barbarians oould not "attain. 
Though in theory her submission was abject and com-
plete, her status oannot in faot be termed flva~salage'l t 
21 Korea ~ ~ ~ Order~ in Eastern Asia, 91-92. 
12 
for the Far East possessed no counterpart of the word 
'suzerainty' as It was understood In the West. Before 
external pressure was felt on the relatlonshlp, as late 
as the beginnlng of the~neteenth oentury, its outward 
evidences went little beyond formal submission and trib-
ute, the practice of investiture being only the conflrma-
tion of the de facto ruler. What Is more important, the 
internal fiens of oontrol and policy were lett to the 
discretlon of the king, whlle external relations, neces-
sarily 11ml ted to J.i'ar Eastern natlona, were also dlrect-
ed by the individual ruler~. Clearly, then, the positlon 
of Chao-hsien was far from being uncomfortable. 22 
Thus, though the status of Korea was quite clearly defined in the 
Confucian order, it is In no way surprising that Western observ-
ers, failing to appreciate the unique character of the relation-
shlp, should have found in Korea a nation neither sovereign enougk 
to conduct independent relations nor subject enough to shift re-
sponsibility for its actions on China. 
Koreats early relations with the West were confined, 
for the most part, to the efforts of a few missionaries and trad-
ers to open a wedge for purposes of evangelization and exploita-
tion. As early as 1593 the Jesuit, Cespedes, had insinuated him-
selt into the "hermit kingdom." In the later years of the 
eighteenth century Catholic doctrine entered Korea through books, 
from 1784 Catholic missionaries, mainly F'Nnch, began to enter 
the country and taught their ere~d with moderate success. In 
1839 a court party came into power which favored the exclusion 
of foreigners and the extirpation of all traces of Christianity. 
the immediate result being a persecution which culminated in the 
- 22 Ibid., 92-93. 
13 
aurder of three French prlests and some one hundred thirty ot 
thelr converts.23 News of the incldent was rather slow ln 
reaching the outside" world, and it was not until 1846 that a mis-
8ion was dispatched to inquire into the execution. The Korean 
government, stressing Korea's dependence on China, replied in 
effect that it W88 only through China that Westerners could deal 
with her. China in turn, notwiehlng to alter the relationship 
ln which Korea had traditionally stood, persisted in a policy 
which t.o the West appeared anomalous--that of declaring Korea·· 
dependent, but refusing at the same time to accept legal respon-
sibility for Korea's transgressions. 
The year 1866 is one of major importance ln modern 
Korean history. For some twenty years the F'rench had taken. no 
further steps to exact conpensatlon for the murder of her mls-
sionaries, and the outrage had been virtually forgotten. In 
these intervening years several more F'rench missionaries had ven-
tured across the frontier. However, a fal •• report from Ohina 
that the Chinese were putting to d,eath all Christians in the em-
pire served to intensity the native anti-foreign sentiment.24 
Th. cry "Death to the Christians" was raised in the streets ot 
Seoul, and launched a persecution which resulted in the violent 
23 Griffes, Oorea, 347-367; Longford, The St££l of 
Korea, 242-273. These accounts are based, for tne-mos part, o~ 
Eharles Dallet's Ristorie S! l'8s1ise ~ Coree, Paris, 1874, II. 
24 Nelson, Korea ~ ~ ~ Orders, 115. 
14 , 
... 
deaths of other F'rench priests and hundreds of converts. This 
time the news was rather quick to take hold, and a gunboat ot 
the F"rench Asiatic fleet was immediately sent to make surveys ot 
the western coastline of Korea. In an 1nterchang~ of diplomatio 
correspondence between the Chinese government and the French 
/ Charge, M. de Bellonet, China'aga1n repudiated responsibility 
for the acts of Korea. 25 The outcome of the punitive French ex-
ped1t1on dispatohed to avenge the massacre has already been de-
soribed. 26 
In 1867 the United States was placed in a pos1tion 
analogous to that ot Franoe the year betore by an incident in-
volving the burning of the schooner General Sherman 1n Korean 
waters and the murder of 1ts complement and passengers by 
Koreans. In considering the proper method of obtaining an ex-
planation and satisfaction, the Department of State decided 
against the expediency of a punitive expedition to Korea, in 
view ot the conspicuous failure of the recent French mission. 
Instead, it authorized George F. Seward, American consul-general 
at Shanghai, to prooeed to Korea to obtain an official explana-
25 Ibid •• 116-117; Curzon, Problems .2! ~ F"ar East, 
201, remarks that Chlna"' s policy of repudiation was d"I'Cta't'idbY 
a deslre to escape responsibility for the act as well as the 
payment of thelndemnlty which it would ental1. This Is but 
another illustration of the misconcept10ns of the relationship 
existlng between China and Korea. 
26 Supra, 6., 
15 
tien and, if possible a treaty of amity and commerce. However, 
discovering in advance the futility of such a mission. this plan 
.a8 dropped. 21 In 1871 similar authority was granted to the 
United states Minister at Peking, Frederick P. Low. Taking the 
precaution of sollci ting in advance of his departure .fQr Korea 
the good will and otfices of the Pekl.ng government, Low received 
• reply which ran in part aa followsl 
Korea ls regarded as a country subordinate to China, 
yet she ls wholly independent in everything that re-
lates to her government, her religion, her prohibi-
tlons, and her laws; in none of these things has Chi-
na hitherto interfered. 28 
The aotual accompllshments of Low's mission were little 
greater than those of the Frenoh mission five years earlier. On 
June 1, 1871, while some of the six ships comprising the mission 
were explorlng the coastal waters of Korea, they were fired upon 
by land batteries and returned fire. Attempts at peaceable nego-
tiatlon wlth the Koreans were of no avall. On June 10 an Amerl-
can landlng party went ashore; ln the ensulng engagement some two 
hundred and fifty Koreans and three Americana were k1l1ed. The 
American ships then returned to Shangha1. 29 
27 Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders, 121, cltlng For-
e1gn Relat10ns ~ !h! Onltea-!tates;-Ia'o, 336-339. ---
28 ~., 1871, 112. 
29 For an account of the expedltion see Tyler Dertnett~ 
Americans ~ Eastern !!!!,~ew York, 1922, 452-453. 
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In 1876 the caution and self-restraint of Japanese d1-
plomacy in Korea was rewarded by the conclusion of the Treaty of 
Kang-wha between Japan and Korea, by which Japan hoped to separ-
ate Korea from her ·ConfUoian" dependency on China. 30 The open-
ing words of Article I stated that ·Chosen being an independent 
state enjoys the same sovereign rights as does Japan. n31 Also 
of significanoe is the fact that the document was dated, not 
according to the year of the Chinese reign, as had previously 
been the accepted procedure, but rather by the Japanese reign 
year, and that of the Li dynasty in Korea. Aooording to the 
terms of the treaty, inte~oourse between the two countries was to 
be on terms of complete equality; old restriotions on trade at 
the port of Fusan were to be removed, and two additional Korean 
ports were to be opened to oommeroe. Furthermore, Japanese sub-
jects were to enjoy extraterritorial prfrvileges. 32 The Japanese-
Korean Treaty is notable as being the first unilateral treaty en-
tered into by Korea that was negotiated and framed on the basia 
ot Western concepts ot international ]a w, and as paving the war 
for subs~quent treaties which were to terminate Korea's long-
-
30 Curzon, .rroblems .2.! !h!. l!.£!!.!1. 192. 
3~ Briti!h and ForeiSD State Papers, LXVII. 530-553. 
The document Is quote~n its en~. 
.. 
32 Curzon, Problems of the P'ar East, 195, n. 1, remarks 
that: "When Japan dictated the-rirst Korean-!reaty in 1876 she 
copied the extra-territorial olauses SUlost verbatim from Artiel. 
iv. and v. of the Anglo-Japanese Treaty of laSS; and has never 
17 
... 
• tanding iaolation and "open- her to tor.mal diplomatio relationa 
with the nationa ot the We.t.33 
During the period trom 1878 to 1881 Commodore Shuteldt 
of the United Statea BaV7 waa authorized to negotiate on behalf 
of the United Statea Government with the government ot Korea tor 
purposeaot obtaining reliet tor Amerioan sailors shipwreoked ln 
Korean waters, tor opening Korean porta to American trade, and 
tor obtaining such extraterrltorial rights aa had been granted b, 
Japan and Qhina. Though repulsed and ignored b7 Korean ottloial~ 
Shufeldt tound ln the Chineae Vioer07, Ll Hung.Chang~ a wlll1ng 
and sympathet10 al17 who actlve17 urged on the Korean government 
the signature ot tore1gn treatles as the sole .eana ot contlnued 
34 
aeourl 'by. AJ,-rl vlng at the reallzation that the torelgner, 
onoe hav1ng been allowed to meddle wlth Korea, could never be p~ 
manentl7 exoluded trom cloaer relatlon., Chlna undertook to .end 
her Korean pollc7 b7 encouraging the varlous powera to enter lnto 
direot treaty relations wlth Korea. 3ti Thls Dew pollc7 was appar-
shown an7 reluotanoe to set ln operatlon agalnst Korea the pro-
vialona ot which she complain. 80 bitter17 when applled to her-
aelt.-
33 For an account ot the negotlationa attendant on the 
completion ot the treat7 see Nelaon, Korea and the Old Orders, 
126-134. . ---
34 T. C. Lln, -Ll Hung-chaD!J Hls Korea Polloles, 1870-
1886,- Chlnes. Sooial aDd Polltical Soience Revle., XIX, 1935-36, 
209-12. 
36 Curzon. Problema ot the Far Eaat 1>.02_ 
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ently adopted on the theory that the mutual jealousies and anim-
osities of all the powers would necessarily preclude the ascend-
ancy of anyone until such time as China's military strength 
might allow a more active policy.36 It should, however, be not-
ed that Chinafs new policy was not viewed by her 8S altering in 
any way the traditional relationship between the two countries, 
but was designed rather to protect that relationship.3'7 
The year 1882 witnessed the conclusion of the first 
treaty entered into by Korea with a Western natIon, that nation 
being the United State.. More significant than the fact that 
the treaty opened Korea to American commerce is the fact that 
each of the contracting parties agreed therein to render assist-
ance to the other in caae ot necessity. Article I provided* 
There shall be perpetual peace and friendship be. 
tween the iresident of the United States and the Kina 
of Cholen and the citizens and subjects ot their res-
pective Governmentst 
If other Powera deal unjustly or ~ppressively 
with either Government the other will exert their 
good oftices, on being infonned or the case, to 
bring about an amicable ~greemen, thus showing 
their frisndly reelings.38 . 
3'7 T. F. Tsaing, "Sino-Japanese Diplomatic Relations, 
1870-1894," Chin ••• Social ~ Political Science Review, XVII, 
1933-1934, 65. , 
3a William M. Malloy, (Ed.), Treaties, Conventiona, 
internQtional Acts, Protocols, and Alreemen£s between €he United 
~tatea and Oth~owers, i776-l~, aahIngton, D. C.,~lO, I, ~4.33s.- - - .. . 
, I 
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The second clause of the above quoted art1cle was later to be-
come the subject of considerable d1scussion between the United 
states and K~r.ea~ and it was because of this clause that Korea 
came to regard the United Sta tea as her "Elder Brother." The 
-Treaty of Peace, Am1ty, Commerce and Navigation between the 
United States of America and the Kingdom of Chosentt was ratified 
by the Senate on January 9, 188~, and proclaimed by President 
Arthur on June 4 of the same year. 
Onee ~rea had been penetrated, other nations lost no 
time in solicit1ng and obtaining concess1ons similar to those 
obtained by Japan and the United States. Subsequent conventiona 
with Japan opened the port of Gensan in 1879, and Chemulpo the 
following year; further Trade and Fishery Regulations were con-
cluded between the two countries in 1883. The Chinese Overland 
Trade Regu1at1ons and the American Treaty were signed in 1882. 
England and Germany concluded treaties with Korea in 1883, Rua-
aia and Italy in 1884, F'rance in 1886.39 
However, this sudden transition from Koreats tradi-
tional policy of jealously guarded seclusion to one of almost 
unprecedented liberality in her dealinga with foreigners, was 
not accomplished without familiar symptoms of domestic unrest. 
In 1873, upon the Assumption by the King, L:1. Bsi, (tf full sover-
eignty, the former Regent beoame head of the Conservative or 
-
39 Nelson, Korea !!!S !h!. ~ Orders, Appendix A, 301-&. 
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anti-foreign party. Opposing all treaties and coneesslons to 
foreigners, the Tai-Wen-Kun remained a dominant figure in Korean 
politics, chiefly by lnstigating several plots to remove the 
foung King and the old Queen Dowager, who had associated herselt 
wlth the 11beral and pro-Japanese factlons. 40 One such attempt 
in 1882 led to an outbreak in which the Japanese Legation at 
seoul was attacked and burned, forcing the Japanese residents to 
flee. Both Japan and Chlna, the latter aoting on her theory ot 
Korean dependence, dispatched troops to quell the outbreak. The 
Tai-Wen-Kun, as instigator ot the uprising, was himself kid-
napped and deported to China.4l 
During his absence events at the Korean Court precipi-
tated a seoond outbreak, of somewhat similar eharaetel', in 1884. 
The Queents party, having become supreme, soon reverted to an 
anti-foreign policy_ The so-called Liberal Party, comprising a 
few well-intentioned but politically inexperienced Koreans who 
believed that Korea was ready for the same volte face made by 
Japan ln 1868, seoured momentary control of the government with 
Japanese help. The attempt, however, was rendered abortive by 
the arrival of a Chinese force which, after some thirty Japanese 
40 Curzon, Problems of the Far East, 148-149 • 
....... ......- ------
41 For accounts ot the uprising see Grltfls, Corea, 
437 ff; also Longford, !!'!!. Ston .2! ~orea, 308 ft. 
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bad been kiiled, forced the others to withdraw. 42 Japan prompt-
ly dispatched two diplomatic missions to settle the incident: 
one to Seoul under Inouye, the other to Tientsin under Count 
Ito. At Seoul the Japanese demands, including a formal apology, 
an indemnity, and the punishment of the guilty, were readily 
accepted. 43 The mission to Chtna, resulting in the Convention 
of Tientsin of 1885, which provided Russia with a baeia for sub-
sequent intervention in the peninsula, will be disQuesed in the 
following ohapter. 
42 Longford,!h! ston .2! Korea, 321-325. 
43 Shuahi Hau, China ~ !!£ Political EntltI, New 
Xork, 1926, 116-117. 
~----------, 
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CHAPTER II 
EARLY RUSSIAN DESIGNS IN KOREA 
Russia, long an interested spectator, appeared for the 
first time as an actor on the Korean scene in the early 1860's. 
Ever sinoe the Crimean War, whioh had revealed in a most humili-
ating fashion Russia's all-round weakness when pitted alone 
against the West, Russian interest had become more and more fixed 
in the East·. The eminent Russian Governor-General of Siberia, 
Count Muraviev-Amurski, taking advantage of' China's preocoupation 
in her war with Franoe and Britain, had paved the war for Russian 
penetratIon in the direotion of Korea. 1 By the Treaties of Aigun 
in 1858 and Peking in 1860 Muraviev had secured Russia's title to 
the entire northern bank of the Amur River, as well as the some 
six hundred miles of sea coast comprising the Maritime Province, 
including the important harbor of Vladivostok. Thus Russia was 
brought into immediate juxtaposition with Korean territory on the 
north. "Never,b observed Lord Curzon, with an irony tempered 
with admiration, "was a flne dominion so cheaply or more cleverly 
1 Curzon, Problems .2! l!!! !!.!:!.!.!!, 208, n. 1. 
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However, neither the Russian government nor Muraviev 
himself was thoroughly satisfied. Even at that early date Rus-
alan diplomats and mllltary leaders In the East had come to the 
realization of Russia's absolute need for a port on the Paoific. 
Thls need was two-fold: first,' as a base for naval operations in 
eastern waters. second, as a commerclal outlet to southern mar-
kets, to enable Russla to compete in Paciflc trade on an equal 
tooting with such nations as Japan and Great Britaln. To be 
aure, Vladivostok, founded by auravlev in 1860, was one such port 
on the PacIfl0, but Its harbor was frozen atlesst four months ot 
the year. The eastern coast of Korea, on the other hand, poa~ 
leased several excellent harbora free from lce all year round. 
Especially notable among theae were Fusan on the south east 
coast, and aenzan, sltuated on Broughton Bay, half-way between 
Pusan and Vladivoatok. 3 Even more deslrable, from the Russian 
polnt ot vlew, was Port Lazarev, also on Broughton Bay. The port 
was first surveyed and named by Ruaslans In 1854, and aince that 
time had been regarded by them wlth a more than covetous eye.' 
2 Ibid • 
.......... 
3 The physical attributes of theae ports are described 
by Curson, Problems ~ ~ Far _E.8.S.t, 89-94. 
4 Ibid., 92. 
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In 1861, pursuant to her need for an ice-free, all-
year-round port on the Paclflc, Russla made her flrst attempt to 
acqulre such a port ln the vlclnl ty of Korea., In August of that 
year the Russlan frlgate Possadnlk anchored off the coast of the. 
island of Tsush1ma, a Japanese possesslon lylng about thlrty 
miles to the south-east of FUsan. 6 The crew dlsembarked, estab-
lished ltself on the lsland, and proceeded to cultlvate the so11 
and form a colony under the Russian flag. The Brltlsh Mlnister 
to Japan, Sir Rutherford Alcock, becomlng immediately apprehen-
sive of the Russlan move, dlspatched one of hls asslstants, 
Laurence Ollphant, to lnvestigate the matter. 6 The latter repor-
ted to Admiral Slr J. Hope, Commander of the Britlsh Far Eastern 
Squadron, who ln turn notlfled the Russlan Admiral that he In-
tended landlng a party of Britlsh sailors, who would remain on 
the lsland as long as did the 'Russians. This elementary strateg7 
proved effectlve. immedlately on receiving the message the Rus-
slans evacuated the ls1and, approxlmately slx months after they 
had landed. 
To be sure, the circumstances of thls rather short-llved 
enterprise are important chlefly as providlng an historlcal pre-
5 Though at one time belonglng to Korea, Tsushlma waa 
ceded, to Japan ln 1615, and consti tuted her nearest outpost to 
the Asiatic mainland. Cf. Krausse, lS! l!l!!l1, 7. 
6 Curlon, Problems of the F'ar East, 210, n. 1. Ct. 
also Ollphant t s own account of~he-rn~e~ A Vislt to Tsuahlma. 
:!nl~Ciil~t~ie:g:~i!BaA~g;l!!;8B!· Blackwood's Edlnbu£Sh!!&!- , 
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cedent fo~ subsequent mo~ determined Russian moves in the direc-
tion of Korea. However, in analyzing the situation, the question 
quite naturally suggests itself as to why the incident should 
have provoked British rather than Japanese action. The extreme 
reluctance of the latter power to undertake an Investlgation 
seems to have stemmed from the fact that she was at the tim$ in 
mortal fear of becoming embroIled In a war with Russia. Conse-
quently, she preferred to overlook the occupation rather than, by 
oalling attention to it, run the risk of precipitating a con-
flict. This is borne out by the fact that, even when the Britlsh 
Minister determined to initlate British act1on; Japan declined to 
lend any officlal ass1stance.7 Britain'a 1nterest, on the other 
hand, waa d1ctated or waa at least subsequently defended on the 
ground that her colonial and commercial interests 1n the Far East 
rendered "resistance to such an act a necessary _ asure of self-
preservat10n. "8 
After the Tsush1ma episode Russ1a cont1nued to manlrest 
an inte~st in Korea, though 1n such a way as not to provoke any 
serious susp1cions as to her designs. AQcordingly, she embarked 
upon a policy of ass1milat10n, the object of which was to encour-
age a faml1larity on the part of the Koreans by 1nv1tlng them to 
settle In Rua.1an v111ages across the border. There they served 
7 Oliphant "A Visit to Tsushima," Blackwood's Edln-bU~~h Masazine, 136, ~62. 
e IbiA. t 768. 
r:------'----." 
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first as squatters and colonists in a virtually uninhabited coun-
try, later as farmers, graziers and woodcutters. There also they 
were educated in the principles of the Russian faith so as to be-
come, on their return, the nucleus of a natIve pastorate for the 
evangelizatton of Korea. By 1885 there were an estimated 20,000 
Koreans living in Russlan territory, and the number was constant-
ly increasIng.9 "It was through the agency of these volunteer 
Immigrants ana natura11zed citIzens," writes Curson, "that Ru,sla 
first opened her campaIgn of politlcal intr1gue 1n the penln-
lula."lO All the whl1e, Ru.slan officers and agents were travel-
ling throughout the peninsula, conducting geographical surveys, 
partIcularly of the coast11ne, by way of deter.m1ning the desir-
ability of the various Korean harbors. ll 
Tbe year 1885 1s one of signal Importance not only in 
the h1story of Korean foreign relations, but 1n the h1story ot 
Russian Far Eastern policy as well. In April of that year diplo-
matic representatives of the Chinese and Japanese Empires, Count 
Ito for Japan and Vioeroy Li Hung-Ohang for Ohina, met at Tien-
tsin to negotiate a settlement arising from the Japanese-inspired 
9 Curzon, Problems ~ lh! l!!!!!!. 209. 
10 Ib1d. 
-
11 Ibid., 208-209. Curzon cites as evidence the taot 
that up to the-tIme of the Sino-Japanese War the only decent map 
of Korea was one that em.nated from RtJ.ss1an souroes. 
".-;---------, 
27 
seoul rebellion of the previous year. 12 By the terms of the Con-
~ention of Tientsin both parties agreed to withdraw their troop. 
from Korea and pledged themselves not to send any military ad-
visers into Korea. Furthermore. it was agreed that neither party 
would send an armed force lnto Korea at any tuturedate without 
first notifying the other party' or its intention to do so. This 
important stipulation, contained in the concluding article ot the 
Convention, ran as folloW8. 
that. 
In case of an,. disturbance of a grave nature 00-
curring in Corea which necessitate. the respective 
countries or either ot them to send troops to Corea, 
it is hereby understood that they shall gtve, each to 
the other, previous notice in writing of their inten-
tion so to do, and after the matter is settled, they 
shall withdr-w their troops and not further station 
them the re .13 . 
Wlth regard to the Korean Army, the ConventIon provide4< 
The aaid respective Powers mutually agree to in-
vl te the King ot Oorea to instruct and drill a sutfi-
cient armed force, that she may herself assure her 
publio seourity, and to lnvite him to ~ngage into his 
service an officer or officers of a third Power, who 
shall be intNsted with the instruction of said force. l • 
In general. the document may be said to have represent~d a slg-
nlficant diplomatic triumph for Japan, for implioit in It was the 
12 Supra, 20~21. 
13 Full text in British.!.!!i! F'oreign state iapers, 
LXXVI, 297-298. 
14 Ibid. 
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of substantial equality of rights with respect to Korea 
Japanese diplomacy had so long been laboring to assert.15 
Japan followed up this diplomatic triumph by embarking upon an 
energetic policy of commercial ascendancy in Korea.16 However, 
barring "e:rave disturbances, It Japanese advances in the peninsula 
bad to rely thereafter solely on diplomatic and commercial oxped-
lents. 
China, on the other hand, pursuing a policy of encour-
aging the commerclal nations in order to foil those with terri-
torial ambitlons, made every effort to reestab11sh actual con-
trol in Korean affairs. In this she held a distinct advantage 
oyer Japan, not alone because of her close connect1on with the 
Korean throne, t,he F'oreign Office, and the CUltC:!&3 Service, but, 
mOlt important,. through Korea's recognition of her dependent 
Itatus. 17 
However, it the Tientsin Convention was int6l-preted -at 
the time as a diploma~ic triumph for Japan, it was even more a 
triumph for Russia, inasmuch as it constituted a virtual invita-
tion for her to intervene in Korea. Pursuant to +;'1-- ... m~_l! tary 
clause of the Convention, Korea turned to Russia for m1.1i tary ad-
15 Curson, Problems of the ;r'al" East, 193. _ ................ .......-
16 Ibid., 194-195. 
-
17 Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders, 172. On Chinese 
control of Korean Customs, cr:-Curzon;-Probtems s! ~ ~ !!!1. 
178-179. 
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visers who, from the very nature ot the situation, were bound to 
e:1:cercise considerable influence, not only, in the Korean Army, 
but in domestic affairs as well. 
In this connection it is important to note the role 
played by P. G. von Mo11endort, a former official of the German 
Consular Service 1n China, appofnted by Li Hung-Chang early in 
1883 to the important posts oftlnspector General of Korean Cus-
toms and adviser on economic affairs. This appointment may be 
said to have marked the introduction Of a new element in Chinals 
Korean policy--the use of commercial agents as vehicles of con-
trol. lS Mollendorf reorganized the Customs Service and was in-
strumental in introducing several significant CD mmeriea1 retorms 
in the eountry.1S Not content .. however, to confine his attention 
to internal matters, Mol1endorf concerned himself also with the 
foreign policies of his newly-acquired homeland, whicb policies 
immediately took an abrupt turn for alliance with -Russi~. His 
plan had as its purpose to forestall the possibility of any repe-
tition of Japanese intervention in Korea, by inviting Russian 
instructors for the Korean Army and conceding to ~'~sia a port on 
the Pacifie. 20 Seizing the opportunity of obtaining for herselt 
IS le1son, Korea !n2. ]h! lli Orders, 165. 
19 Hosea B. Morse, The International Relations of the 
Chineae Empire, Lon~on, 1918, lTf, io-ii. - -
1928, S. 20 Boris A. Romanov, Rossila ~ Manchzhurii, Leningrad, 
~--------~ 
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a port in Korea, Russia in a secret provisional agreement de-
clared her willingness to grant Korea a for.m of protection and to 
provide the desired military advisers, in return for a "lease" ot 
port Lazarev, on the eastern littoral of Korea near Genzan. 2l 
News of the secret Russo-Korean agreement, came to light 
hen the Russian agent, Alexis de Speyer, arrived in Korea to 
confirmation ot the agreement. The disclosure imme,diately 
ecame a source of embarrassment for all concerned. Von Mollen-
dort, whose complicity in the scheme to displace Ch~nese influ-
ence in Korea and substitute Russian was evidenced by his support 
of the Russian envoy, was recalled and summarily dismissed by Li 
Hung-Chang. The King of Korea, having earlier solicited military 
advisers from the United states, disclaimed any knowledge of the 
agreement and, despite repeated Russian threats, disavowed it 
completely.22 The Chinese Viceroy took the lead in frustrating 
the Russian attempt, and in so doing further augmented Chinese 
power and prestige in the peninsula at the expense ot that of 
Russia and Japan. 23 Thus, it became apparent that the Sino-
21 Dennett, "Early American Policy in Korea, 1883- . 
1887," Political Science Quarterlr' XXXVIII, 1923, 94. As early 
as 1880 RUssIan aftectlon for tor Lazarev was in eVidence, and 
i. believed to have further inclined Li Hung-Chang toward the 
policy of Korean treaties. Cf. Curzon, Problems of the Far East, 
209-210. -- --- --- ----
22 Dennett, "Early American PolIcy," 95. 
23 Tsiang, "Sino-Japanese RAlations," 91. 
~~------------~ 
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Japanese Convention of 18S5 had not resolved, even in the minimum 
degree, the Korean question whioh, in time, was to beoome even 
more complex. 24 
Meanwhile Russo-British antagonism in the !oar East was 
beooming inoreasingly eVident, due ~artly to the disolosure ot 
the secret agreement, partly axso as a result of new Russian ad-
vances on the Afghan frontier. 2S Again Britain aoted without 
hesitation. Immediately on reoeiving word of the prospective 
Russian occupation of Port Lazarev, the British Navy was in-
struoted to oocuP1 Port Hamilton, a small island of the Quelpart 
group dominating the entrance to the Korean Strait. Without con-
sulting either the Chinese or the Korean governments, the base 
was seized on April 15, 1885. Though this action on the pa.rt of 
the British was an open and flagrant violation of international 
law, they remained in oocupation until F'ebrua17 of 1887, at which 
time the Chinese government finally succeeded in exacting from 
M. Ladygensky, the Russian representative at reking, ha most ex-
;plioit guarantee" that if the British evacuated Port Hamilton, 
"the Russian government would not occuP7 Corean territory under 
any circumstances whatsoever. h26 It would appear, however, that 
24 Morse, Internat10nal Relat10ns of the Chinese 
Empire, III, 6-19. Arso Romanov, Rossila ~ Manchihurl1, 8-9. 
25 Langer, D1Rlomacx £! Imper1alism, le~. 
26 Letter of Tsungli Yamen to Sir J. Walsham, Pek1ng, 
~,,18B6 quoted in full by Henry Norman, Peoples and 
. New York, 1895 270. -
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the British were induced to evacuate partly because the admiralt7 
had reported unfavorably on the military and defense aspects of 
the port. 27 The Russian action, on the other hand, was under-
tak.en in ore...er to forestall the possib1.1ity of a naval conflict, 
unacceptat19 at that time~ which might very easily develop into 
somethlng like a ftsecond Dardanelles."28 
British interest in Ko.rea at this particular juncture 
in P'ar Eastern international relations can be explained, part17 
as dictated by commercial interests and the political necessities 
of the time, partly also as arising from contingencies of the 
none too certain political future. British policy recognized 
that a Russian port and fleet in Korea would constitute a formid-
able threat to Brit1sh shipping in eastern waters, let alone con-
vert Russia wi thin the short space of a few years into the great-
est naval power in the Pacif1c. In such an event the balance of 
power in the Far East would be ser10usly threatened, if not com-
pletely overturned 1n the favor of her chief rival in Aeia. 
Furthermore, in the words of Lord Cur,on, "England is prohib1 ted 
alike by her imperial objects and her commercial needs frem lend-
ing her sanction to any such issue."29 
27 Norman, Peoples !E& Politics, 369. 
28 Romanov, Rossila Z Manchzhurii, 8. 
29 purzon, Problems .2.! ~ l:!.£!!..!l, 214. 
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In the fall of 1880, in the face of rising agitation on 
the part of the Western nations and Japan for the neutralization 
of Korea, China took further steps to tighten her hold upon 
Korea. Since these nations still persisted in viewing Korea as 
sovereign and independent, the Korean King had manifested a grow-
ing indifference to the firm observance of the Confucian rela-
tionship.3O Accordingly, Li Hung-Chang dropped his former polic7 
of maintaining the status quo by encouraging foreign commercial 
interests, and thereafter attempted, insofar as possible, to ex-
clude all traces of foreign influence. The Tai-Wen-Kun, who' had 
formerly been removed because of his extreme pro-Chinese and 
anti-foreign sentiments, was returned to Korea. 3l Chinese con-
trol ln the peninsula was to be further augmented by the instal-
lation of a Chinese -Resident" at Seoul. This important offlce 
was entrusted to Yuan Shih-Kai, long familiar with Korean affair 
from the time of his appointment as -Director-General Resident 
in Korea of DiplomatiC and Commercial Relations," Yuan was in the 
position of a virtual mayor of the palace, and it was through hi 
that the Chinese F'orelgn Orfice administered its Korean policy. 32 
Other key adMinistrative and advisory offices in the Korean Cus-
30 Nelson, Korea !B£ ~ ~ Orders, 176-177. 
31 On the Tai·Wen-Kun's removal, see !upra, 19. 
32 Curzon, Problems £i !e! l!£!!!!, 207. 
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toms Service and Foreign Office were filled by Li with an eye to 
insuring maximum efficiency and loyalty under the revised plan ot 
operations. 33 
nlough RUssia was in no position to act on her Korean 
interests at the moment, this is not to say that she had forsak-
en her desire for an'ice-free port on the facific. There hal 
been found in the Krasny Archiv a document which records a spec-
ial secret policy discussion held on May 8, 1888, between Adjut-
ant-General Kort, Governor-Genera~ of the Amur, ano Zinoviev, 
Head of the Asiatic Department of the Russian Foreign Offlce.34 
In view of the considerable light which this document sheds on 
the underlying motives and objectives of Ruslia' s F'ar Eastern 
polioy at this time, it might be well to examine it in some de· 
tail here. 
The actual discussion revolved about the following 
three pointsl first, whether the acquisition of Korea was immed-
iately desirable, and if so what consequences might be expected 
from such action. Second, whether danger in Korea might consti-
tute a threat to Russia. Third, what measures should be taken to 
resist Chinese designs in Korea. As regards the first two points 
33 Nelson, Korea ~ !h! ~ Orders, 179-180. 
34 "First Steps of Russian Imperialism in the Far 
East, 1888-1903," (trom 1932, 54-124), Chinese Social and Politi-
cal Science Review, XVIII, Shanghai, 1934, 231-244. ~trans­~atb:rls ,,~~It 
~~------------~ 
the gentlemen were ln substantial agreement that though Korea, 
by reason of her extreme weakness, might easlly become a tool of 
aspirations inimical to Russia, notably China, the lmmediate ac-
quisition of the peninsula by Russia was nelther feasible nor 
partlcularly desirable. Three reasons were alleged for this: 
first, the fact that belng a po'or country, Korea was hardly a 
profitable market for Russian goods; second, it was too tar re-
moved from Russian defense centersJ and, third, Russian occupa-
tion of Korea would destroy once and for all diplomatic relations 
wlth China and, consequently, wlth England as well. 
As to the policy to be pursued by Russia, it was agreed 
that Chinese control would be definl tely detrimental to Russia. 
However, since Japanese policy most closely corresponded to Rus-
sla's long-range ambitions, the prime object of Russian policy 
shoald be to work with Japan in supporting Aorea against Chinese 
pretentions, thereby b·ring1ng a certain "moral pressure" to bear 
upon China-. At the same time it was suggested, however, that "to 
encourage the Korean government in development of its military 
proportions exceeding the need of malntaining order 1n that coun-
try would not be in harmony with our own Interests~35 
In the same year, l8a8, a Commercial Convention was 
concluded \)etw~en Russia and Aorea, acct:'l"dJ.ng to the terms of 
Which the Korean land frontier and a Korean market at the mouth 
35 Ibid. 
-. 
~~. ~------------~ 
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of the Tiuman River were to be opened to Russian trade. 36 Some 
three years later, in 1891, a Russian packet service between. 
Shanghai and Vladivostok, touching the harbors of Fusan and Gen-
zan, was initiated and maintained under a liberal subsidy of the 
Imperial Russian Government. This last seemingly innocuous move 
11 
is described by Curzon as char~cteri8tic of the energy with~eh 
the Russians 'advance .their flag in Eastern waters, and make an 
experime.ntal and even expensive CODl.>nerce subserve 'larEer poll ti-
cal ends. tt37 
However, during these years, 1888-1891, the Korean sit-
u_tion remained unsettled, with events working, g~nerally, in 
Ohins·s favor. The assassination in 1890 of the Korean Queen 
Dowager, at the instigation of the recently returned Tai-Wen-Kun, 
provided but another in,stance of China t s 18 tent strength in the 
peninsula. The Korean King, according t~ a time-honored custom, 
immediately deputed a mission to report the death to the Emperor, 
who in turn dispatched a mission of condolence. 38 This incident 
served as a fitting climax to China's continued efforts to secure 
recognition of the traditional familial relationship between the 
two countries. Russia, as is eyidenced by the aforementioned 
35 Curzon, _P ... r ;;o,;;;b ... l,;;,em;;;;;.;;.s !!.! !!!.! !!.!:!!.!!, 212. 
37 Ibid., 178, 
-
38 The interesting details of this mission are related 
by Curzon, PrOblems .2! !h! !!.!:~, 199-201. 
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discusslon between Korf and Zlnovlev, was pursulng a dellberatel1 
studied policy with respect to Korea, chiefly out ot fear of be~ 
coming embrolled in a war with England, whose interests in the 
Far East coincided, for the most part, with those of China. 
Japan, for her part, was pursuing a policy not toodit-
ferent from that of Russla, !Urtihermore, she was enjoying no par-
ticular success in asserting her position in .Korea without the 
use ot force which, for the time being at least, was out at the 
question because at the governmentts preocoupation with domestic 
considerations. Other Western nations, particularly the United 
states, were still occupied with trying to figure out the subtle-
ti6s of Korea's Conru~ian relationship to China and, as a conse-
quence, played no aotive role in the situation with regard to 
Korea at this time. 39 
39 For an excellent disoussion of Amerioa's relations 
with Korea in this period, see Nelson, Korea and the ~ Orders, 
180-198. 
,,--
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CHAPTER III 
THE "TRANS-SIBERIAN" RAILWAY 
In the 1890's Russian eastward expansion took the for.m 
of a oonoerted "push" toward the Pacific. Aooordingly, her Far 
Eastern polioy assumed a muoh broader, more dynamio, aspect than 
it had previously. This fundamental change was in large measure 
related to the oonstruotion of the Trans-Siberian Railway, an 
undertaking whioh from its inoeption was seen to be pregnant witb 
world signifioance. l Predioated not on the simple extension of 
the base of internal railway oommunications, nor solely on the 
oommertial advantages of intermittent conneotions of isolated 
trade points in Siberia, the railway wss heralded as "one of 
those world events whioh usher in a new epooh in the history ot 
nations."2 The bold and rapid oonstruction of a railway aoross 
1 The term "Trans-Siberian," it should be noted, is 
one which exists only in foreign, wh.ioh is to say, non-Russian 
historical literature. Though, as will be seen later, there was 
no single ·:>rganizational unit oontrolling the line, it wl11, for 
the 0..,'-r8.1..1 purposes of this study, be oonsidered as a single 
unit. 
2 Romonov, Roselya .! ,!_!lcnzhurli,4. 
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the tro.en steppe. ot Sibe~ia was to unite oentral Russia direot 
11 with the Far East by an unbroken ohain, a total distanoe ot 
some 6,000 mil.s. 3 
The impulse neoessary to the undertaking ot so grand-
iose and far-reaching a soheme was one ot the ohier results of 
the so.called "Westernization" ot Russia. In the l880's-- at 
approximately the same tim,e that Japan reversed her two-and-a 
halt oen~ury poli07 of isolation and made her fatefUl turn to 
the West-- Russia, already for some two oenturIe. influenoed by 
the We.t, plunged torward In the gigantio task of Westernization 
at a tar more rapid pace than' at any time sinoe Peter the Great. 
For Russia this Westernization meant two things, primarily. Firs 
and foremost, it meant the emanoipation ot the serf. with ohange 
both for the preponderantly peasant population and, ooncomitantl 
tor the whole sooial and eoonomio struoture. Secondly, It meant 
a large-scale importatlon ot oapital and modern technlque trom 
the West. This eoonomic Westernization manitested Itselt most 
notably in four fields-- tlnanoe and ourrency, torelgn invest-
ment In Russian enterprise, taritts, and railways." All tour 
aspects are to be seen In varying degrees ot importance in the 
3 In Russian measurement the dlstance was slightly 
more than 9,000 vera.ts, the verst belng equlvalent to 0.6629 
miles. 
" B. H. Sumner, ! Short Hlstory ot Hussia, Hew York, 
1949, 346-351. 
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construction of the Trans-Siberian. 
Whether regarded from an economic or poll tical point 
of view, the urgent need tor an improved system of communication. 
in Siberia had been obvious to Russlan authorities for well over 
a quarter of a centu17 before the inception of the Trans-Siberial, 
although, it must be granted, the stupendous conception ot a 
Russian-Pacific railway was not from the beginning grasped in it. 
entirety. The outbreak of the Crimean War "in 1853 served to i.-
press upon authorities the necessity for the construction ot 
strategic railways, and it ia generally believed that the ditti-
oulties ot transport, added to those ot maintaining oommunica-
tiona between the ahores ot the Blaok Sea and the administratlve 
centers of the count17. were largely responsible tor the course 
5 
of eventa whlch ended the campaign. Ever slnce the time of 
.Muravlev there had been talk of connectlng Russia t • Slberlan 
possessiona wlth Europe by a tranacontlnental ral1road. 6 Mar-
avlev himself became interested in the scheme. advanced by sev-
eral Engliah and Amerioan concession, hunters. For the moat part, 
however, theae schemes were based solely on conjectures, wlthout 
any prelimlnary surveys aa to the exact ne~d8 and tradlng pos8i-
bl1itles of the d18tricts affected. As a consequence, they 
5 Alexis Krausse, Ruasla in Aalac A Record and a Stud~ 
Hew York, 1899, 196. -- ---- - --- -
6 Langer, Diplomact 91. Impel'iallem, 171. 
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remained without any immediately praotioable result.7 
During the seventies and eighties some consideration 
waS given to the oonstruotion of a Siberian railway, especially 
in view of the need of opening up for exploitation the vast weal~ 
of Sibena. However, several factors oombined to obviate the 
possibility of any action being-taken at that time, only after 
the acute orisis occasioned by the British occuaption of Port 
Hkmilton in lS85 ~as the strategic argument advanced with any d.-
gree of persistence by Russian military men in tne Far East.S 
Even then, however, the Minister of Finance, Vishnegradski, per-
.isted in his plea of lack of fnnds, so that no substantial pro-
gres.s was made until news came in lS90 of China's projected Man-
churian line. In th4t year Li Hung-Chang sent an English engin-
eer, C. W. Kinder, to plot a line from the Great Wall at Shan-
t 
haikwan northeastward through Manchuria to Mukden, and thence to-
ward the Russian frontier. Despite the secreoy of Kinder's move-
ments, the Russian intelligence disoovered his intentions, and 
bo·th at St. Petersburg and Vladivostok great apprehension was 
felt. g , Such a scheme, if realized, constituted a formidable 
7 These early schemes for a Russian-Pacifio railway 
are reviewed by Henry Norman, Peoples .!.!!!!. roli tics .2! l!'.!!. l!.£ 
!!!,!, 160-161. 
a Langer, Diplomacl ~ Imperia11sm, 171. 
9 ~. For a fuller discussion of the projected Man-
churian line, see Percy H. Kent, Railwal Enterprise !n China, 
London, 1907, 38-41. 
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threat to Russia's territories on the Amur and Ussuri. Finally, 
on March 17, 1891, the knot of all the technical and official CO& 
troversies was cut by the Tsar, and the decision was taken to con-
struct the line. 
One of the decisive factors in the entire project came 
in August, 1892, with the appolntment of Sergel Witte as Minister 
of Flnance. The ablest and most powerful single representative 
of the new financial, commercial, and industrial lnterests which 
were transforming Russia internally and lending a new cast to 
Russian imperialism, Witte was born at Tiflis in 1849, where hi. 
father, of Dutch-German extraction, was an imperlal administrator. 
Educated at the University of Odelsa, Witte devoted some time to 
reactionary journalism in connection with the Slavophils and 
M. Katkov, and lubsequently associated himselt wlth railway con-
struction in southern hussla. Thus, while a staunch apostle ot 
Slavophil political conservatism, he become also a staunch advo-
cate of Western comme~elal and industrial development. 
Witte served for a time as general traffic manager ot 
the south-Western Railway, and also as a member ot an imperial 
commission appointed to survey railway construction and managemes 
throughout the Empire. Appointed head ot the department of rail-
ways in the Ministry of Finance by Tsar Alexander III, he was pr~ 
moted to be Minister of Ways and Communications in 1892, and sev-
eral months later was appointed to succeed Vishnegradski as Min-
ister of Finance. The significance of this appointment cannot be 
~ --------------------~----------------------------------------, " , 
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o.erestimated, inasmuch as it constituted an otficial repudiation 
of the money-saving policies pursued by Vishnegradski, and fur-
ther testified to the determination of the Imperial government to 
allow no expense to stand in the way of drawing Siberia closer to 
itself, aa well aa to remove the railway from the dead issue potnt 
at which Vishnegradski had kept it.10 
DurIng WI~tets tenure of ottice the FInance Ministry 
came to include also.commerce, industry, and labor. In Far East-
ern attairs it became, tor all practical intents and purposes, 
the superIor of the.Forelgn OttIce, and the rival even ot the War 
Otfice.11 As Minister of Finl\nce Witte conceived and put into 
practIce the policy which l~ter came to be called "conquest by 
railways," and which was subsequentlJ to be merged in the Idea ot 
"dollar diplomacy.- Throughout the period trom 1892 to his e~ 
clipse and tall trom grace In 1903 Witte's politIcal biographJ i. 
the story of the buildIng of the Trans-Siberian to the point 
where it became the most important single factor in Russian ex. 
pansion1st policy in the Far East. 
A fI~ believer in the economic as well as the strateglc 
value of the Trans-Siberian, Witte, In one of his early reports 
10 RomanoT, Rossila ~ Manchzhurii, 55. 
11 B. H. Sumner, nTsardom and Imperialism In the Far 
East and MIddle East, 1880-1914,- Raleigh Lecture on HIstory, 
!roceedings of the British AcademI, XXVII, London, 1941. 
~-----------. 
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to the Tsar, described the extension of the line across the whole 
of Siberia as fla state undertaking in the broadest sense of the 
tezm, tt one attended with "the greatest benefits in the field ot 
economic, cultural, and political. interests," for European Russia 
as well as for Siberia.12 He added the fact that the line would 
establish "an unint,rrupted rail' communication of Europe with the 
Pacific and East Asia, thereby opening up a new road and 
zons not only for Russia, but for international commerce as well, 
and placing it in the rank of "those world events which usher in 
a new epoch in the history of nations, and which often bring in 
their wake fundamental changes in the established relationships 
between states. fl13 Among the economic considerations under which 
the plan was formulated must be counted the famine which in 1891 
held European Russia in ita grip with unprecedented force, and 
the fact that the fulfillment of the undertaking was laid, in the 
course of the next few years, upon the broad shoulders of the Ru 
lion peasantry,14 The railway meant relief from the famine in 
the form of Siberian grain, +0 the .Russian peasantry it meant an 
accelerated road of escape trom hunger and landlessness into a 
virtually unpopulated Siberia. 
. 12 Romanov, ROISifa v Manchzhurii, 57, Interestingly, 
the plan even suggested to ~tti.the possibility of entering into 
"more direct relations with the United states," Romanov, 60. 
13 .!!?!a., 57. 
14 ..!2!:!., 4·5. 
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strategically, the Trans-Siberian was of the utmost im-
mediate consequence.1S It was this aspect which Witte emphasized 
, 
when he wrote that "The ra11way will secure for the Russian NaVJ 
all the necessary prerequisites and will provide it with a firm 
base of support in our eastern ports •••• The Navy can be strength-
ened considerably •••• ln·the event of political complications in 
Europe or the Asiatic East ••• it will control all international 
shipping in Pacific waters~"16 The slogan "Dominat1on over all 
international commerce in the Pacif1c," proclaimed by Witte in 
1892, containid in itself a program which fUrther impelled the 
Russian government ultimately to carry the Siberian line acroes 
. 
the whole of Manchnria as .e1l. 17 These eeonomic and strategic 
arguments provide a olear insight into the essentially realistic 
motives entertained by Witte in connection with the railway. 
That there was, however, also something ot the idealist aDd impe~ 
ialist in Witte's make-up is revealed in a letter addressed to 
Tsar Nicholas lIon the eve of the Russo-Japanese War, atter hie 
own personal 1nfluenoe had been eclipsed and his po11cy of ftpeac 
penetrat10n" thrown to the winds. "We shall prooeed southward,· 
Witte then wrote, 
along the road of history .... The more ineJ1t countries 
in Asia will fall prey to the po~ertul invaders and 
15 Langer, DiplgmacI 2! Imperialis~, 171 
16 Romanov, Roseila.! Manchzhurii, 60. 
17 Ibiq.., 6. 
l 
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will be divided up between them •••• 'l'he problem of each 
country concerned is to obtain as large a share as pos-
s1ble of the inheritance of the out11ved Ch1nese Colos-
sus. Russ1a, both geograph1call,. and historically, has 
the undisputed r1ght to the l1on's share of the expec-
ted prey •••• The absorpt1on by RuBs1a of a considerabi. 
port1on of the Chinese Empire 1s only a question ot 
time •••• 18 
To promote construct1on of the line the Siberian ~uil~ 
way Committee was organized, wh1ch exercised both administrative 
and leg1s1at1ve authoritl 1n all matters involve1 in planning and 
construction. At W1tte's instance the young Tsarevitch, Nicholas 
soon to become Tsar Nicholas II, was appointed to head the Oom-
mittee, and reportedly took a great personal 1nterest 1n the mat-
ter, the task affording htm, a8 Witte put it, "something in the 
nature of a preparatory school of statesmanship.R1S As to the 
financing of the project, Witte was in a posit1on to take full 
advantage of the recently concluded'Franco-Russian Alliance to 
so11c1t loans from the French government, which, 1n effect, el1m-
lnated every flnancial r1sk earlier connected with the under-
tak1ng. 20 
As orig1U311y planned, the line was div1ded into sevea 
sectlons, correspondinp roughly to natural div1sions, each wlth 
18 Serge1 Wltte, Memo1rs, translated and ed1ted bJ 
A. Yarmolinsky, ~ew York, 1921, 122. Cf. alBo Romanov, Rosaila 
! Manchzhurii, 80. 
19 Ibid., 63. 
20 Romanov, ROfsila ~ Manchzhuri~, 56. 
l 
47 
1ts own organizational unlt. 21 Construction of the ral1way began 
simultaneously at both ends of the 11ne. General lnterest in 
Russla's Paclflc lands was greatly stimulated by the publiclty 
rtt~~19n+; I3n the much-advertlsed vlslt of the Tsarevltch to 
Vladivostok ln May, 1891, when work was commenced on the eastern 
part of the 11ne. Throughout the nlnetles there was wldespread 
approval of the ldea of Russla's "great, hlstorical mlsslon" 1n 
the East. and Russlan opinion of almost all shades, except the 
extreme left, backed Witte's pollcy of Far Eastern expansion. 22 
In the non-Russian world, however, the order to commen~ 
construction of the Trans-Siberian was regarded as a portentous 
departure ln F'ar EasteI'D policy. The extension of the line was 
to take lt, theoretically at least, to Vladivostok, at the AAst-
ern extremlty of Russian possessions in Asia. However, even be-
fore the outbreak of the Slno-Japanese war, it became perfectly 
clear to many well-informed observers in the Ii'ar East that Russia 
had no intention of allowing so important a venture to terminate 
ln a harbor which, like Vladivostok, was frozen for at least a 
third of each year. Writing in 1895 the publiclst Ben~" Norman 
inquired somewhat incredulously. "Can anybody belleve for a mom-
ent that Russia will build the longest ral1way in the world, 
21 Krausse, Russia 1n Asia, 208 !!_ J cf. also Norman, 
Peoples !.9.9. Politlcs, 162 .. !63.--
22 Sumner, "Tsardom and Imperiallsm," iroceedlngs ~ !h! Britlsh Adademy, XXVII, 38. 
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stretching five thousand miles from the furthest edge of her 
European possessions, and will spend upwards of forty millions 
sterling upon it, for it to end in a harbour that is frozen solid 
during five months of the year?"23 The answer, quite obviously, 
was no. Thus, it became perfectly logical to assume that Russia 
still entertained designs on an 'io.e-free port in Korea, both Gen ... 
zan and ~ort Lazarev on Broughton Bay being considered ideal ~ 
mini for the railway. 
-
Both Japan and China viewed with a. sense of apprehenskm 
the progress of the Russian plan. It was in Japan and Korea, 
however, that the initial repercussions of the railway venture 
were felt. In Tokyo it was feared that onee Russia completed her 
system of communications it would thenceforth be impossible to 
resist her advances in the Far East with anything approaching 
even chances of suocess. At the same time, the independenoe 01' 
Korea or the maintenance theren61" a fully independent "buffer" 
were viewed as necessary to the continued security of the Empire~ 
Consequently, in 1893 Japan, under pressure of the radical and 
militaristic elements at home, tried to reas.ert her former ag-
gressive policy with regard to Korea. In the same year an acute 
crisis developed between Japan and Korea, growing out of an em-
bargo placed by"the latter government on the export of beans. 
23 Peoples ~ Politics, 165. 
24 Langer, Diplomacy ~ Imperialism, 172. 
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The affair was settled, but only after Count Ito had appealed to 
L1 Hung-Chang to request Korea to satisfy the Japanese claim.25 
For the time being at least Japan seemed Ciuite willing to recogl'- ,; 
nize China's claims in Korea as an expedient intorestalling 
hussia's designs, apparently on the theory that if matters came 
to a war between Japan and China', the former could then occupy 
Korea without fear of prof:;(~'3t trom the Western powers.26 :aence, 
there can be little doubt that the fear of Hussia's establishing 
herself in Korea had much to do with hastening the outbreak ot 
.. 
war over the Korean question. 
It will be recalled that, according to the terms ot 
the Tientsin Convention of 1885, both parties, Japan and China, 
agreed not to send troops into Korea except in case of a "grave 
disturbance," and then only arter giving previous notice in writ-
ing of their intention to do 80.2'7 Such a d.1sturbance presented 
itself in 1893 with the emergence in Korea of a party calling it-
self the "Tong-Hak," or Oriental Learning Society. Founded in 
1859 as a purely religious sect, by the 1890 t s the party had 
assumed a political character which was compounded largely ot 
anti-foreign, anti-Obri.tian, and anti-Japanese elements.2a Be. 
25 Nelson, Korea ~ lh! ~ Orders, 205. 
28 Ibid., 206~20e. 
-
27 Supra, 27 • 
28 For a brie f discusslon of the TOllg-Hak in its earl,. 
religious phase, see Yo~hill Kang, N!onghak, Encyclopedia ~
pn;.s., Chicago, 1948, XXII, 279. 
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straint gave way to violence as the Tong-Hak sought to obtain 
redress for the execution of its founder, Choi Jaiwoo, as a her-
etic, and also to secure offioial reoognition of its existenoe. 
In 1893 ita leaders petit10ned the king to prohibit all foreign 
religions and exclude foreign Merohants--ln other words, to ab-
rogate the Foreign Treatles--threatening rebellion if the govern-
ment failed to comply with its demands. Rebellion was not long 
in coming; originat1ng 1n the southern provinces, it had attained 
before long such menacing proportions that the Korean King found 
it necessary to apply to China for military assistance in sup· 
pressing the peril. 
There is some evidenoe to support the theory, held by 
some authors, that ~apan encouraged, albeit indirectly, the Tong-
Haksl likewise, evidence is to be found in favor of the sugges-
tion of other authors that the Tai-Wen-Kun may have been using 
the movement as an in$trument to secure his return to power.29 
In any event, the uprising clearly worked to Japan's advantage, 
inasmuch as it afforded her a unique opportunity for direct in-
tervention in the peninsula, where Dsuperior force could aohieve 
what had baffled diplomacy.u30 Fully awareof the consequences of 
direct aotion, China at first rendered all assi.tance possible 
29 "Russian Doouments Relating to the Slno-JapaDese 
War, 1894-1895,· Chinese Social and Political Scienoe Review, 
XVII, (1933-1934), i§6.!1!, pals1m: 
30 Nelson, Korea ~ !h!. ,2!g, Orders, 206. 
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short of aotually sending troops to the trouble area. When the 
Korean government failed to quell the outbreak, however, Li Hung-
Chang, on June 6, 1894, dispatched 1,500 troops from Tientsin, 
with 725 more to follow. Pursuant to the terms of the Tientsin 
Convention, Li "formally assured the ~ap8nes. government that 
these troops shall be withdrawn' immediately upon the cessation ot 
hostilities.-51 Similar assurances were made to the Russian min-
ister at Peking. 52 G,ulte significantlr, the Chinese note to the 
Tokyo government made use of the term "our tributary statea wlth 
reference to Korea. 55 
" In reply to the Chinese note of June 6, the Japanese 
government countered with the statement that "the Imperial Gove 
ment has never recognized Korea as a tributary stete of China," 
and added that Japan l1kewise would send troops into Korea to p 
tect her interests there. 54 Acoordingly, she dispatched a force 
which in a short time nUlllb~red some 4,500 men. In the series ot 
diplomatic notes which followed each side attempted to justify 
the course of action upon which it had embarked. China 1nsiated, 
in efrect. that she was merely following the traditional practice 
31 Letter of Charles Denby, Jr., Amerioan Charg,t!, at 
Peking, to Secretary of State Ore.ham. June 9, 1894, cited br 
Morse, International Relations ~ ~ Cblne~! Em~ire, III, 21. 
52 Ibid. 
-
33 Rsu, China ~ !!! Political Ent1ty, 151-152. 
54 Ibid. 
-
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of proteoting her "tributary states," wh1le Japan, repudiat1ng 
Korea's tributary status, cited the Japanese-Korean Agreement ot 
1882, conferring upon Japan the right to maintain a legatIon guam 
in Korea.~5 Both countries kept pour1ng troops into Korea. In 
the meantime, however, the insurgents, learning of the arrival ot 
the Chinese troops, had dispersed, thereby obviatIng the necesa1_ 
for any outside interference. 
A new problem presented itself in the evacuation of top 
eign troops from Korean soil. By the end of June, 1894, there 
were slightly more than 3,000 Chinese and, 1n all, some 18,000 
Japanese troops in the Peninsula. 38 On June 24, at the inv1tation 
of the Korean King, the Western powers.-the UnIted States, RussIa; 
France, and England--submitted a Joint note to China and Japan 
suggesting a s1multaneous withdrawal ot troops. Ch1na expressed 
its willingness to withdra~, but uapan, embarking upon a new tao~ 
refUsed to do eo until certain internal reforms had been arranged 
for. 37 The Peking government, again citing its traditional prac-
tice, flatlyretused to 1nterfere in strictly Korean concerns, 
and suggested rather pointedly that 1f Japan regarded Korea as an 
independent nat1on, she had no r1ght to inte.rofere e1ther. 38 
35 Payson J. Treat, D1~lomatic Relations Between the 
United States and JaRan, 185~leg , Stanroi'dl.. IgSt!, ttl 44S.---..t'h. 
~lspatcfies are-cIt3d 6y Nor.man;-p6oples ~ pol1t1cs, ~62. 
36 Morse, Internation~l ~elat1on8, III, 22. 
37 Hau, China ~ ~ Political Ent1tl, 154. 
38 Morse, Iat,lQltlQQal B,laM*9DI, 22. 
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At this point Japan decided to go on alon.. Dispensing with dip. 
1 ~atio means, the ~apanese, on the morning of July 23, took pos-
session or the royal palace and made a prisoner of the king, 
appointing the octogenarian Tai-Wen-Kun as regent over the king.3 
On August 1, both China and Japan issued formal declarations ot 
war, and on August 16, the now Japanese-dominated Korean govern .. 
ment announced the abrogation of all treaties and agreements bin 
ing Korea to China. 
Before actually putting to the test the talents newly 
acquired as a result of her assimilation of Western influenoe, 
Japan had first taken the precaution of sounding out the attitude 
of the two foreign powers most directly coneerned--notablf, Great 
Britain and Russia. 1be British, long-standing allies of China 
and the beneficiaries of a considerable trading interest in the 
F'ar East, were particularly anxious to preserve the status guo,40 
Consequently, Britain declared categorloally that she would de-
precate any outbreak of hostilities and, specifically, that she 
refused to countenance the anneX9.tion of any Korean terri tory b7 
Japan. This was acconlpanled by a W J"J'ling to the effect that anl" 
untoward action on the part.of ~apan would lead almost Inevitabl 
39 Ibid., 23-24. 
-
40 In 1894 Britain controlled 69 per cent of Chinese 
trade, and tully 83 per cent of all imports and exports were 
carried in British ships. Cr. Curzon, Problems of the Far East, 
281, n •. l. ----
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to Russian ifttervention.41 Before the war had run its course, 
however, Brit1sh Far Eastern policy, largely under the pressure 
of pub11c'op1nion at home, wae destined to undergo a complete 
transformation, the consequences of which will be set forth 1n 
the following chapter. 
Russia, for her part, stood behind China throughout th 
entire dispute, though for different reasons. Fully cognizant 
that Japanese occupation of Korea would render illusory all her 
hopes of obtaining an ice-tree port in the pen1nsula, Russia pro 
ceeded on the theory that her interests would be better served 
should Korea remain under the tutelage of a weak China rather 
than of an aggressive Japan.42 Shortly atter the outbreak ot 
hosti11~ies, on August 21, lSg4, a special Comm1ttee, compr1sing 
the heads of the various military, naval,.and administrative de-
partments, was convoked to consider the problems arising from the 
war and to arrive at a statement of the policy to be pursued by 
~ 
Russia. 43 The conclUsions adopted by the Oommittee after its 
41 A. M. Pooley, ed., The Secret Memoirs of Count 
Tadasu Hayashi, Hew York, 1915, 4!=i6. HayasS! was the Japanese 
Ambassador to the Court of St. James in the important years pre-
eeeding the outbreak ot the RuBso-Japanese War. 
42 Witte, Memoirs, S3. 
43 Present at this meeting were. Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, M. N. Giers, War Min1ster VannovakYJ Acting Minister".ot 
lavy, N. ChikhacheftJ Finance Min1ster Witte, Vice-Minister ot 
Foreign Affairs, N. Shishk1nJ Director of the Asiatic Department 
in the Foreign Ottice, Count Kapnist. 
~--------------
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disoussion were substantial17 as tollowsl 
(1) An7 aotive interterence ot Russia in Sino-Japanese 
War being admitted as unsuitable to our interests, the 
Committee agrees that in Korean question we must oontin-
ue to follow a pollo7 compatible wlth the other Inter-
ested powers and must use our utmost efforts in order 
to Inollne the belllgerents to the earliest cessation ot 
war operations and to a settlementor.Korean question 
through diplomatio ohannela • 
. 
(2) The Committee deoide. to abstain rrom maklng a 
special declaration ot neutrallt7, to contlnue to In-
spire the Japanese and Chinese governments respect of 
our interests and especial17 to oalltheir attention 
to the necessit7 of avoidlng everything whlch might 
give pretext for misunderstandlngs on our Korean tron-
tier. 
(3) To consider desirable as an 1.sue ot the Sino-
Japanese War the preservation ot the statu. guo In 
Korea •••• 44 
However, in antlclpatlon of an7 unforseen developments whloh 
mlght affect Russla's position, the Commlttee oharged War Minia-
ter Vannovsk7 to "come to an agreement wlth the Minister ot Pin-
ance as to openlng the needed oredlts when necessary," to rein-
force the troops alread7 statloned on the Korean trontler.4S 
The posslblllt7 ot ~ls.lan Interventlon great17 dis-
turbed Japan. Nevertheless, desplte the un~avorable diplomatio 
auspices, Japants splrited forelgn po1lo7 was opportune In vie .. 
-of the situatlon at home and abroad, partloularl7 In China, whe 
44 "First Steps of Russian Imperiallsm In the Far 
East," Chlnese Soolal ~ Polltloal Solenoe Revlew, XVIII, 251. 
45 Ibid. 
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• oloser raPRrochement with Russia was at that time being effeot~ 
ed.4S It fUrther bears wltness to the fact that Japanese diplo-
macy had kept pace wlth her rapld material development. However, 
the contention of some authors that ~apan, ln taking the lnitia-
tlve, was merely forestalling a slmilar course of action on the 
part of Chlna, seems untenable." In her effort to anticipate 
Russia, whose position ln the F'ar East would be supreme: .. i th "the 
. 
completion of the Trans-Slberian, Japan merely forced a conven-
ient issue wlth Chlna, and beoause she was prepared, whereas 
China had only talked preparation, she won. 
46 ~ Seoret Memolrs ot Count Tadaau Hazashi, 42. 
47 This theais is advanced, though not substantlated, 
by A. M. Pooley 1n h1s preface to Hayashi's Secret Memoirs, 42. 
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GHAPTER IV 
THE TRIPLE llTERVENTIOJ 
The military phase of the Sino-Japanese oampaign need 
not ooncern us here.1 It is quite sufficient, for the purpose 
of this study, to observe that during the course of the war the 
Japanese destroyed or oaptured the greater part of the Chine •• 
navy, drove the Chinese forces out ot Korea, occupied southern 
Manchuria as far west as the Liao Riyer, and invaded Shantung. 
The campaign revealed, much to the 'surprise of all concerned, 
the complete tmpotence of China to put any effect1ve mi11tary 
s1stance even in the immediate proximity of tts own cap1tal, 
on the other hand, the indubitable milttary preparedness ot 
Jap~n. Outwardly; the war tied an lnternatlonal "Gordian knot· 
whlch, according to the Russian historian Romanov, ·was cut, 
though not untied, ten years later by the treaty of Portsmouth." 
Fi~lly, it revealed unm1stakably .the fact that Japan already en 
1 A generally excellent treatment of the military 
phase is to be found in "Vladimir," ~ China-iapan !!£, London, 
1898. 
2 Roasiza ~ Manchshurii, 10. 
~----------. 
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tertained ver" proud and tar-reaohlng ambitions, the essenoe ot 
whlch reduced to the tollowing. (1) the establlshment ot a pro-
tertorate over Korea, (2) the establishment of a militarr base 
close to the shores of the MIddle Klngdom, and, (~) the ooou~n 
of Manchuria, including the Llaotung ieninau).a. 
Japan's vlotorr over the "ramshaokl. Emplre" had oaten-
slbly been complete, and Chlna was compelled to sue tor peace, 
formal negotiations for whieh were lnitiated.at Sh1monosekl in 
Maroh, 1895.3 Boweve~, Japants success brought her up at once 
against the Western Powers, allot whom, having failed to fore-
see the outcome of the war, were deeply concerned with the sudden 
upset ot ~he atatus g,u~ in the liar East. It was perfeotly clear 
that they oould not be expeoted to ma1ntain an indlfterent att1-
tude to the terms imposed by Japan, whlch tound herself in the 
rather paradoxloal posltlon of not belng able to imitate the 
Western natlons wlthoutchallenglng them. 
At this junoture ln Far Eastern relatlons, Russia was 
having conslderable diffioulty in fixing upon a defInite oourse 
ot aotion. The questlon now was whether it was advisable for her 
to- oontinue to aot conjointly wi th the other interested powers, 
--,---",~" q 
3 Several earlier attempts on the part of Chlna to 
effeot a settlement.-one in November, the second in Deoember--
were rejected by Japan on the grounds that the Chinese ambassa-
dors did not possess full diplomatic powers. Cf. Morse, Inter-
national Relations, III, 37-43, also Treat, Diplomatic Relaiions, 
!!, 801-512. II 
pi 
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or to take independent action. Ber position was rendered partic-
ularly uncertain by the faot that the exact nature ot the Japan-
ese demands could not be aseertalned, despite Japan's aSluranee. 
that she had no intention of encroaching upon the lndependence ot 
Korea." For this reason, any discussion of the pos8ibility ot 
guarantees for Russia against the further strengthening of Japan~ 
position was bound to assume a highly conjectural, not to mention 
eontroyersial, charaeter. 
The entire question of Russia's policy was submitted to 
a meeting of the Special Oommittee held on February 1, 1895, and 
. 
presided over by the Grand Duke Alexis.' Throughout the course 
of the discussion, a marked divergence of opinion obtained, par-
ticularly among the representatives of the Foreign Office and the 
military •.. The Foreign Minister suggested that Russia might ocouR 
the island of Kargodo (Koje-do), on the southeastern littoral ot 
Korea at the entranee to Broughton Strait. ThlS sugg&8tion met 
with a sharp objection on the part of the Chief ot the General 
Staff on the ground that the island was too remote to serve any 
effective miliiial'7 purpose. The Navy Department favered occupa-
tion of some "part of Manchuria,· to counterbalance Japan's occu-
4 Romanov f Ros8ila.I Man'ehzhuri!, 67. 
5 The membership of the Committee, with the exception 
of AleXis, was substantially the same as that of the m~eting ot 
Augu~t 21, 1894. Cf. supra, 54, n. 43, The minutes of the meet ... 
ing are quoted in full ~n £he Chinese Soclal ~ Political Seie~ 
Re.le~, XVIII, 251-260. 
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pation ot Port Arthur and Weiha1we1, but th1s was rejected as 
111-advised until such time as the Trans-Siber1an should be com-
pleted. W1tte maintained that, tor the t1me being at least, it 
would be advisable to do nothing beyond augmenting Rus~la'. naval 
forces in Far Eastern watere eo as to be able "at any time to 
meet all kinds of eventualities.ue This opinion was concurred in 
by Minister of War Vannovsk7 and Count Kapnist, Director of the 
Asiatic Department, and was one ot the conclusions adopted by the 
Commi ttee in 1 ts report to Tsar Nicholas' 11.7 The chlet polnt ot 
Ru.ssian pollc7, 1 t was generally agreed, must be to lnsll!rt on the 
preservatlon of Korean independence. For the rest, lt was deter-
mined to reach an agreement wlth England and France for "collect-
ive pressure" upon Japan, contingent upon the gravity of her 
demands.B To Witte thls last point was of prlme importance, be-
cau.e only in this wa7 could Russia secure the time necessary to 
complete the Trana-Slberlan--"when we shall be able to step for-
ward in full possession of our materlal means. uS 
255. 
6 Chinese Social !!S Political Science Review, XVIII, 
7 It should be noted that Alexander III died on Novem-
ber 1, 1894, and was succeeded by hls eldest son, the Tsarevitch 
Nlchola.. Though Nicholas assumed the responsibilities ot oftice 
immediately on nis tather's death .. the actual coronation ceremon-
ies were deferred until the spring of 1896. 
S Ibid., 259-260. 
-
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The dilemna with which the Russians found themselves 
confronted at this time was characterized in an extremely pene-
trating dispa tah of the Amerioan Minister at St. Petttrsburg, 
Mr. Breckinridge, to Secretary of State Gresham, dated FebNar7 
lS8 
••• T conclude that what Russia most needs and wants at 
this time is outlets upon the Pacific Ooean. She would 
be glad to have with this a considerable population to 
help make her railroad pay expenses. Mongolia is a des-
ert fit only to sustain cross tie. or to act as a fron-
tier. Manchuria is thinly populated and. too far North 
to alone fully answer her purpoles. Corea and the coun-
try,about Pekin, one or both, coupled with the other, 
more nearly meet her requirements. 
Thia war haa come too early for Rulsia. Her Si-
berian road is not completed, and the great increase 
of her navy ia not finished. Both continue to be ra-
pidly pushed, but some years are required for their 
completion •••• ln a few years she could pick a quarrel 
with China and take what she wanted •••• 
I take 1 t, then, that Russia is in a state of ex-
treme embarrassment. She may not offioially reveal her 
fUll desires unless favored by circumstances in'the 
course of the negotiations for peaoe. But if she can'" 
not now get what I am sure she wants, she will at least 
leave nothing undone to prevent Japan from gaining a 
foothold upon the con'tinent, and t(\ prevent anything 
like a protectorate over Corea •••• Having formed fairly 
confident opinions of the wishes of Russia, I will add 
that her diplomaoy may, in view of the complications ot 
the situation, abound in surprises.10 
This analysis of the situation proved quite correct and, with the 
development of the peace negotiations at Shimonoseki,' took on an 
added note of prophecy. 
10 Breckinr1dge to Gresham, cited by Treat, DiRlomatl0 
BllltlQP" II, 532-5&3. 
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As regards the proposed entente between England, li'rance, 
and Rulsia, there was no apparent reason, in the days before 
Sht.onoseki, why it should not come oft as originally planned. 
In the early oonversations held between the three powers in Feb-
ruary and March of 1895, it was found that a community of inter-
est existed, and it was presumed t?at concerted action would fol-
10w.11 From the very outbreak of the war, England had declared 
herself as unalterably opposed to any infringement of Korean in-
dependence and the annexat10n of Korean terri t,l')" by Japan.12 
Howeve~, she was somewhat hesitant about lending her sanction to 
any interventlonary measurea until ,the commerc1al clauses ot the 
Japanese terms should be known. Although all sources are strang. 
1,. s1lent on this matter, there can be l1ttl'$'doubt that England'. 
SUbsequent pollcy of non-intervention was due in large measure 
to the fact that Br1tish interests were benettted by the oommer-
clal and 1ndustrlal concessions exacted by Japan hom Chlna.13 
Also of 1mportance, though cons1derably more dlff1cul t of evalu-
ation, 1s the tact that public opinion 1n England, part1cularly 
as reflected 1n the press, seems to have been sent1mentally in-
fluenced b7 the ev1dence ot Japanese "progressU afforded by the 
11 Langer, Dil10mac~ of Im~erlal1sm, 176, citing Baroa 
A. Me7endortt. corres~on .nee ~li!oma lque a. M. de Stall. Paris, 
1929, II, 259-2B4. S art was €be RUssIan AmSaasa~r In tondon at 
that time. 
12 Supra, 53. 
13 Langer, .. 'alAIIIAJ' At tRIpod ,1 i 11'. 186. 
, 
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outcome ot the war. 14 
In the meantime, however, the peaoe negotiations at 
shimonaseki were proceeding rather tenuously, and no amount ot 
inquiry -or deliberation on the part of the interested powers 
could throw much light on the Japanese conditions.1S The progrea. 
of the deliberations was retardea somewhat as a result of an 
attempt by a Japanese fanatic to assaSSinate the Chinese Aubasca. 
dor, Li Hung-Chang. Though the wOUJI.d sustained by Li did not 
prove tatal, the attempt on his life altered appreciably the 
course of the subsequent negotiatiors{ In recognition of the fl. 
grant and unprovoked nature of theasaault, the Japanese govern ... 
ment felt constrained to otfer'China an unconditional armistice, 
and the severity of its terms was mitigated considerably. Thus" 
according to Morse, the incident "benetited China more than a 
victory in the field."lG Nevertheless, in view ot the desperate 
straits to which China was reduced by the war, the Japanese,terms 
were still more severe than she could hope to meet. 
With tbe exception ot England, which positively re-
~sed to intervene, the position of the powers remained indefinite 
14 Da1lin, Rise !! Ruasi~ in Asia, 38. 
~5 Only on April 1 waa the first draft of the condi-
tions presented to the Ohinese delegation. Ct. Paul H. Clyde, 
I!temational Rivalries in Manchuria, 1689-1922, Columbus, Ohio, 
I ~I, 21. --
16 international Relationa, III, 45. 
place on Marc 24. The asaault took 
1 
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At the same time, however, it was becoming increasingly evident 
tbat to procrastinate further was also to run the risk ot losing 
altogether the opportunity to intervene. It was to this extreme-
ll,ceri tical state of affairs that Prince Alexis Lobanoy-Rostovskl 
addre.sed himself immediately upon hi' appointment to succeed 
Giers as Minister of Foreign Aff~irs.l7 Prior to this appoint-
me~t LObanov had occupied for some sixteen years the poet of Am-
bassador in Vianna, the same capacity in which he had also served 
in London and Constantinople. According to Witte, LobanoY, at 
the time of his apPOintment, was utterly ignorant of the Far 
East,18 This statement must be Interpreted; however, in the 
light of the fact that Lobanov entertained views radica1ll diffe~ 
ent trom those of the Finance Minister. His observations conce~ 
ing the situation that had developed in the Far East Lobanov set 
forth at length in two memoranda to the Tsar, dated April 16, 
1895.19 
17 Giers had died on January 26, 1895, Lobanovts ap. 
pointment was confirmed by Micholas on March 6 of that lear. 
1S Memoirs, 82. According to his own statement, Witte 
was the only one Nilf conversant wi th the l"ar East. Langer,,!2!-
210macI of ImRerialism, 180 puts this down as "just one of the 
many exaggeratIons in Wittefs vainglorious account of his own ca- , 
rear." Strange1f enough, Baron Romen Rosen in his FortI Years i! 
Di~lomacI' New York, II, 134-137, confirms Witte'. estImat. of 
to anov. 
19 Both of these dispatches are quoted in -First Steps 
ot Russian Imperialism in the Far East," Chinese Soc1a1 and Poli-
11cal Science Raviaw,XVIII, 260-263. -------
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In the first of these memoranda Lobanov characterized 
as extremely undesirable "from the pOint of view of our interests-
any occupation by Japan "of the peninsula where Port Arthur is 
situated. n There was no doubt in h1s mind that Russia should p~ 
test such a move. The question presented itself, however, as to 
whether she should carry th1s protest so far as to "have recourse 
to measures of foreeft--and 1n such an event could she count on 
the support of the other powers' The British Ambassador, he con-
tinued, had informed him that though the British government sh~~ 
Russia's concern over Port Arthur, it would "!g!ll probabl1itl •• 
use neither measures of force nor demonstrations, because lately 
publlc opinion in England was more than inclining to the slde ot 
the Japanese. H20 FUrthermore, in view ot the ill-defined polic-
ies of France and Germany, there was no telling how far they 
• would be willing to support a ~us8ian protest. Onder such cir-
cumstances, Russia could do little more than "to indicate to the 
Japanese government in the most friendly manner that the taking 
possession of Port Arthur would become an everlasting impediment 
to the restoration of friendly relations with Ch1na, and serve as 
a pretext for the disburbance of peace 1n the Far East. ft21 But 
preliminarr to any such action, advised Lobanov, Russia should 
250. 
20 Chinese Soclal ~ Po11tical $oience Review, XVIII, 
21 ~., 261. 
r 
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t1rst make certain that the otner powers would join her in suoh 
an expression. 
In his second report at April 6, Lobanov stressed the 
broader aspeets of the problem: notably, the choice between 
China and Japan as a "future ally" of Russia. "It our present 
posi tion in the Far East satisfl'es us and we intend only to 
strengthen it," Lobanov reasoned, Russia could find no better a117 
than a hopelessly defeated China. On the other hand, if Russla 
intended actively to seek sa,tlstaetion at her "essential require-
ments" in the East--the acquisi tion at an ice .. tree port on the 
Pacifio, and the annexation of a part of Manchuria necessary tor 
a more convenient routing of the Trans ... Siberian .... then she would 
almest inevitably have to turn to Japan. In the tirst place, 
China, after the loss of Korea, possessed no such ,ort whieh 
oou'.d be given to Russia and, sdcondly, she could not reasonably 
be expected to cede a part ot Manchuria. Thus, h£ concluded, 
China could hardly be regarded "as an active and useful ally." 
Japan, however, was quite another story. She would prove .m1nen~ 
1,. "usetul" to Russia as a check upon England .... "our principal and 
most dangerous edversary in Asia." An agreement with Japan ap-
peared to Lobanov quite conceivable, and lh 11e he did not defin-
itely express himself in favor of this alternative, he did pro-
pose "carefully to abstain from any hostility, apart trom the otb 
er powers, ln order not to affect future good relations with the 
67 
Japanese government. n22 
F~m the foregolng it ls quite evldent that Lobanov 
was pushing the Tsar, unconsclously perhaps, into the arms at 
Japan. Blcholas, ln turn, waa apparently dlsposed to accept Lob-
anov's analysls ot the sltuation and, according to Homanov, read-
ily agreed not to demand the retrocession of Port Arthur.2Z At 
the S8me tlme, however, Nlcholas himself raised the question as 
to whether, by way of compensating hereelf, Ruseia should not 
occupy Port Lazarev or some other port on the east coast of Kore. 
Thereby, in the terminology of the January 20 conference of min-
isters, he laid the basis for an "independent course of action." 
In a marglnal note to Lobanov' a second memorandum the Tsar ex-
pressed hlmself categorlcally ln favor of such action: "Rusaia 
absolutelI needs !. Rort f~e (.trom leeJ ~ open !!! lear £Oi.tnd. 
1h!!. ;eort .!e.!! .2! 1008 te4 ~ .!!l! me inland (tOuth-.!!.!!.2.!' Korea) 
!!£ oertalnll, connected ~ ~ possessions £z !. strip ot 
~."24 These two memoranda of Lobanov, together with his own 
thoughts on the subject, the Tsar arranged to submit to another 
meetlng of the Special Committee. 
However, when the Committee convened five days later--
on April 11--lt did so under sharply modified circumstances. In 
22 ~., 263. 
23 Ho.sila.! Manchzhurii, 70. 
24 ~., 71. The italics are Romanov's. 
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the meantime, as Lobanov informed the assembled ministers, word 
had been reolved from the Russlan representatlve at Berlln to 
the effect that Germany had deolared her readlness "to partlcl-
pate in every step whlch we mlght deem necessary to take in Tokyo 
with the vlew of compelllng Japan to forego not only the oocupa-
tion of South Manohuria, including Port Arthur, but also the 00-
oupation of the Pescadores Islands."25 France, 11kewlse, had 
agreed "to coordinate her pollcy with ours."26 Thls sudden chang4 
In the attitude ot the German government was explained as having 
been dictated by her oommeroial interests In the Far East, inter-
ests whlch might sufter trom the increase of Japanese influence 
in Chlna. There can be little doubt, however, that this action 
was also designed to forestall the possibility of a Russo-Japan-
ese coalition, such as that advocated by Lobanov. 
Although the questi~n of intervention would seem to 
have been decided once and for all by the agreement of Germany an~ 
France to partioipate, it still remained very muoh of an open ia-
sue, and revealed once again the diffioulty ot reaching a deci-
sion. Certain ot the Russian ministers, Grand Duke Alexis among 
them, tell In with Lobanovta proposal tor an alllance wlth Japan, 
though Lobanov himself had to concede his distrust for the Tokyo 
25 Mlnutes of April 11 melting in "First Steps ot 
Russian Imperialism in the Far East, Chinese Social and PQL1~al 
Sclence ,Review, XVIII, 265. -
26 IbId., 266. 
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government. Th& burden of oppoaing Lobanov'a proposal was assume 
by Witte, who outspokenly ins1sted that the de01s10n aa to a 
course of action conoerned most ot all the Finanoe Mlnistry be-
cause, as he put it, ''In case of a wrong solution we risked to 
lose everything wh1ch had been done fio improve Russla's finan-
ce8~ "27 Inasmuch as Witte's arg~ent was the one whloh finally 
preval1ed over all the contusion, it might be well at this point 
to conslderlt in some detall. 
Taklng as his starting-polnt the tact that the Sino-
Japanese War was a direct consequence of the Constructlon of the 
Tran8-~iberlan, Witte went on to observe that the Japanese oocu-
pation of Liso-tung was likewlse direoted against the railway_ 
All the European powers as well as Japan were aware that a parti-
tion of China was only a question of tlme and were becomlng In-
oreasingly apprehensive that the rallway would seoure for Rusala 
a lion's share of the expected prey. If allowed to remain in 
occupation of -anchuria. Witte argued, Japan would proceed to 
annex the whole of Korea, would fortIfy herself in those posltions 
and attract to her s1de the belligerent Mongols and Manchus, in-
deed it was not inconceivable; under such Circumstances, that the 
Mikado would at some future date replace the Emperor of China, 
Sooner or later, acoording to Witte, a clash with Japan was In-
--------
27 Minutes In "Firat Steps of Russian Imperialism in 
the Far East, It Chinese Soclal .!.!l9. Poli tlcal Science Review, XVIII, 
265-272. 
p 
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evitable. Consequently, tram the Russian polnt of view, the que 
tion was merely whether it was better to conoede South ~anchur1a 
to Japan and seek compen.at .. t1 after the '1'rans-Slberian was com-
pleted, or to take immediate iSBue with Japan. '1'0 Witte the lat-
ter course appeared more logLcal, inasmuch as France and Germany 
were willing to support a protest. It was unlikely that such ac-
tlon would lead to war. It, however, contrary to expectations, 
diplomatic measures did not suffice, then the Russian .wavy should 
be ordered to open hostilities against the Japanese fleet and to 
, 
bombard Japanese ports. The Russian forces already stationed ln 
" 
the Far East were adjudged sufficient to handle the situation an 
besides, ln any resistance to Japanese pretenSions, Russia could 
count on the support of the Chinese and Koreans. By vlrtue of 
such an act, concluded Witte, Russla would appear as the uSavior 
ot Chlna,P whlch, out ot gratitude, would readily agree to an ex-
tension of the Russian frontier. 
Later, during the same seSSion, Witte expressed hls 
willingness to give Japan anlth1ng-.Fo~osa, the Pesoadores, even 
Port Arthur and, in an extreme case, the southern part of Korea.-
~ not _M.a.n.ch .. u.ri .. a. The plan to route the maln line of the Trans-
Siberian acros. Manchuria had become so flxed in Wit\ets mind, 
that he w~s willing to risk even an tmmediate war to prevent 
Japan from establishing herself there just when Russ1a's capacitT 
• 
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for F'ar Eastern expans10n was about to mature.SS hssla, sa14 
Wltte, should acoept thls challenge rather than postpone It. 
Otherwise, she "would be obliged ·in the future to make far great-
er sacrifloes,"et The AnDY and lavy Mlnlsters concurred in thi8 
view, and test1fied to the battle read1ness·and relat1ve surtt-
c1e~C7 ot the Russian forces. Consequently, the question waa re-
solved much as Witte bad wished. However, the official report ot 
, 
the proceedings, along with the concluslons adopted by the Com-
mittee, was not submitted to the Tsar until April 15.30 
On April 14, Lobanov conferl'8d w1th the French Ambassa.-
dor, Count Montebello, who had just returned from Farls. During 
the courae of their conversation Montebello admitted two alter-
natlve courses of actlons first, 1ntervention to force Japan to 
retrocede Port Arthur and the Pesoadores, second, to allow the 
Sino-Japaneae peace settlement to stand.al If the latter course 
was the one adopted, aa Lobanov w1shed, then the question of com-
penaat10n would have to be oonsidered. Accordlng to Montebello, 
France would be quite satisfled w1th the Chinese Island of H.lna~ 
28 Romanov, Rosslza ~ Manchzhurl!, 74. 
29 Ibld. 
-
30 Ibld. 
31 Text of Lobanov's report to the Tsar, dated Aprll ~ 
quoted 1n Chlnese Soclal ~ Political Sclence Rev1ew, XVII, 263-
264, 
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and he left it to Russla to deter.mIne upon a suitable compensa-
tion for herself. Tbe Ambassador pressed for a quick decls10n, 
polnting out the extreme Impatlence of the French government. 
After reading Lobanov's report of the oonversation, Tsar .Nicholas 
notede "I agree wlth the second suggestion, that is, after an 
agreement with France, to aocept carrr1ng out of the Slno-Japan.s 
. 
peace lettlement, to get by all means a desirable compensation ln 
the far.m of an open port."32 
In the meantime, the peace negotiatIons at Shimona.eki 
were rapidly drawing to a close. Despite CODstant appeals ~ 
China, no intervention by anl'" of the Western powers took place 
d~ring the actual oourse of the negotiations. According to 
Article I of the final draft, Chlna recognized definitely "the 
full and complete indtpendence and autonomy of Korea," •• the orig-
inal matter of dispute--and further agreed that "the payment ot 
tribute and the performance of ceremonies and formaliti.s by 
Korea to China, in the derogatlon of such Independence and euton-
oml, shall wholly cease for the tuture.- ZZ In addltlon, Japan 
seoured for herself most-favored-nation status 1n Ch1na. certa1n 
addltlonal rights not yet possessed by any foreign power, an In-
demnity of two hundred mll1ion taels, and the complete eelslon 
32 l2!!., 263, n. 11. 
~ ~ll{text 1n J. V. A. MacMurray, ed., Treaties and 
Asree.entsIWitn-.nd conc.r.ni~ Chlna, 1694-1919, Bew York, 191r; 
I, ifJ-22, al'S'C)l'~urzon, Pro lems of • !!£ last. "29."35. 
> 
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"1n perpetuity and full sovereignty" ot Formosa, the Pescadores, 
and the whole ot the L1ao-tung i eninsu1a, 1ncluding Port Arthur. 
The Treaty ot Shimonosek1 was tormally signed on Apr11 17, by 
voceroy L1 Hung-Chang for China, and Counts Ito and Mutsu tor 
Japan. 
On April 16, the Tsar s~oned for final consultation 
tour of the m1nisters who had particlpated in the meetlng of 
April ll--Alexls, Lobanov, Witte, and Vannov8ky. However, as no 
official record or transcript of their discussion was kept, it 18 
extremely dift1cult to deter.mine what transpired on that occaeon. 
The only suggestion as to what took place is provided by a brief 
entl'y in Witte's Memoirs, according to which "I reiterated my 
opinion and, as it met with practicallino opposition, the EmPer-
or accepted my suggestions. n34 The Tsar, reversing his preter-
ence for Lobanov's plan, ~proved the minutes ot the Speoial Com-
mittee meeting of April 11, and instructed Lobanov to carry out 
the program outlined in its report, to wita 
34 Mem01rs, 84, however Romanov, Ross1la v Manchzhur~ 
76, argues that £}iIs entl'y in the Memoirs "surfers frOm. inaccura-
cies which form themselves into a kInd of tendency, distort per-
spective, and lead the reader on a false track." Whereas Witte 
claims to have defended the principle of non-violation ~6r the 
integrity of the Chinese Empire," this argument had no place in 
his statements at that time, but appeared only after 1907, the 
pPOduct of_~ facto intelligence. Likew1se, the reason for 
Lobanov'., "SlI8nce fI C!urlng the conference with the Tsar was m.erel:J 
the fact that there were before Micholas "two po1nts of view, but 
not two conourrent practical proposals,· Lobanov's proposal hav-
ing already been dismissed from cons1derat1on. 
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(1) To enaeavor to preserve the status ~uE ante bellum 
in the Norlh ot the Chinese Empire and w t tEIi In vrew 
to advise ,apan, first in a friendly way, to desist from 
occupation of southern part of manchuria because such oc-
cupation interfered with our interests and would be a 
permanent menace to the peace of the Far East) in case of 
a determined refusal ot ~apan to follow our advice, to 
declare to the Japanese government that we reserved for 
ourselves treedom of action and would act in conformity 
with our interests. 
(2) To communioate offIcially to the European powera 
as .ell as to China that we on our part without seeking 
for any seizures, considered it necessary for the se-
curity of our interests to insist upon Japan's forego-
ing the occupation of the southern part of -anchuria ••• 35 
With this the basis for the three-power intervention was firmly 
established. Pursuant to the Tsar's ordera Lobanov immedia.tely 
put himself in touch with Berlin and iaris, and on April 23 the 
diplomatio representatives of the three powers in Tokyo presented 
a formal protest to the Japanese government, calling for the ret-
rocession of the Liao-tung Peninsula to China, 
The outcome of the demarohe 1. too well known to be se' 
forth in detail here. After consultat1on with her. military and 
naval experts had revealed that resistance to the Dreibund, or 
Far Eastern Trlplice as 1t is variously called, was out of the 
question, Japan·de.med it wise to capitulate. Acoordingly, on 
May 5, she agreed to retrocede her acquisitions on the mainland, 
requestlna~on11 that the Treaty of ShimoDosek1 be ratIfied first, 
35 Chinese Soclal ~ Politlcal Soience R~v1ew, XVIII, 
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and that a s1ight"'1ncrease in the indemni t7 be allowed her. As 
there was no serious objection to either request, the powers as-
sented. The Trea.ty was ratified at Chef at) on May 8, while a Rus-
s10n fleet comprising seventeen warships and several torpedo-
boats la7 at anchor ,in the harbor.~6 The final settlement, b7 
which Japan agreed to retrocede Liao-tung in return for an in-
crease in the indemnityot thirty million taels, was subscribed 
and sworn at Peking on November 8, 1895. 31 . 
This was, no doubt, a severe wound to the amour Rropre 
ot Japan. However, the disaPPOintment was accepted by her 1n the 
spirit ot stern philosoph1c resignation inher1ted tram her feudal 
past. By way at 11lustrat1on we may c1te the words addressed by 
Count Hayashi to his tellow-countrymen, published at that time: 
It must never be forgotten that d1scontent is the 
prime factor wh1ch incites men to great act1vIty and 
diligence. We should theretore retain our d1scontent 
to spur us on to greater diligence, with a view to one 
day dispersing the gloom around us. We must persist-
ently surrer the insutferable and support the insup-
portable tor the sake ot what the fl.1h-;.1'O will haVE"; in 
store tor us. In this way we shall truly promote the 
strength and prosperity of our nation. 
36 Morse, International Relat1ons, III, 47, citing 
John W. Foster, D1J!lomat1c lemoirs, II, 151. Foster, Secretary of 
State during the fiarrlson Aaianlstrat1on, was legal adviser to 
the Chinese delegation at Sb1monoseki. 
37 Text 1n William W. Rockhill, ed., Treaties and Con-
ventions With or Concern1ng Ch1na and Korea, 1894-1904, Washing-
ton, 1904;-26.--The total lnaemnity was thu8 increased to 230 mil 
lion taels, or approximately 175 m11l1on dollars. 
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We should exert ourselves to develop our commerce 
and our industries, tor these are the principal factors 
ot national expansion •••• 
We must cont1nue to study according to Western meth-
ods, tor the application of science is the most important 
item of warlike preparations that civilized nations re-
gard. If new ships are considered necessary, we must 
b~ild them at any cost. 1t the organization of our anDY 
is found to be wrong, it mu~t at once be renovated. It 
adVisable, our whole military system must be entirely 
changed. We must build docks to be able to repair our 
ships. We must establish a steel factory to supply guns 
and ammunit10n. Our ra11ways must be extended so that 
we can mobilize our troops rap1dly. Our oversea ship. 
p1ng must be developed so that we can provide transports 
to oarry our ~rm1es abroad. 
Th1s is the programme that we have t.o keep alway. 
1n view. w~ have suffered hard things, and we must Buf-
tel" yet harder th1ngs before we arrive at our dest1ny. 
Wh11st our preparat10ns are 1n the making things w111 
not be easy. Vur taxes will increase, our people will 
suffer distress, our Government officlals must work for 
small salarles, and amidst a disoontented populace. Po-
litical parties w11l use the distress to raise po11tioal 
d1sputes, and our whole Empire may feel unhappy. But it 
we always keep 1n view the great ends which I have indi-
oated, then we shall endure all these things gladly_ 
Peace has been restored, but it cannot be a last-
ing peace. We must sacrifice ourselves, we must work 
tor those who come after us,.we .ust taoe ditficu1ties, 
even as 'comb1ng our hair in the rain and bath1ng in 
the wind.' Many w11l be d1sappointed and discontented, 
but they must endure all their disappointment and d1s-
content 1n silence and with a brave heart. 
If they were private merchants they would endure 
and continue struggling. As a nat10n we must do the 
same. The aotions of great Powers are like those ot 
individual merchants. ~aoh one seeks his own gain, 
and 1f he cannot at onee win cont1nues w1th increased 
energy unt11 he does so at last. 3e 
38 lnl Secret Memg1rl ~ CQuQt TadalY Haygsu1, 104-106. 
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This testament of Hayashi reveals the extent to which J'apanese 
political thought had been influenced by the west. It likewise 
suggests the determination of the Japanese nation to recover from 
the setback administered by Russia and her allies in depriving 
her of the fruits of her Victory over China and to even the score 
at an opportune moment. 
Russia's official interest at this stage, far from the 
expansionist policies of Peter the Great, was motivated, as has 
already been suggested, by distinctly imperialistic considera-
tions. The Tsar t s personal intentions were already quite gener-
ally known. "Emperor Nicholas,n wrote Witte, "was anxious to' 
spread Russian influence in the Far East. Not that he had any 
definite program of conquest. He was merely possessed by an un-
reasoned desire to seize Far Eastern lands."39 Fortunately for 
Russia, however, Witte had motives more intelligent. He per-
ceived that " ••• it was to Russia's best inter~st to have as its 
neighbour a strong but passive China, and that therein lay the 
assurance of Russia's safety in the East. n40 The particular 
stress in Witte's mind was perhaps rather on the word "passive" 
than on the word "strong," but, whatever the reason, it was to 
Russia's interest that China remain, for the time being at least, 
unpartitioned. ~or this reason Russia had taken the lead in or-
39 Memoirs, 83. 
40 Ibid. 
-
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... ganlzlng the opposition to the ter.ms which Japan had attempted to 
exact of China at Shimonoseki. This opposition became the basis 
for the rivalry which was to dominate Far Eastern relations from 
1895 until the outbreak of the Russo-Japanese War. 
At this pOint, having established Russia's concern 1n 
the Far East, it is relevant to o~r purpose to inquire into the 
motives of France and Germany in supporting Russia. The motives 
of Britain, in refusing her support, have already been suggest-
ed. 41 The att1 tude of !t'rance 1s most readily comprehensible. 
French policy with respect to the Far East was predicated, as the 
French diplomatist, M. Hanotaux, said later, on "considerations 
of general policy."42 That is to say, Franoe was bound to Russia 
by the F'ranoo-Russian Alliance of 1893.43 The creation of the 
alliance had established a delicate balance of power in Europe, 
and it was not France's intention at this time to disturb the 
balance. Consequently, even though she might, and in this situa-
tion probably did, perfer a different course of action, there was 
no alternative for her but to tag along 1n opposing the Japanese 
demands. 44 France's role 1n the three-power intervention was 
41 Supra, 62. 
42 Quoted by Langer, Diplomacy 2! f,mperlalism, 185. 
43 For a full aocount of the origin and original in-
tent of the Alliance, cf. Langer, 1!!!. F'ranoo-Russian Alliance, 
Cambridge, 1929. 
44 The Frenoh preference was undoubtedly the second a~ 
terrnative prQPosed by Montebello in his conversation with Lobano~ 
C • sunra, 64. 
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distinctly secondary to that of Germany and Russia. 
The German motives, on the other hand, were somewhat 
more numerous and complex, having been dictated by a combination 
of considerations, European and Asiatic. In the first place, 
Ger.many had had her eye upon a port in China. "Willy" broached 
this matter to "Nlcky" ln a lett'er dated April 26, 1895: 
I shall certainly do all ln my power to keep Eur-
ope quiet and also guard the rear of Russia so that no-
body shall hamper your actlontowards the Far East I 
For that ls clearly the great task of the future for 
Russia to cu1tlvate the Asian continent and to defend 
Europe from the inroads of the Great Yellow race. In 
this you will always find me on your side ready to help 
you as best 1 can. You have well understood that call 
of Providence and have quickly grasped the m~ment; lt 
ls of immense polltlcal and hlatorical value and much 
good wl11 come of It. I ahall with interest awalt the 
further development of our action and hope that, just 
as I will gladly help you to settle the question 01' 
event~al annexations of portlons of territory for Rus-
sla, you wl11 klndly see that Germany may also be able 
to acguire a Port somewhere where lt does not tgene f 
you.4S 
From this it would appear that the Kaiser had finally grasped 
what the Iron Chancellor had realized long before--namely, the 
expediency of "nailing" Russia's attention to the East, 80 that 
it might be diverted from the Balkans and the frussian frontier. 
The stronger Russia became in the East, reasoned William II, the 
weaker it would become on the Russo-German border; moreover, in 
its eastward expansion Russia would embarrass England's interests 
45 Letters 'from the Kaiser to the Tsar, Isaac Don 
Levlne, ed., New York,-y§20;-9-tO. -- --- ----
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and would eventually clash with Japan. At the moment, the usual 
friction 'between France and Germany was making itself felt, and 
1n the face of this friction the Germans were intent on avoiding, 
as Langer puts it, "any consecration of the Franco-Russian coali-
tion, any encouragement of a larger English-Russian-French com-
bination, and any antagonism betwe.en Germany and her continental 
neighbora. n46 Consequently, Germany had nothing to lose and much 
to gain by fostering friendly relations with France and Russia. 
A still further reason for Germany's participation in 
the Dreibund i8 the fact that the Kaiser seemed conf1dent that by 
joining"the intervention and having a voiee in the resettlement 
he could thereby ingratiate himself with the Chinese and, at the 
same time, insure Germany a voice in all future dealings of Eur-
ope and Asia. There can be no doubt that William II was fully 
aware of the: possibilities for German political and commercial 
development in the i'll!- East. Perhaps even m.ore interesting, 
however, when viewed in the light of in.ternational diplomacy, was 
the Kaiserts use of the "Yellow Perl1" to scare Nicholas and to 
gain publio support for a more forward Aslatlc polley. That he 
envisioned, or at least pretended to envlslon a future conflict 
between East s.nc West, is evident from his letters to the Tsar. 
"The development of the Far East," he wrote to Nicholas on Septem 
46 Dlplomacl of Imperiallem, 184-185, citlng Die Grosa 
Politlk, IX, No. ~135. -- ---
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ber 26, 1895, 
especially its danger to Europe and our Christian F'ai th 
is a matter which has been greatly on my mind ever since 
we made our first move together in Spring. At last my 
thoughts developed into a certain for.m and this I sketched 
on paper •••• lt the sketch shows the Powers of Europe 
as represented by their respective Genii called together 
b7 the Arch-Angel Michael,--sent from Heaven--to unite 
in resisting the inroad of Buddhism, heathenism ane bar-
barism for the Defence of the Cross. Stress is espec-
ially laid on the united resistance of all European Pow-
ers, which is just as necessary also agaInst our common 
internal foes, anarchism, republicanism, nihilism. I 
venture to send you an engraving, begging you to accept 
it as a token of my warm and sincere friendship to you 
and Russia. 4'7 
For these several reasons and, no doubt, for others as well, the 
., 
German government ranged itself in the East, on the side of the 
alignment which had been formed against itself in the West. 
Britain, in declining to intervene, committed a blunder 
the full consequences of which she failed to realize until it was 
too late. At the time there were no foreseeable advantages in 
joining the intervention, and she proceeded on the theory that a 
strong Japan must needs by cultivated to replace an impotent 
China as Britain's eastern bulwark against Russia. liowever, in 
failing to see in Japan a serious threat to her commercial inter-
ests in the F'ar East, Sri tain completely misjudged the situation, 
and lived to regret the error as Japanese trade gradually super-
ceded its own. By not intervening, Britain did court Japan, but 
in so doing abdicated its dominant influence in Peking in favor 
4'7 Letters ~ lh! Kaiser !2 ~!!!I, 16-17. 
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of Russia, the very power which it sought to halt. 48 Brltain's 
decllning position was later buttressed by a rapprochement with 
Japan, and the void created by her abdication was supplied by the 
emergence of Ge~any as a Far Eastern power. 
Perhaps the c8.rdinal phenomenon of the realignment of 
powers in the F'ar East in the decade 1895-1904 was the placing in 
contrast of "progressive It Japan and Britain, later to be joined 
by the United States, against "backward" Russia. 49 What might 
have happened had Russia followed Lobanov's advice and joined 
Japan in picklng China's bones it ls quite useless to speculate. 
Lobanov's wl11 dld not prevail, and lnstead, a cha"~-reactlon ot 
events which would have world-wlde signlficance was set inm.tion 
in large measure, by the will of one man--Sergel Wltte. By inlt-
iating the Triple Intervention Russla had won a brilliant dlplo-
matic vlctory: Japan was repulsed, Brltaln humbled, and China 
placed in her debt. 50 However, Russia's diplomatlc Victory, 11ke 
the military vlctory of Japan over China, was short-lived, and 
48 Ramanov, Rosslya ~ Manchzhuri1, 11-12. 
49 Da11in, 1!!.!.! .2! Russia!!!!!!!" 41. 
50 There ls considerable divergence of opinion among 
scholars as to which of the three powers actually initiated the 
interventlon. However, from the evidence already cited here ln 
describing the origin and development of the Dreibund, it is cer-
taln that the initiative for the move 1s to be found in St. Pe~m 
burg, rather than i~ Paris or Berlin. Specifically, the th~e­
power intervention nad its origin in the Russian policy dlscus-
slons of Aprl1 11 and 16. 
~----------------------~ 
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was won at the expense of alienating the Russian Empire's mortal 
enemies, Japan and Great Britain. 
On paper the Dreibund was a very formidable combination 
of powers and, up to a pOint, an effective working partnership as 
well. O!Jtensibly" the chief bond uniting the three nations was 
the desire to impress the Chinese'with their good will. Under-
lying this, however, was the realization that conoerted aotion 
would contribute to the eventual breakdown of British hegemony in 
the F'ar East. The inherent weakness of the oombination is evi-
dent; each of the thr$e powers was out to seoure advantages for 
itself.51 Aooording to a Russian statement published at the tim. 
in the Novole Vremya, Rulsia paid for the oooperation of Franoe 
with an agreement "to support an eventual French demand for a 
rectification ot the Indo-Chinese frontier, and for Germany's 
help with a promise to advance German demands for industrial and 
commercial conoelsions in China. 52 Thus, even as early as 1895, 
it became fully evident that Russia and rrapan, both nations in 
full progrels, both operating in the same sphere of action, must 
sooner or la ter meet face to face. 
51 Langer, Dip10macl ~ Imperialism" 187-189. 
,,~ 52 Issue dated April 22, 1895, cited by Pooley, The 
Secret !emoirs ~ ~alashi, 50. ---
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CHAPTER V 
RUSSIAN ASCENDANCY IN KOREA 
Throughout the course of the Sino-Japanese War and the 
subsequent peace negotiations at Shimonoseki, Russia had contin-
ued to manifest a vital interest in the affairs of the Korean 
government, being particularly conoerned with the guarantee of 
Korean "independence" and territorial integrity. This is evident 
from the decisions of the Special Committee, discussed in the pr. 
vious chapter, notwithstanding the fact that in its deliberation. 
the Korean question had assumed an importance more or less sub-
ordinate to that of ~9nchuri9. Meanwhile, however, events within 
the Korean peninsula were working to Russia's advantage much more 
effeotively, perhaps, than if Russia herself had been guiding 
them. It will be recalled that, previous to the outbreak of the 
war between China and Japan, the Japanese had invaded the royal 
palace and seized the person of the king, making him a prisoner 
in his own palace.l Thereupon the administration of the country 
was assumed by a cabinet of pro-Japanese Koreans, with the aged 
1 Supra, 53. 
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Tai-Wen-Kun acting BS regent. Under the supervision of a group 
of Japanese advisers the government of Korea was reorganized the 
better to subserve Japanese interests in the peninsula, as well 
as to eliminate onoe and for all the traces of Korea's "ConfUoian 
dependence upon China.2 All this was done with a pretext to se-
curing Koreats "independence." 
Diplomatio procedures proving too slow for the realiz-
atton of absolute hegemonJ in Korea, however, the Japanese onoe 
again had recourse to more forceful measures. In an effort to 
stamp out all internal opposition to such control, the Japanese 
agent, General Muira, arranged the assassination of his most out-
spoken opponent, the Korean Queen, by a group of Japanese soshi, 
or strong-arm men. The murder was accomplished on October a, 
1896, in the palace. The body was then removed t~ 8 g~ve near-
by, saturated with kerosene, and bu~ed.3 Shortly thareafter 
Muira appeared at the palace and presented for the king's signa-
ture several prepared documents oalling for the apPointment to 
office of certain of the oonspirators and agreeing to the manage-
ment of all internal affairs by the Japanese-dominated oabinet. 4 
2 The nature and extent of this reorganization is des-
oribed by Nelson, Korea ~ ~ 2!2 Orders, 224-226. 
3 Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders, 228, citing Kore~~ 
RetpSitor!h III, (1898), 12lr-!2~216=2~O. Of. also RomerE. Hu bert, --! Passing ~ Korea, New York, 1906, 137-139. 
4 Nelson, Korea ~ ~ ~ Orders, 228. 
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Revulsion against this crime brought severe criticism both at 
home and abroad, yet the Japanese government took no action other 
than to recall Mu1ra. As no foreign opposition was forthcoming, 
the internal situation was allowed to stand.5 
Events reached a climax on February 11, 1896, when the 
King, disguised as a woman, managed to escape from his Japanese 
captors and took refUge in the Russian legation in Seoul, where 
he remained for el[aotly a year. Inasmuch as Japanese control had 
clearly centered in the possession of the Kingfs person, all il-
lusions of Japanese domination in the peninsula were now comp1et 
11' shattered. Thus, as Langer puts it, "the Russians suddenly 
found themselves on the crest of the 'wave. The Japanese, by 
their indefensible polIcy, had done the work ot the Ru.,saians more 
effectively than the Russians themselves could have done it.·e 
Russia was now not only the "Savior of China," but by reason ot 
this most recent development she had emerged also as the "pro-
tector· of Korean independence. 
In this situation Russia found seope tor implementing 
her Korean policy. Not wi~hing, however, to disSipate the ini-
tial advantage, she played her hand somewhat more cautiously than 
5 The American Minister at Seoul, Mr. Sll1, was seve 
ly reprimanded by the Secretary of State for even suggestlng a 
protest: "intervention in polltlcal concerns of Korea is not 
among your fUnctions. 1I Telegram, November 11, 1895, clted in 
Morse, International Relations, III, 46-47. 
6 Diplomacl2! Imperlallsm, 297. 
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had Japan. At first the Russians were quite content to pursue a 
policy based on ingratiation ana gentle persuasion, keeping their 
own designs temporarily in the background. Meanwhile, from his 
asylum in the Russian legation the king issued proclamations 
annulling the Japanese-imposed reforms, announcing the dismissal 
of the pro-Japanese cabinet and the creation of a new cabinet to 
. 
take its place, in short, reconstituting his own rule. 7 One such 
royal proclamation, issued the very day of the Kingt. escape, 
read in part as follows I 
Alas! Alas' on account of Our unworthiness and 
mal-administration the wicked advanced and the wise 
retired. Of the last ten years, none has passed with-
out troubles. Some were brought on by those We had 
trusted as the members of the body, while othe~s, by 
those of Our own bone and flesh. Our dynasty of five 
centuries has thereby been often endangered, and mil-
lions of Our subjects have thereby been gradually im-
poverished •••• 
Fortuna"tely, through loyal and fai thfUl subjects 
rising up in righteous efforts to remove the wlcked, 
there ls a hope that the tribulations experienced may 
lnvlgorate the state, and that calm may return after 
the storm •••• We shall endeavour to be mercifUl. No 
pardon, however, shall be extended to the principal 
traitors concerned in the affairs of July 1894 and ot 
October 1895. Capital punishment should be their due, 
thus venting the indignation of men and gods a11ke. 
But to all the rest, officials, or soldier, citizens 
or coolles, a general amnesty. free and full, 1s 
granted, irrespectlve of the degree of their offencee. 
Reform your bus1ness, public or private, as in times 
past •••• 8 
7 Isabella L. Blshop, Korea ~ ~ Neighbors, London, 
1898, 365-368. . " 
8 Quoted by Bishop, Korea ~ ~ NeiSbbors, 366. 
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To bis soldiers the King addressed these wordss 
On account of the unhappy fate of Our country, 
traitors have made trouble every year, Now We have a 
document informing U. of another conspiracy. We have 
therefore come to the Russian Legation •••• Soldiers! 
come and protect USe You are Our children •••• Do your, 
duty and be at ease. When you meet the chief traitors 
••• cut off their heads at once and bring them.9 
In accordance with this edict of· the King, and in retaliation for 
the murder of the Queen, a blood purge was instituted, in which 
the former premier and several cabinet-ministers, some of them 
quite innooent of the crime, were killed by mobs in the streets 
of Seoul.10 
The first lines of Russian poliey, namely ingratiation 
and "gentle persuasion," paid SUbstantial dividends in securing 
the implicit trust and confidence of the Korean monaroh, to whom 
it appeared that Russia was merely aiding in the restoration ot 
th~ status quo ante bellum in the peninsula. During the corona-
tion festivities for the new Tsar held in May and June of 1896 
a special Korean representative, a brother to the murdered queen, 
made his appearance in Moscow. HaVing secured a private audience 
with the Tsar, he presented on behalf of the Korean King a re-
quest for the establishment of ' a Russian protectorate overKoreL~ 
9 ~., 367. 
10 Hulbert, ~~ Passlns ~ Korea, 148. 
11 Lar~er, Diplomaci £! Imperialis!, 405. 
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Wlthout consultlng elther Lobanov or Witte before commlttlng hlm-
self to such fA o.rastic course, Nicholas granted the request then 
and there, seeing ln lt nothlng but "8 very proper acknowledgment 
of and homage to his power and greatness. rtl2 The verr serious 
international compllcatlons to which such action on the part of 
Russla might give rise entirely escaped the young Tsar. 13 Both 
Lobanov and Witte were of the oplnion that the situation was not 
as yet propitious for the realization of such a protectorate. 
Consequently, the fact of the promlse havlng been glven was kept 
highly secret.14 
Japan, at thls time, had not quite succeeded ln recon-
cillng herself to her sudden loss of power ln Korea, and was en-
gaged ln a large-scale program of ml1itary and naval rearmament 
along Western 11nes.15 Russia, for her part, was directing her 
every effort to the earllest posslble completion of the Siberlan. 
Rallway. Consequently, it became the primary task of Russian 
diplomacy to maneuver cautiously untl1 such tlme as sufflclent 
force was available to sustain a more aggressive policy. The 
extremely delicate nature of the situation ln whlch Russla found 
12 Rosen, Fortz Years S! Diplomacy, I, 125. 
13 Ibld., 125-126. Thenceforward Rosen detects a 
marked Iteoolne~affeetlng the r>ela tions between the Tsar and 
Lobanov. 
14 Ibid. 
-
15 Langer, Dlplomaci £! Imperialism, 405. 
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herself as a result of the sudden change in the political power 
balance in Korea, not to mention the Tsar's rash promise of a 
protectorate, was reflected. 1n two agreements negotiated between 
Russia and Japan in May and June of 1896. In general, these 
treaties had the effect of establishing a more-or-less £2n ~­
num over Korea between Russia and Japan_ They were of special 
-
importance to Russia because Japan reaffirmed Korea's independ-
ence, to Japan because Russ'ia pledged itself to send no mi11tal7' 
or financ1al advisers into the peninsula.1S 
The first of the aforementioned Russo-Japanese agree-
ments, the so-called Waeber-Komura Agreement, was signed at Seoul 
on May 14, 1896.17 According to the terms of the compact, Japan 
recognized that the Korean King remained at the Russian legation 
of his own volition and at his own d1scretion, while Russia agxeec 
to advise his departure at such time as his personal safety W&s 
no longer in question. To insure the kingfs safety, Japan under-
took to restrain those of its subjects who advocated forceful 
action in Korea. Moreover, Japan was constrained to recognize 
the new Korean Cabinet, and agreed to restrict the number and dis 
16 Romanov, Rossiya ~ .anchzhurii, 143. 
17 Text in Korea: Treaties and Aareements, Pamphlet 
No. 43, ot the Carnegie Endowment for Internationa! Peace, Divi-
sion of International Law, Washington, 1921, 21-22. Both Waeber 
and Komura were the ofticial diplomatic representatives of their 
respective governwents at Seoul. The document is sometimes re-
ferred to QS the ~eoul Memorandum. ft 
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. 
position of its troops and telegraph guards in the peninsula. 
hussia was allowed to maintain a force equal in number to that ot 
Japan. 18 However, both sides were to wi thdra1f when order had b3en 
restored. 
The means by which Russia would attempt to consolidate 
and give definite form to its influence in Korea remained a com-
pletely open question. Japan, at the same time, was confronted 
with the first-class problem of blocking the path to any further 
extension ot Russian influence in Korea. This, ostensibly, was 
the origin of the Lobanov-Yamagata Agreement, negotiated in the 
early days of June, 1896, and signed on June 9 of that year. 
Expanding on the earlier agreement, it provided, in substance, 
that neither of the contracting parties would lend finaneial aid 
to Korea by Dmutual accord," and that Korea should be allowed to 
establish an armed foree and a native police "in sufficient pro-
portions to maintain internal order wi thout foreign aid ... 19 In 
this way Japan hoped to forestall the possibility of complete 
Russian dominl)tton over Kor:Ja, either through loans or through 
control over its armed forces and police, 
18 The total strength of the Japanese force was set at 
1,000 men: 200 telsgraph guards, 800 guards for Japanese settle-
ments in FUsan, Genzan, and Seoul. However, as Romanov points 
out, such a limitation constituted a virtual evacuation of the 
Japanese forces stationed in Korea. Rossila ~ Manchzhurii, 142. 
19 Full text in Korea, Tree ties .!.!'lll Agreements, 23-24 
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More signifioant, in the light of subsequent develop-
ments, is the faot that the agreement, as finally approved by 
Russia and Japan, was but a substitute for a more radioal solu-
tion proposed by Japan 1n the early stages of the negotiations~ 
Yamagata, Japan's spec1al representative to the coronation festl-
vi ties, had initially suggested 'a partition of Korea at the 
thirty-eighth parallel. The northern part would become a Russian 
sphere, the southern, including Seoul, would go to Japan.20 In-
asmuch as the proposal had clearly been inspir.d by considera~. 
of national self-interest on the partot Japan, it is not surpris-
ing to find that it was rejected by Russia tor muoh the same rea-
sons. Basioally, Russiafs rejection stemmed from the reoognition 
that at the moment her influence in Korea was, ~ facto, stronger 
than that of Japan. To agree to suoh a partition, Russia would 
not only have had to surrender the most important part of Korea, 
trom the military-strategic point of view, but also to compromise 
her futuretreedom of action in the peninsula.21 Besides, why 
divide KoreR w1~h Japan when, in the near future, ahe might have 
it all to herself? Thus, for the first time in history the 
thirty~eighth parallel was proposed as a 11ne dividing Korea into 
two foreign protectorates. As we already know, it was not to be 
20 Romanov, ROlsira v Manchzhurii, 142-143, cf. also 
Langer, Diplomacy ~ Imperia Ism, i06. 
21 ROi.4anov, ~,stif.x MancDf;Qural, 14Z, citing a letter of the ).ater Fore gn ~ nTs£er, ams ortt, read at the Im-
perial Conference ot May 20~ 190Z. 
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the last. 
If the Lobanov-Yamagata Agreement had been sacredly ob-
served in the subsequent period, it might be possible to say that 
it preserved the illusory independence of Korea. However, as the 
Russian historian Romanov points out, Russia, in signing the pac\ 
was clearly double-crossing Japan. 22 The evidence which he addu-
ces is so conclusive as to leave little room for doubt as to 
Russia's bad faith. It will be recalled that the Tsar had pre-
viously committed Russia to the establishment of a protectorate 
over Korea. The preCise form which this protectorate was to take 
was not disclosed until after the Russo-Japanese treaty had been 
signed--nor, for that matter, the fact that any such agreement 
eXisted. Then it appeared that Russia had undertaken to supply 
a military patrol to "protect" the Korean King, as well as mili-
tary instructors for the Korean army. Furthermore, a Russian 
financial adviser was to be attached to the Korean Court, and a 
Russo-Korean loan negotiated as soon as the financial needs of 
the Korean government had been made clear.23 That these condi-
tions were retrograde, both in spirit and substance, to the terms 
of the Moscow Protocol is fully evident, and they provide an in-
teresting commentary on the duplicity of Russia's Korean policy 
22 Rossi:a ~ ~anchzhurii, 144. 
23 Ibid., 144-145, Citing the letter of Lobanov to 
Witte, June 16-;-n96. 
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at this time. ~Only when the Korean ambassador returned from 
Moscow with the first group of Russian instructors was there any 
indication that Russia had no intention of abiding by the terms 
of the agreement. 24 
Concurrent with its negotiations wi th Japan over Korea, 
the Russian government was also c.e.rrying on negotiations with 
China for railway rights in Manchuria. For some time the builder 
and planners of the Trans-Siberian had recognized how greatly'the 
work of construction might be facilitated and how substantial an 
economy in time and distance might be effected if, instead of 
following the circuitous route along the Amur River, the line 
could be carried directly across Manchuria. This idea had actu-
ally predated the Triple Intervention, although it gained virtu-
ally no support or momentum up until that t1me. 25 Investigations 
in the summer of 1894 had disclosed almost insuperable technical 
difficulties of construction, particularly in the Lake Baikal and 
Amur River areas, and inspired Witte to consider the political 
and economic advantages lat~nt in the Manchurian route.a6 Tbese 
advantages he outlined in a report to the Siberian Railway Oomm~ 
24 Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders, 233, citing 
letter of Allen to Olnay, ~ctOOer-27;-rage. 
25 Romanov, Roseila v Manchzhur1i, 82. According to 
Romanov, the idea ortginated with a certaIn Admtral Kopytov as 
early 8S 1887. 
26 Witte. ~emoirs, 86-87. 
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tee: not only would such a route be shorter by some three hun-
dred and forty-five miles and appreciably cheaper, but it could 
also better compete with the existing sea. rout8 •• 27 Furthermore, 
once she had the line direct to Vladivostok, no other railway 
could be constructed in Northern China without Russian consent. 
In Manchurian matters; however, the Russians made hast 
slowly. Witte, the prime-mover in all matters related to the 
construction of the railway, laid his plans carefUlly so as to 
obviate all possibility of failure. The first and most importan 
reqUisite to success, as he saw it, was the establishment of a 
Russian bank in China. Such a bank, Witte wrote to the Tsar, 
might "prove to be a very useful weapon in the hands of the Rus-
sian government in the letter's carrying out of the measures mos 
closely connected wi th the completion of the Siberian Railway. "2 
Plans for the formatlon of the bank took definite shape In Witte' 
mlnd in June, 1895, when li'rench financiers arrived ·in st. Peters 
burg to negotiate the joint loan which would enable Chins. to pa7 
off the Japanese indemnity.29 The Russo-Chinese Bank. later 
known as the RUBso-Aslatio Bank, came into being by an Imperial 
Russian Charter of December 10, 1895, and In Witte's hands was to 
27 Ibid., 92, citing report dated aovember 11, 1895. 
-
28 Letter of Ju17 26, 1895, quoted in ~., 92. 
29 Romanov, R08~iza ~ ~nchzhurii, 90. 
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become an integral part of the Trans-Siberian scheme and a flex-
ible instrument in his policy of "conquest by railways."SO 
Nominally, the bank was an ordinary joint-stock com-
pany formed, accirding to its charter, for the purpose of devel-
oping commercial relations with the Far East. Its capital, fixed 
at 11,250,000 gold rubles. in addi'tion to five m11110n taela ad-
vanced on permanent loan by the Chinese government. was subscri 
1n part by four of the leading banks of Paris and many of the 
leaders af the French financial world. 3l Among its functions--
over and above the right to engage in regUlar banking operation 
the Russo-Chinese Bank was empowered to engage in such d1vers. 
pursuit! as the followingt 
The collection of dut1es in the Emp1reof China, 
and the transactions relat1ng to the State treasurJ of 
the respect1ve place, the COinage, with the author1za-
tion of the Chinese Government, of the country's money, 
the payment of the 1nterest on loans, concluded by the 
Chinese Government, the acquisition of conceasiona for 
the construction of railways w1thin the boundaries of 
China and the establishment of telegraph 11nea.32 
Also worthy of note i8 the fact that all of the important admin-
&0 Text of the Charter 1n Rockh111, Treaties and Con-
ventions ~ .2! concernip.g Ohina ~ Korea, lS94-i§04, ~-~. 
31 Morse, International Relat10ns, III, 83. Of the 
six million rubles actuaiiy raIssa, 57a was Ii'rench. 3/8 Russian. 
Nevertheless, of the nine votes Russia commanded six. Cf. Roman-
ov, Rosaiya ~ Manchzhurii, 91, n. 2. 
32 Rockhill, Treatiea and Conventions, 209. Tbe abo 
quoted section 1s A~ticle XIV of U\i aharter. _. 
IJil: 2.12 . 
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lstrative posts were held by Russians, the president of the bank 
being Witte's chief lieutenant, Prince Esper Ukhtomsky, companion 
to Nicholas on his Far Eastern tour of 1890-1891, and an ardent 
apologist for Russia's "manifest destiny" in Asia. All this 
would seem to bear out the truth of Baron Rosents description ot 
the bank as u a hybrid politico-financial institution which in 
reality was but a slightly disguised branch of the Russian Treas-
ury. ,,~~ 
The establishment of the Russo-Chinese Bank was but a 
means taken by Witte to the ultimate end of securing from China 
railway rights in ~anchuria. Should such rights be obtalned--and 
there was no reason to doubt that they would--then the instrumen-
tality for putting them into effect already existed in the bank. 
Preliminary negotiations for railway rights were conducted in 
Peking from December, 1895, to April, 1896, by the Russian Minis-
ter, Count Cassinl, and were conspicuous for their lack of suc-
cess. Even attempts at briblng the obstinate ChInese officials 
proved tutIle, reported Cassini, chiefly because of apprehension 
on the part of the Chinese that "in the near future we will demanc 
certain exclusive concessions, the true significance and extent 
of which we now conceal."34 
~3 Forty Years ~ Diplomacy, I, 198. 
M Telegram of Cassinl, December 28, 1895, ct ted by 
Romanov, J3Re31~' Jt Ianibzburl1, 96. The idea of plaCing a certait 
amount of bri e money at 0888ini'8 disposal originated with 
,, __ -------------------------------------------------------'-,j-L-ZZ-Ai-" __ 
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A more auspicious issue of the Manchurian question was 
presaged by the appointment of Li Hung-Chang as China's Ambassa-
dor Extraordinary to the Coronation of Nicholas II. Russia would 
take fUll advantage of Lits presen~e at the event much as she had 
availed herself of the Japanese and Korean representatives. A 
, fA. plan of operations was mapped out ~ the minutest detail by Witte 
well in advance of Li t S arri val;"'l:' St. Petersburg on April 30. 
Indicative of the care with which Witte's plans were laid is the 
fact that he even arranged to have Li met at Suez by Prince Ukh-
tomsky and carried directly to Odessa, so as to preclude any pos-
sibility ~f his being seduced prematurely by any other European 
power. 35 
The ~o giants of Far Eastern diplomscy conferred in 
st. Fetersburg for three weeks in deepest secrecy, after which 
negotiations were resumed and concluded in Moscow. After pre-
liminary assurances that Russie lntended to adhere strictly to 
the principle of China's territorial integrity, Witte proceeded 
to point out that to do so effectively she must be in a position 
to render China armed aSSistance, which at the moment was practi-
cally impossible because of the lack of railroad faoilities. By 
way of a solution Witte proposed that Russia be allowed to lay a 
Witte and was approved by the Tsar. However, none of the funds 
were used at this time. Ibid., 92-93. 
-
35 This and other detalls of Lifs reception are re-
counted by Witte, ~emoirs, 87. 
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branch line of the Trans-Siberian from Chi~ to Vladivostok. To 
make his argument more persuasive, Witte recalled for L1 f a bene-
f1t the services which Russia had reoently performed in arrang1ng 
the Tr1ple Intervention and the indemnity loao. Such a railroad, 
he added, would increase the economic product1vity of both em-
pires. 36 
Li, tully oognizant of the disagreeable and dangerous 
features of the Russ1an proposal, was reluctant to agree. Con-
sequently, Witte was forced to resort to bribery as a means of 
securing Lits support. In his Memoirs Witte emphatioally denies 
the use of bribes, but the evidence is much too conclus1ve to ad-
mi t of any doubt. 37 Romanov quotes in full a Ministry of Finance 
Protocol whioh assigned a fund of three million rubles credit to 
be advanced to Li, payments to be made in lnst~llmente of one 
million rubles eaoh at the follow1ng spec1f1ed times, 
(l) upon the concession of the line to the Russo-Chi-
nese Bank by an edict of the Chinese Emperor; 
(2) the determ1nation of the exact route ana its con-
f1rmation by Chinese law; and 
(3) the oompletion of the ra1lroad. 
36 The Li-Witte oonversations are discussed by the 
latter in ibid., 88-90. Cf. also Romanov, Rossila.! 14anchzhurii, 
107-117. 
37 Memoirs, 95. "At the time 1t was rumored in Europe 
I remember, that t! Hung Chang had been bribed by the Russian 
Government. I must say that there is not a particle of truth 1n 
th1s rumour." Techn1cally, this statement of Witte is quite oor-
rect&-!naamu.ch t ll.8 thebr1be wa.st;:<:uaranteed, not by the Russian gov8£"Qment, DU .Dy~~e HU8so-cn nese ~ank. 
1 
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Withdrawals against this fund were to be entered as "expenses of 
construction of the Chinese Eastern Railway."38 Li gave in and 
applied to Peking for the desi red concession, perm1.ssion for 1¥h1cl'l 
was gran ~Qd on May 50. Aacordingly, the secre t trea ty was signed 
on June 3, 1896. 39 
By this agreement the Russo-Chinese Bank received the 
right to construct and exploit a railway through Manchuri~, Rusml 
to have the right to transport its troops over the line in war 
and peace.40 In return for this concession China received a mu-
tual defense pact against any further Japanese aggression, this 
being the price that Russia had to pay for the railway concession 
and also a face-saving device with which China could cover her 
humiliation. The treaty was so constituted as to make it appear 
that the .lliance was its primary concern, the I'ailway me :.:-ely a 
means of implementing the military provisions of the alliance. 
It is significant, from the point of view of this study, that the 
3B Romanov, Ros8~a v Manchzhurii, 116, citing Secret 
Protocol ot June 4, 189g.e protocof was drawn up the day 
after the signing ot the treaty, presumably to give Li some writ-
ten assurance of payment. 
39 Li did not receive the first million until Septem-
ber, 1896. According to Ro~nov, this was the only payment he 
actually received from the fUnd. Ibid., 118-119. 
-
~o Text in J. V.,A. MacMurray, ed., Treaties and Agre. 
ments with and concernigs China, 1894-1919, Washington, 1921, f, 
sl. French text In RomanoT, Ross!fal.!.-ra'iiChZhUr1i, 111-1.13., 
l 
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terms of the agreement ext~nded to Korea as well as to Russian 
and Chinese possessions: "Any attack by Japan on Russian terri-
tory in East Asia as well as on the territory of China or Korea 
will be considered cause for the application of this treaty. ft41 
However, the tree ty was no t to become final until China had con-
firmed the contract for the railroad. 
Shortly thereafter, on September 8, 1898, the contract 
was negotiated between the Imperial Chinese government and the 
Russo-Chinese Bank, providing for the construction and management 
of the projeoted new line--the "Chinese Eastern," as it was 
cal1ed.42 Acoording to the agreement, China might redeem the 
lines -i.n thirty-six years, and at the end of eighty years, dating 
from the opening of the line over its entire system, they were to 
revert to her wi thout payment. A' careful examination of this 
agN"ment reveals beyond all shadow of doubt that the Chinese 
Eastern Railway;was, in reality, a Russian one. A few brier ex-
tracts ~i1l suffice to make this cleare 
••• The statutes of this Company will be in conform-
ity with the Russian usages in regard to railways • 
••• The gauge of the line should be the same as that 
of the Russian railways (five Russian f.et--about four 
feet two and one-half inches, Chinese) • 
.••• The Compan'1 will have the absolute and excluai ve 
right of administration of its lands •••• 
41 Ibid. 
-
42 Text in ibid., 74-·77. 
-
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Tbe Company is responsible that the Russlan troops 
and war material, dispatched ln translt over the line, 
will be carried through directly from one Russlan sta-
tion to another, without for any pretext stopplng on 
the way longer than ls strictly neces.ary •••• 
Passengers' baggage, as well as merchandise dis-
patohed ln translt from one Russian station to another, 
will not be subject to customs dutles; they wll1 11ke-
wise be exempt from any internal tax or duty •••• 43 
· Moreover, all profits of the company were to be tax tree, and 
only Russian and Chinese subjects could be shareholders.44 The 
right to acquire and exploit mines and other concessions was also 
given. The statutes of the newly formed Company were approved by 
the Tsar on December 16, 1896.46 "With this," writes Langer, 
"the preparation for the Great Russian enterprise was complete, 
the Russlan government had succeeded in cloaking its action by 
using the fiction of a private company, and everything was regu-
lated to meet the need. of the government 8S Witte saw them. R46 
The strategiC and political implications of this Ru.-
sian move are manifest. Not only would Russian offices have to 
43 ~t' pas.im. 
44 Witte saw to it that all the shares, one thou.and 
in number, fell into Russian handst Seven hundred were reserved 
for the Ru.sian government; the remaining three hundred, set 
aside for private purohase, were absorbed by the Russo-Chinese 
Bank. Cf. Romanov, Ro.eila ~ Manchzhurii, 12. 
45 Text in Treaties and Asreements with and cOI'.cerni!!C 
China, I, 84-88. - ,,- - - -
46 Diplomacy s! ImRerialism, 409-410. 
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be set up in Manchuria, but an armed guard stationed there as 
well, thUB throwing wide open the Goor to Russian penetration, 
The Trans-Siberian, no longer a purely internal enterprise run-
ning through unknown territories to terminate in a Pacific port 
had. by virtue of the Manchurian alignment, become a world high-
way from west to East, and had pass~d into the domain of foreign 
affairs. Furthermore, it had developed into a political instru-
ment whose far-reaching effects it was difficult to gauge~-a wor~ 
as one author wrote at the time, "destined to playa premier part 
in the transformation of Asia.""? This prediction, as we shall 
Bee, was more than borne out by subsequent events, 
By the end of 1896 Russia was, to all intents and pur-
poses, so absorbed in consolidating its most recent gains in 
Manchuria that Korea was relegated to the background. However,· 
to inter trom this that Witte had sacrificed Korea to the pros. 
pect ot more immediate gains in Manchuria is to overlook certain 
considerations which were implicit in Witte's thinking, The dis. 
tinction here, as before, is one between the means and the end. 
Rejecting the narrow view that in undertaking the Manchurian rall-
way Russla was merely trying to assert itselt In Manchuria, Witte 
remarked rather candidly that "Manchuria is not worth going to 
47 Archlbald R. Colquhoun, "The Trans-Siberian-Manchu-
rian Railway," Rotal United Service Institution Journal, London, 
~t)OO. 1418. 
,.., 
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all the trouble. n48 Instead, he preferred to rest his justifica-
tion of the enterprise on the fact that it would open for Russia 
an ever-broadening wedge of penetration: "the very force of 
things will oblige us short;ty to carry through branches from this 
main line into the very depths of China."49 Therefore, by con-
solidating her position and increasing her means of action in 
Manchuria, Russia was enlarging upon rather than lessening her 
chances in Korea, and at the same time conserving instead of dis-
sipating her energy. 
Although urged to take immediate steps to insure the 
realization of the Korean protectorate, Witte stood firm in his 
opposition to any precipitate action. Both Lobanov and Pokotilov 
Witte's China agent, anxiously called his attention to the fact 
that at that very moment British and French agents in Korea were 
attempting to force loans upon that unhappy kingdom, and earnest-
ly urged him to ~ake immediate action on the question of a Rus-
sian loan and the establishment of a Russo-Korean bank. 50 Witte 
oategorically forbade any action being taken until November, 1896, 
at which time he approved the loan only in prinCiple and on the 
condition that a Russian be placed in charge of the Korean Cus-
48 As quoted by Romanov, Rossila ~ Manchzhurii, 80. 
49 ~., 99. 
50 Ibid., 149-150. 
-
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toms Service. 51 This condition entailed something of a revolu-
tIon in Korean internal affairs, inasmuch as it involved the ex-
pulsion of British influence which had sustained itself solely 
on the basis of its administration of the Korean Customs. 
Needless to say, there was considerable opposition in 
St. Petersburg foreign circles to such a long-range F'ar Eastern 
policy as Witte proposed. The con,troversy which ensued containe~ 
in an incipient stage, almost all the elements of the struggle 
carried on in the following decade, and was but a foreshadowing 
of the eventual breakdown of Russian policy in the F'ar East. For 
the time, however, Witte was the virtual dictator of Tsarist Far 
Eastern policy, and was quite willing to forego immediate partial 
gain for the sake of the future whole. Consequently, the plans 
for the Korean protectorate were put temporarily Qon ice," 8S 
Russia under Witte directed its attention elsewhere. However, as 
we have seen, Korea occupied a place of paramount importance in 
Witte's plans for a Russian-dominated East. As the later Minis-
ter of Foreign Affairs, Lamsdorff, recalled on the eve of the 
" 
war that was to terminate once for all Tsarist designs on Korea: 
"The fat;, cf K~rea, as a :-:,l.tuJIi component of the Russian Empire, 
due both to political and geo~Faphic considerations, was early 
51 Ibid., citing letter of Witte to Ministry of For-
eign Affairs, November 14, 1895. 
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determined by us.u52 
52 Letter read at the Imperial Conference of May 20, 
1903, cited in ~., 66. 
.., 
CHAPTER VI 
DECLINE AND FALL 
Whether or not the motives underlying the construction 
of the Manchurian branch of the ·Trans-Siberian Railway were ba-
sically military and strategic rather than economic, the fact 
remains that they were so interpreted by the other powers. Con-
sequently, as Wittefs policy of "peaceful penetration" gained in 
momentum, it also stirred the other powers to bring corresponding 
counter-pressure to bear. Once again Korea provided the fulcrum 
to their strategy. The activities of British and French agents 
who were attempting to force loans upon Korea have already been 
mentioned. 1 Japan, still smarting under the blow received at the 
hands of the Dreibund, was further provoked to action by the now-
evident duplicity of Russia in signing the Lobanov-Yamagata Pro-
tocol when all the while she had no intention of abiding by its 
tenms. Germany, for her part, was sitting tight, waiting for the 
opportune moment to seize the Chinese port of Kiao-chow. 
In the early months of 1897 Russia's position in Korea 
gave evidence of geteriorating. In February of that year, in 
1 Sup:r~. 104. 
107 
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response to the many memorials of his subjects, the King departed 
from the Russian legation for his newly-constructed palace near 
the American legation. He did so without interference on the 
part of the Russians, 'though not before he had granted to Russian 
companies a twenty-year lumber monopoly along the River Tiumen, 
a five-year lumber option in the Ya1u Valley, as well as 'a mining 
concession in the Ham-Kyang Province.2 After the King's depar~ 
Russia's posl'tion in the peninsula was further compromised when" 
in March, the Japanese government communicated to Korea the text 
of the theretofore secret Lobanov-Yamagata agreement. 3 With this 
a marked cooling of Korea's affection for her would-be "protec-
tor" set in. Disillusioned with Russia's dilatory tactics in the 
matter of the loan" and finally awakening to her duplicity in 
promising military and financial adVisers, the King openly soli-
citated aid from Germany and F'rance, even going so far as to sug-
gest that the latter station a naval squadron at Chemulpo.4 
In a sense it is possible to state that the then-eviden 
need for a more forward policy in Korea had alreedy been antici-
pated by Witte. That his attitude may have undergone a change in 
the months of December and January is indicated by the minutes 01 
2 Brown, Masterx ~ ~ !!£ East, 142. 
3 Bishv~, Korea ~ !!! ~eighbors, 456. 
4 Romanov, Rosslya v Manchzhurli, 155, citing telegram 
of Alexeiev to Witte, fi'6rufu.,.-la, 1897. 
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a meeting of the Board of Governors of the Chinese Eastern Rail-
way Company held on ~ebru8ry 3, 1897.° Having already realized 
the desired contract for the MQnchurian line from China, and dis-
turbed by foreign railway concessions in Korea, Witte proposed 
at that time that Russia inst1tute pressure by way of requiring 
Korea. to refuse all subsequent ~ontracts to fore1gn oompan1es as 
.ell as to change all existing lines to conform to the Russian 
broad gauge. S 
Finally, on Ma.y 21, 1897, Witte gave h1s consent to the 
appointment of a Russian f1nancial adviser to be attached to the 
Korean court.7 His choice for the post was Kir Alexeiev of the 
Russian Customs Service, whose task it thereby became to effect, 
carefully but steadily, the transfer of the Korean customs admin-
istration into Russian hands. Alexeiev's persuasive powers were 
auch that within two months of his arrival early in October a new 
and thoroughly pro-Russian cabinet was enstated, and the existing 
head of the Korean Customs Service, J. McLeavy Brown, an English-
man, was ordered dismissed. 8 The office of "Resident" in charge 
5 Minutes c1 ted in ibid., 164. The Board of Governorl 
was formed on December 27, 1896, and its first meeting was held 
on January 21 of the follow1ng' year. 
6 Ibid. 
-
'1 Ibid., 165. 
-
8 Brown refused to accept his dismissal on the ground 
that h1s term of office had not yet expired, and the matter re-
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of finance was" conferred upon Alexeiev on November 5, at which 
time Korea agreed that it would apply only to Russia for finan-
cial assistance in the fUture. 9 
Further signalizing this departure from the previous 
policy of ron-interference in Korea was the appointment, also in 
September, 1897, of Alexis de Sp~yer to succeed the mild-mannered 
and general~y well-liked Waeber as RUBsian Minister in Korea. 
From the time of his arrival in Seoul, Speyer let it be known 
that he had been sent to impart a new vigor to Russia's Korean 
policy_ His conduct of Russian affairs, quite devoid of the con-
ciliatory policy of his predecessor, was to lOBe for Russia many 
of the advantages which had already been secured. or this we 
shall have more to say later. 
In the cl. osing months of 1897 the international status 
of Korea underwent a profound and rather significant change. On 
October l2~ the King of Korea ascended the "Altar of Heaven" and 
there assumed the title of Emperor. 10 Two days later Korea 
mained unsettled until the Russian advisers were withdrawn in 
1898. Cf. Nelson, Korea ~ ~ Old Orders, 234-240. 
9 Romanov, Rossiya ~ Manchzhurii, 178. 
10 This move was urged upon the King by the so-called 
"Independence Club" organized in June of 1896 by a Korean, at 
that time an American citizen, Dr. Phillip Jaisohn. This organ-
ization published a newspaper, The Independent, the first issue 
of which was printed on April ~8§6. X memorial of the Inde-
pendence Club, urging that the King take the step of becoming 
Emperor, appears in The Korean RepoBito£l, Volume IV, 1897, Seou~ 
387-388. The Imperiar-Ealct upon the assumption of the title 
Emperor is quoted in ~., 388-390. 
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dropped her ofl'icial name of Chao-hsien or Chosen, which had ob-
tained since 1392, and became the Empire of Dai Han. As early 
as 1895 such a step had been contemplated and at that time had 
been sponsored by the Japanese, who were then in control of the 
peninsula. Russia, which on the earlier occasion had strenuously 
opposed the move, now lent every ,measure of support, presumably 
to further the illusion of Korean independence, and at the same 
time to strengthen her position as Koreats "protector" at the 
expense of Japanese pretensions which were momentarily in abey-
ance. ll Within a relatively short period Korea was recognized by 
the treaty powers as an Empire, and assumed a position of equal-
ity in the Far East with China and Japan. 
However, this assertion of Korea's independence ot for-
eign suzerainty did not seriously deter Russia's designse The 
success which had attended Alexeiev's initial efforts caused 
Witte to reconsider the long-delayed creation of a Russo-Korean 
Bank. The advantages of such an institution were outlined to 
Wi tte by his Assistant Minister of i'inance, .p. M. RomBnov: 
It is my conviction that Korea has paramount impor-
tance tor us; Northern Manchuria is of importance only 
insofar as it affords us access either to Liaotung or 
to Korea. However, at this time the, Chinese would hard-
ly allOW us to reach by railway one of the ports of the 
Liaotung Peninsula, since they understand that this would 
place Peking completely at our mercy; on the other hand, 
they would not oppose very strenuously the leading of a . 
11 Nelson, Korea and the Old Orders, 235. On the In-
dependence Club, cf. Hulbert, The Passiaa ~ Korea, 150-157. 
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railway from Bodun through Kirin to one or other of the 
Korean ports, inasmuch as this would protect them from 
any seizure of Korea by the Japanese. In order that we 
may obtain such permission from Korea it first becomes 
necessary to secure influence in her financial affairs, 
in which connection we need not avoid financial sacri-
fices, since our investment will be rerurned a hundred-
fold in the not too distant future •••• 2 
It would seem that Romanov's argument was sufficiently persuasive 
for on October 28, Wi tte at last approved the foundation of the 
Russo-Korean Bank. That suoh an institution is not to be consid-
ered an innocent humanitarian undertaking on the part of the Rus-
sian government; but rather as another pliable instrument fash-
ioned by Witte in his program of F'ar Eastern expansion, is clear 
from the above-quoted words of Romanov. Interestingly enough, 
the board of directors of the newly created bank was virtually 
identical with that of the Russo-Chinese Bank established in 
Deoember of 1895.13 
It is fitting that we here introduce into these pages 
the name of one Mikhail Muraviev who, in the post of Minister ot 
F'oreign Affairs, was shortly to become the most outspoken oppo-
nent of the then omnipotent Minister of Finance, Witte. Prince 
Lobanov had passed away in August of 1896. The following Janu-
ar,:, Muravlev, by virtue of his p"'lrsoNl1 acqilalntance with the 
Tsar, andparticu1arly with the Empress Dowager, was recalled 
12 Letter Maroh 20, 1897, quoted by Romanov, Rossila ~ Manchzhuril, 157-158. 
13 §\aP£I, 96-97. 
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113 
from his relatively obscure post as Russian Minister in Copen-
hagen to become Aoting Minister of Foreign Affairs; in April of 
the same year Muraviev was appointed Foreign Minister. The son 
of Nicholas Muravlev-Amurskl, whose name has already been men-
tioned in connection with the hussian acquisi~ion of the Amur 
territory ana Vladivostok in 1860, Mikhail Muraviev was, as will 
be seen, a considerably more forceful personality than his prede-
cessor, Lobanov. Described by his contemporaries as a "fast 
liver" and an "ignoramus," Muraviev was, nevertheless, reluctant 
to be merely a tool in the hands of Witte, fo~ whose policies he 
had little sympathy.14 Consequently, when, after Germany's well-
timed seizure of Kiao-chow in November of 1897, the choice of a 
suitable Russian policy again presented itselt, the discussion 
found Witte and Muraviev on opposite sides of the fence. 
Before prooeeding to a consideration of the Kiao-chow 
and Port Arthur "incidents" however, passing notice should be 
paid to the si ~uation which gave rise to the first expression ot 
personal antagonism between the two men. In the spring of 1897, 
Witte had decided to parallel his I'8':1ised KOl'eflln policy with an 
attempt to exact still further r~t1way concessions from China. 
Accordingly, in May of that year he dispatched to Peking the ubi-
14 The tone of most of the contemporary estimates was 
in general tlui te ori tical. Cf. Rosen, Forty Years .2.! Diplomacy, 
I, 102; Hayashi, Secret Memoirs, 105-106; Alexander Isvolsky, 
Recollections 2.! .!l Foreign MInIster, New York, 1921, 119. 
---
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quitous Prince Esper Ukhtomsky.16 Ostensibly the purpose ot 
Ukhtomsky's visit was to distribute certain "gifts" to the Chines 
officialdom--notably the first installment of the bribe to Li 
Hung-Chang. Underlying this. however, Ukhtomsky was instructed 
by Witte to inquire into the possibility of acquiring rights for 
an extension of the Chinese Eastern to a port in Korea, as well 
as for a branch line running south to the Yellow 8ea.16 
Actually, Ukhtomsky'8 mtssion bore little fruit. Li 
refused categoricelly to con.;;.idEU' any further concessions and 
pOintedly charact6r1zed Russiat~ eonstant encroachments at China'. 
expense with the words: "We have let you in the yard, and now 
you want to enter with t'.S into the very room where we keep our 
wives and children."17 Tbe only point to which he lDuld agree 
was that no concession for joining the Russian and Chinese lines 
would be granted to any other power.1S When, in mid-August, 
Muraviev finally learned trom his personal agents in Peking the 
real purpose of Ukhtomsky's visit, he launched into a violent 
16 
3 meeting of 
is described 
172. 
Ukhtomsky's mission had originated in the February 
the Chinese Eastern Railway Board of Directors, and 
in detail by Romanov, Rossila ~ Manchzhurii, 162-
16 These secret instructions were cleared through Tsal' 
Nicholas, but were concealed trom Muraviev, ibid., 168-169. 
-
17 Telegram, Pokotiloy to Witte, May 27, l897, quoted 
in ibid., 171. 
-
18 ~., 172-173. 
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tirade against Witte, critlcizing ?he latter's move as one cal-
culated to provoke China and push her into the waiting ar.ms ot 
Great Britain. Witte's judgment in employing a known expansion-
ist to negotlate behind the back of Russia's legitimate diplomat~ 
representatives, as well as his constant and repeated interfer-
ence in the conduot of Russlan foreign policy, were seriously 
questioned by Muravlev, who was soon to take revenge for these 
invasions of his diplomatic domain.1g 
The failure of Ukhtomsky's mission to seoure from China 
rights to construct a railway to the Yellow Sea paved the way for 
Muraviev's action in the occupation and lease of Port Arthur, a 
~ove inspired by the German occupation of Kiao-chow in November, 
1897. With this, Rassia was once again confronted with a choice 
of alternative polieiesl whether to oppose the German oocupation 
of Kiao-ohowor to acquiesoe and seek compensation for herself 
elsewhere. The ensuing debate presents a striking parall.l to 
the controversy occasioned by Japan's defeat of China some two 
and a half years earlier. In both lnstances,--Shimonoseki and 
Kiao-chow--Witte championed a policy whioh insisted that China 
remain unparti tioned; in both, cat'es 1~he Finance Mini ster was 
opposed by a Foreign Minister who advooated concesaion and com-
pensation. The differenee between the two policy debates was, aa 
-
19 Letter, Muraviev to Witte, August 18, 1897, cited 
.. in.!lli., 172. 
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shall be seen, in their outcome: in the case of Shimonoseki, 
Witte's will had triumphed over that of Lobanovl in the question 
of Kiao-chow, Muraviev was to emerge the victor. 
The siezures of Kiao-chow by Germany and Port Arthur by 
Russia present themselves as an interrelated episode .. the full 
details andmnsequenoes of which it is impossible .. and indeed 
qui te needless to enter into here, exoept to establish the rela-
tion between Russia's decision to occupy Port Arthur and the eveft 
tual abandonment of Witte's policy of "peaceful penetration." It 
is clear that the motives underlying the German action may be 
traced back to her partiCipation in the three-power intervention 
of 1895. We have already cited the Kaiser's letter to his cousi~ 
the Tsar .. in which he first broached the question of a Far Easterr 
port for Germany, suggesting that, " ••• you will kindly aee to it 
that Germany may alao be able to acquire a Port somewhere where 
it does not 'gene' you. ftSO Indeed, this would ~ee.m to have been 
one ot the major considerations in view of which the Kaiser agree( 
to take part in the intervention. In the ensuing years Germany's 
search for a place in the Asiatic sun had narrowed down to Kiao-
chow, a Chinese port situated at the threshold of the rich Shan-
tung province. Disoounting a prior Russian claim to Kiao·chow, 
the Kaiser bided his time until a convenient opportunity to acoo~ 
20 Supra, 79. 
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pl18h the selzure might present itself. 21 The murder of two Ger-
man Catholicmlssionaries ln Shantung on November 1, 1897, provid-
ed William with the desir.ed pretext; the German Far Eastern squae.. 
ron was dispatched immediately upon receipt of the news, and by 
November 14 was anchored in Kiao-chow Bay.22 
Before this fortunate .opportuni ty ot obtalning Kiao-chOl 
by means of warships rather than by resorting to the more tenuoua 
processes of diplomacy presented itself, however, the Kaiser in a 
visit to St. Petersburg in August of 1897 had personally inquired 
of the Tsar whether Russia would object were Germany to occupy 
Kiao-chow. The popular interpretation of this so-called Peterhot 
eonference is that "Willy" tricked "Nicky" into approving such a 
move, and that he in turn had given Russia the go-ahead to occupy 
Port Arthur. 23 In view of Russiats subsequent opposition and re-
sistance to the move, it would seem that however ambiguous may 
have been the Tsar's answer to the Kaiser's inquiry, Russia did 
not write oft Kiao-chow to Germany until faced with the fiat 
-
21 This alleged Russian claim to Kiao-chow took the 
form of a priority on the port in the event that it were to be 
alienated to another power. It was, however, but an expansion ot 
a temporary concession granted by China for tha use of Kiao-chow 
as a winter anchorage for the Russian fleet in the years 1~95-18~ 
and was ~robably based on the spurious "Cassini Convention ot 
1895. or. Langer, Diplomacl ~ Imperialism, 450-452. 
22 Ibid., 449-454. 
-
23 This is the version of Witte in his MemOirs, 98-10~ 
Substantially the same version is presented by Witte's friend and 
apologist, Mr. -E. J. Dillon, ~...!. Eclipse .2! Russia, New York, 
1918, 245 ft. 
..... ---------------------------, ---' 
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accompli of a German war fleet in possession of Kiao-chow Bay. 
Upon hearing of Genaany's intentions. Muraviev, who had not pre-
viously been consulted by Nicholas, was irate and protested vehe-
mently to the German F'oreign Otfice.24 However, ,his intention 
forcibly to resist such a German move was undermined by the arr1~ 
al, on November 16, of news of th~ German seizure two days earli-
er. Accord1ngly, plans to disps tch a Russian fleet to the trouble 
zone were abandoned in favor of the alternate solution--compenaa-
tion. Then and only then did Russia turn northward to Port Ar-
thur. 25 
Within a week of the announcement of the German seizure 
of Kiao-chow, Muraviev had submitted to the TSGr a rather lengthy 
memorandum in which he called for a complete and radical volte 
face in the course of Russian policy_ He suggested that. by way 
-
of compensating herself, Russia might occupy either Port Arthur 
or Tali.nwan, both ports in the Liaotung Peninsula, as a po1nt ot 
leverage toward Korea and a gateway to Manchuria. Employ1ng 
Germany's actions as a pretext, Murav1ev reasoned, it would be 
easy to justify the occupation to China on the ground that a 
strong base for the Russian fleet was a virtual necessity should 
24 The notes of Murav1ev, dated November 8 and 9, were 
described as diplomatic "bombshells," and for about ten days to 
two weeks thereafter it seemed as though war was imminent. Cf. 
Langer, Dielomacf ~ I~perlalism, 452-453. 
25 Ibid., 457. 
-
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events take a course harmful to China. 26 On November 26, the 
Tsar summoned his ministers to discuss the Muraviev memorandum 
and himself presided at the de11berations. Px-esent on this occa-
sion were MuravIev, WItte, War Minister Vannovsky, and Naval 
M1nister Tyrtov~ Muraviev repeated h1s argument to the assembled 
ministers and added that circumstances now favored such act1on • 
. 
In favor of Muraviev's proposal were three members of the confer-
ence--h1mself, Tsar N1cholas, and Vannovsky, opposed was a minor-
ity of two--Witte and Tyrtov. 27 
The most outspoken opponent of the move was, of course, 
Witte. He rem1nded the ministers that any occupation of a Chine_ 
port would const1tute a violation of the spirit of the Moscow 
Protocol of 1896. By the terms of this treaty, in the event that 
Japan infringed upon the terr1torial integrity of either China or 
Korea, Russia was obliged to come to China's aid. The occupation 
of either Talienwan or Port Arthur, argued W1tte, would place 
Russia 1n the anomalous posit1on of doing the very thing she had 
comm1 tted herself to prevent others from doing. Besides setting 
an extremely dangerous precedent, such a move would be unfeasible 
from the standpoint of national selt-interest because it might 
endanger the construction of the Manchurian railway. Implicit in 
26 Romanov, Rossiia v Manchzhurii, 186-188. 
Langer, DiPlomacl ~ ImperIa 18m, 4S1-45a. Cf. also 
27 Witte, MemOirs, 99-100. 
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Wltte's thinking was the fact that he hlmself had moves under wa7, 
which, if successfUl, stood to gain infinitely more for Russia 
than the rash grabbing-off of Port Arthur. Consequently, argued 
Wltte, Russia should not emulate Germany, but rather should do 
everything in her power to force Germany to withdraw from Klao-
chow. Admiral Tyrtov also opposed the move, but from consldera-
tions different from those suggested by Witte. Speaklng from the 
naval point of vlew, he declared both Port Arthur and Talienwan 
to be inadequate a8 compared with certain of the Korean porta. 
Therefore, accordlng to Tyrtov, the best thing would be to get 
along with Vladivostok for the time being in the hope of ultimat. 
ly acqulring a port in Korea. 28 
Muraviev replied to these objections with the rather 
pointless argument that Rus*ia was obligated to China only in the 
event of an attack by Japan. Witte countered with the prophetlc 
assertlon that any such action on the part of ~18sia would almost 
ineVitably lead to war with Japan. His argument evidently carriec 
some weight since the Tsar, though himself completely converted 
to Muraviev's vlewpoint, temporarily shelved the plan to occupy 
Port Arthur. 29 
28 Curiously enough, the Tsar, in his conference with 
the Kaiser in August, had expressed a decided preference for the 
port of Ping-yang on the northwest coast of Korea. Russian naval 
authorities, on the other hand, seem to have preferred Massampo. 
Langer, Diplomacy ~ Imperialism, 456, citing B1! Grosse Politik, 
XIV, no. 3663. 
M.moir8,108~ Romanov, Rossila ~ Manchzhurii, 18S-l89, Witte, 
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Here the personal equation comes increasingly into evi-
dence ss a determinlng factor in the formatlon of Russia's Far 
Eastern polley. The clash of personali ties between W1 tte and Mu-
rav1evhad, as has already been suggested, developed'lnto a per-
sonal struggle for advantage wh1oh, ,though 1t stemmed from legit-
imate d1fferences of op1nion, stemmed also from Murav1ev t s resolw 
to oonduct his own foreign policy, exclusive of W1tte's 1nterfer-
enoe. !tor his own part, Wi tte, after almost s1x years as virtual 
d1ctator of Russian Far Eastern policy, could not succeed 1n re~ 
cll1ng h1mself' to this rad1cal 1des"ot Muravievt Even after the 
November 26 conference of m1n1sters 1t appeared that W1tte's will 
had triumphed aga1n. However, th1~ vi~tory over Murav1ev and 
compensation was extremely short-11ved. The outcome is best de-
scribed 1n Witte's own words, in which he recalls an interview 
with the Tsar "several days" after the November 26 conference: 
•••• '~ou know, Sergey Yulievitch, 1 sa1d the Emperor to 
me, evidently aomewhat put out, I have decided to 00-
cupy Port Arthur and Ta-11eng-wan. Our ships with 
troops are already on the1r way there. Here is why I 
have taken th1s step. After the conference the F'ore1gn 
M1nister reported to me that, aecording to his informa-
tion, Br1tish warships were cruising off the ports in 
quest1on, and that if we d1d not oocupy them, the Eng-
lish would do so.'3O 
Moraviev had apparently concocted this Itory bY' way of scaring the 
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Tsar into aetloa. 3l Thus, he had taken his revenge upon WItte 
tor the latter's invasion of the dlplomatic domain in sending 
Ukhtomsky to China the previous summer. However, in so dOing 
Muraviev set in motion a course of events which was to have ser-
10us and far-reaching consequences tor Russia. 
In this 8ituation, Witte made one last futile attempt 
to forestall the oocupation of Port Arthur. In his Memoirs, 
Witte relates that direotly from his interview with. the Tsar, he 
approaohed Tschirsky, the German Cbarge at st. Petersburs, and 
asked him to wire William II "to withdraw trom Kiao-chow, atter 
having punished those guilty of the assassination of the mission-
arles."32 ~o this personal plea the Kaiser replied, in effect, 
as follows: "I see from Witte's words that 80me very important 
details relating to the matter are unknown to h1m. Therefore •• 
cannot follow his advioe."!! Just what Wi~te hoped to accomplish 
in 80 going over the head of the Tsar remains open to question. 
In any event, his rash act was, tbanks to MuravIev's ever-alert 
intellIgence agents, shortly made known to Nicholas,and thence-
forward there is discernable a marked coolness in the theretofore 
31 Witte adds that, "Muravlev's information was ••• 
false, as I later found out from the British Ambassador." ~ •. 
32 Ibid., 101. 
-
33 Ibid. The "Important details" referred to by 
Wil11am ev1den~had to do w1th certain secret aspects of the 
Peterhof conferenoe, or at least with the Kaiser's interpretation 
of Nicholas' reaotion. 
------------------......-
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cordial relations between the Tsar and his Finance Minister. 
There can be little doubt that this overstepping of his authority 
was in large measure responsible for W1tte's subsequent fall from 
grace, as the Tsar sought increasingly to assert himselt in for-
eign affairs and to throw off Witte's influence. 
PreCisely what Russia stood to gain in the F.r East had 
she adhered to W1tte l a long-range program instead ot embarking 
upon Muraviev's precipitate adventure presents an interest1ng 
problem to the historian. It will be recalled that throughout 
the summer of 1897 Witte had been engaged in seeking for Russia 
an ice. free port on the Yellow 8ea. It was this very assignment 
which Ukhtamsky had bungled and which had occasioned the first 
antagonism between Witte and Muraviev. Witte's hopes for success 
were revived somewhat when, in June, Li Hung-Chang approached him 
for a loan to China. If he could condition the loan upon hi. 
previous demands, Witte stood to gain "the most substantial ad-
va~tages for Russia."34 The chances of realizing these advan-
tages increased with Ger.aany 1 s seizure ot Kiao-chow, for then 
Witte could command a dear price indeed for the loan and a prom-
ise of Russian aid against German enoroaohment. Again in Decem-
ber of 1897, Li repeated his request; this time Witte enumerated 
his conditions: (1) a railroad and industrial monopoly through-
34 Telegram, W1tte to Ukhtomskf, June 13, 1897, oited 
by Romanov, Rossiza ~ Manchzhur1i, 192. 
, ' 
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out all Manchuria and Mongolia; (2) the issue of a concession to 
the Chinese Eastern for a branch line south to the China Sea, and 
(3) permission for Russia to construct there a port with the 
right of acceas to all ships flying the ~ls~l~n flag. 36 Whether 
or not Li could have acce};.;'ued these condi tiona it is needless to 
to speculate. However, in view ot the possibility of obtaining 
these demands it is not in the least surprising that Witte should 
so strenuously have opposed the occupation of Port Arthur. 
On December 23, Russia began the process of self-compen 
sation by dispatching a telegram to Peking disavowing all inten-
tions ot territorial acquisition, and .ssuring the Chinese govern 
ment that Ruesia would withdraw from Port Arthur and Talienwan 
tlas soon ae political conditions and the interests of Russia and 
China permit doing so~36 With this the stage for the seizure was 
set: a few days later a Russian squadron entered the harbor ot 
Port Arthur and ran up the Russian fl-St Newa of the Russian 
seizure was joyously received at Berlin where the move was right-
ly interpreted, as cons'tituting acquiescence to Germanyt. seizure 
of Kiao-chow. Sri tain, !i;ranee, and Japan took a somewhat dimmer 
view of the Situation, eaoh realizing that the previously exist-
ing balance ot power in the ~ar East had been broken. According-
35 Telegram, Witte to Pokotilov, December 16, 1897, 
cited in ibid., 192-193. 
-
36 Quot.d in ibid., 196. 
-
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11, Britaln, discarding her more-or-less traditional polioy ot 
uphol~ing China i s territorial integrity, got into the act by sel~ 
ing Wei-hai-wei; F'rance, likewis., seized Kwang-chow .. wan. '67 Thua, 
instead of preserving China from outward aggre8sion, the action 
• 
of Gennany and Russia proved to be the first step towards the 
foreign invasion of Chinese terr!tory. At one moment the Manchu 
world seemed to awaken to the danger. This was, however, but a 
flash of lightning on an already darkened horizon. 
All of these cases of seizure and occupation later took 
the legal form of "lease of territory," a concept very similar to 
that embodied in the Russian lease of &anchurian territory for 
the Siberian railway.'68 Chinese sovereignty was nominally main-
tained and respected, but the locar' administration was gtve1'1 over 
entirely into the hands of the occupying for.ig}:l powers. The 
convention arranging for the "lease" of Port Arthur" to aussia tor 
twenty-five years was signed in PekIng on March 27, 1898, and an 
additional agreement, defining the boundaries of the leased terri-
tory, on May 7, 1898~9By this understanding the technical sover-
37 Important background material on the British and 
French seizures is provided by Langer, Diplomacl ~ Imperialism, 
473-476. 
38 Supra, 100-102. 
39 For the text of this convention see Treaties and 
Agreements .!.!l!! !.!!£ concerning China, I, 119-121. • -
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eignty of China was explicitly recognized, as well as the alle-
giance of Chinese subjects, but Russia aoquired all governmental 
rights, being allowed to establish her own oourts and otherwise 
given a free hand in matters involving law and administration. 
Although Port Arthur marks the first major defeat sua-
tained by Witte in the realm of j'ar Eastern diplomacy and the be-
ginning of the end for his polley of "peaoeful penetration," it 
by no means terminated his usefulness to the cause of 'l'sariat ex-
pansion. Both Nicholas and Muraviev reoognized Witte's value 
when confronted with the problem of overcoming China's resistanoe 
to the. "leasing" of Port Arthur. Aocordingly, Witte's talents 
were enlisted to negotiate for the desired .. leas .... 'O The out-
come of Witte's negotiations WAS the treaty described in the pre-
ceding paragraph. The means by which the task was accomplished, 
however, recall Witte's dealings with Li in May and June of 1896. 
Again he had recourse to bribery, a tactic which this time he 
candidly admits, arguing that it was the only way in which blood-
shed could be averted.4l In this way Witte contributed to the 
consolidation of gains won in consequence of a policy which he 
40 It would seem that, in agreeing to undertake the 
task, Witte was compromising his principles. This charge is som. 
what mitigated by the fact that Muraviev had decided to push 
Witte's loan conditions upon China. Cf. Romanov, Rossila ~ MancD 
zhUl'li, 198 .. 199. 
41 Memoirs, 103-104. Details of the bribe are to be 
found in Romanov, Rossila ~ Manch~hurii, 198-199. 
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'" had opposed, a task which must have salved his pride somewhat 
even though it did not necessarily restore him to his former con-
fidence in the councils of the Tsar. In any event, this would 
suggest that Witte was not so much opposed to Russia's occupation 
of Port Arthur as to the method of seizure sponsored by Nicholas 
and Muraviev. 
To return to Korea, it will be recalled that, on the 
eve of Kiao-chow and Port Arthur, Witte, after long and serious 
consideration, had consented to a more forward policy, which was 
to take the form of a Russo-Korean Bank. Alexeiev had been sent 
to Korea as financial adviser to the royal court, and a new Rus-
sian Minister in Seoul had been apPOinted in the person of Alexis 
de Speyer. Thus, after momentary setbacks in the early months ot 
1897, Russian influence was once again definitely in the ascend-
ancy. However, in Korea, as at Port Arthur, Witte's position was 
shortly to be compromised and rendered untenable by a combination 
of considerations, not the least of which was the belligerent at-
titude assumed by the new Minister, M. de Speyer. 
Perhaps the most notable instance in which de Speyer 
exoeeded his authority was the so-called "Deer Island episode."42 
In August of 1897, Speyer's predecessor, Waeber, had marked off 
42 For accounts of this inCident, cf. Nelson, Korea 
and the Old Orders, 237-240; Korean Repository, V (1898), i11-116; 
HayashI,-sicret Memoirs, 93-97. 
,... 
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some twenty acres of the small island in Fusan harbor as a pos-
sible looation for a Russian coaling station, notWithstanding the 
fact that the same tract had some two years earlier been demarked 
by Mr. Mc Leavy Brown as a site for a general foreign colon1_ In 
F'ebruary and March of 1898 Speyer decided, apparently on his own 
authority, to press the Russia~ claim. This he presented to the 
Korean government in the form of an ultimatum threatening that, 
if the Russian demands were not met within a specified time, Rua-
sia would withdraw its m1litary and financ1al adviaers. 43 In the 
long run Speyer's bullying tactiCS, as ill-tempered as they were 
ill-advised, accomplished nothing save to focus Korean resentment 
against Russ1a's peremptory methods and to arouse general susp1-
c10n as to her objects. Backed by the Japanese Minister, Mr. Katcl 
the Korean King took full advantage of this opportunity to rid 
himself of overbearing Russian influence. Thanking Russia for 
her past aid, he expla1ned: ftYour officials have accomplished 
their work and it is convenient for us to have them relieved from 
our service. I feel grateful to you for suggesting the idea of 
relieving these officials. ft44 Thus, as Nelson observes, de Spey-
43 The text of Speyer's ultimatum is quoted by Nelson, 
Korea ~ ~ .Q!.!! Orders, 238, citing. Korean Reposl torz, V, 113. 
44 Q.uoted ibid., 239. 
-
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er was made fta viotim of his own designe. ft45 In this situation 
Russia could do nothing but back ignominiously out of Korea. 
Speyer was recalled, the Russo-Korean Bank closed its doors which 
had been open for only thre~ months, the Russian militar,y experts 
were sent to Port Arthur and the .financial advisers were reasAtmw' 
- ....... 
to the legation at Tokyo.46 
More or less contemporaneQusly with these untoward de-
velopments Russia and Japan were negotiating intermittently among 
themselves to clarify their respective positions with reference 
to Korea, Actually, these efforts had antedated the Russian de-
bacle by several months, having originated in a p~otest against 
Alexeiev's activities in Seoul •. In February, 1898, Japan pro-
posed a joint Russo-Japanese interference in Korea, Russia to 
supply Korea with military instructors, Japan to replace Alexeiev 
wi th a financial adviser of its own choice .47 This proposal 
Witte dismissed as detrimental to Russiats prestige in Asia. 
Japan, however, persisted and, after Russia's withdrawal from 
Seoul in April, was emboldened to request that Russia write ott 
Korea entirely, in return for a like Japanese promise to· stay out 
45 Ibid. 
-
46 ~., 2~9-240. 
47 Romanov, Rossila ~ Manchzhurli, 179. 
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of Manchuria. 48 This proposal Russia likewise turned down, al-
though from it was to evolve the well-known Nissi-Rosen Protocol. 
This agreement, concluded on April 25, 1898, carried 
many of the same provisions as the ineffectual Lobanov-Yamagata 
Protocol of 1896.49 This time, however, it was Japan which held 
~he upper hand. According to t~e terms of the agreement, both 
parties pledged themselves to recognize the full sovereignty and 
independence of Korea, and "to abstain from all direct interfer-
ence in the internal affairs of that country," except by common 
agreement and mutual consent. 50 Russia was forced to recognize 
the "wide development taken by the commercial and industrial en-
terprise of Japan 1n Korea," and agreed "in no way to obstruct 
the commercial and industrial relations between Japan and Korea.~ 
Here the personal antagonism between Witte and Muraviev 
comes once again into focus. Wi th his plans for the "leasing" ot 
Port Arthur well on their way to realization, Muraviev began to 
perceive the need for conciliating Japan. His hopes for effeot-
ing such a conciliation he placed in Korea, reasoning apparently 
i, . ; 
48 Rosen, F'ortl Years .£! Diplomacy, 179. 
49 Text of the Nissi-Rosen Agreement in Korea: Trea~ 
~ ~ Asreements, 24-25. 
50 Ibid. 
-
51 Ibid. For background information on tbe treaty. 
cf. Rosen, Forti'!ears £f Diplomacy, I, 157-160. 
131 
.. 
that once Russia had obtained Port Arthur she would have no fur-
ther need of Korea. In other words, Korea was expendable and 
should be written off as a concession to Japan. 52 Muravievfs ex-
pediency once again triumphed over Witte's objections when Russia 
pulled up stakes in Korea in April. Thenceforth, Russia, concen-
trating on consolidating her new~y won gains in Manchuria, would 
be forced to relinquish, for the time being, dominance in Korea 
to Japan. 53 
However, Russian interest in Korea, though checked 
momentarily by the counterpressure of Japan· and the disinclina-
tion of Muraviev to jeopardize rela tiona wi th Japan and Great 
Britain, was far from.being extinguished. The idea of obtaining 
a port in Korea had become so fixed in the official Russian mind 
that even Muraviev's steadfast opposition could not quite dispel 
the hope that in the not too distant future Russia might have 
such a port to herself. In 1899 the Russian Ministry of Marine, 
arguing the inadequacies of Port Arthur as a base for the Pacifio 
fleet, turned tts h'1l".gry eye8 toward the 80uth Korean port of 
Ma8sampo, an excellent harbor which also provided a complete 8tra 
52 Letter of Muraviev to Witte, December 11, 1897, 
cited by Romanov, Rossila ~ Manchzhurii, 179. 
53 At the same time, however, RU8sia tried to keep a 
hand in Korean internal affairs through its new representative. 
1n Seoul, M. Pavlov. Cf. Hulbert, !B! Passigg £! Korea, la9. 
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egio oommand 01' TsushiMa Strait. 54 This demand for Massampo~cul .. 
minated, in Maroh of 1900, in an agreement whereby Russia received 
the r1ght to bu1ld at Massampo a coaling atat10n and naval hospi-
tal in return for a promia6 not to seek further conoessions.65 
This concession at Massampo served merely to whet the 
Russian appetite. Throughout th~ early years of the twentieth 
oentury, indeed up to the very outbreak of the Russo-Japanese Wa~ 
Russia continued, 1n direct viola tion of the above"1"1ent~ ~n'3d 
agreement to press for further advantages and conoessions in the 
. peninsula. In April, 1901, Russia secured from the Korean Emper-
or a non-alienation guarantee whereby the latter promised not to 
grant any mining concessions to foreigners and to lease his own 
personal mines only to Russians if foreigners were to operate 
the~. At the same time it was agreed that Russia would be called 
upon to furnish any foreign capital borrowed for the construction 
of the projected Seoul-Wiju railway.56 
Further indication of a more aggressive Russian policy 
was provided on April 13, 1903, when Russia notified Korea of her 
intention to exeroise the option of cutting blmber in the Ya1u 
54 Brown, Mastetl £! ~ 1!£!!!!, 142-143. 
55 Romanov, Rossiya ~ ~anohzhuri~, 337. 
66 Brown, Mast~.2!.!e!.!!!!!.!!, 144. 
133 
Valley, as provided in the Russo-Korean Agreement of April, 
l8ge. 57 Since the agreement had stipulated that the Russian in-
terpretation was to prevail in all disputes relating to the con-
cession, Korean and Japanese protests were of no avail. Further-
more, Rusgia interpreted the word "valleyb in its broadest sense, 
which is to say, as embracing the territory drained not only by 
the Yalu River itself, but all its tributaries as well. The 
whole enterprise assumed an unmistakably military-st~teiic as· 
pectwhen Russia proceeded to construct forts to protect the ter-
ritory, sent "frontier guards" to patrol it, and selected the 
port of Yongampo, near the mouth of the Yalu, as a shipping port 
for the timber that was cut. At Yongampo the Russians erected 
several large "warehouses" which later turned out not to be ware-
houses at all but barracks and stables. These Russian "lumbering 
activities in the Yalu basin did much to intensify the already 
existing strain between Russia and Japan, and must be counted 
among the major causes ot the Russo-Japanese War. 
By the time the anti· foreign Boxer disturbances had b~ 
ken out in China in 1900, it had become perfectly clear to many 
well-informed observers that Russian Far Eastern policy was no 
longer as univocal as had previously been supposed. In June of 
that year .Muraviev had died, and was succeeded as head of the Rus-
57 Ibid., 142. The original five .. year option had been 
extended to twenty years on January 1, 1901. 
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sian Foreign Otflce by the more conservative and c1rcumspect 
Lamsdorff, who was later to become Witte's staunchest supporter 
in his flnal hour. Witte's chief opponent at this tlme was the 
new Minister of War, General Kuropatkin. As Wittefs long regime 
neared its close, the position of predominant influence in the 
Tsar's confidences and ~ facto control over foreign policy was 
assumed by a group of militarists, 'eourtiers, and adventurers 
headed by a retired army officer and state councillor, Ivan Sezo-
brazov. Known also as the "Koreans," this is the g~up which 
championed the Yalu timber eoncessions as a blind for a more for-
ward policy in Korea, and whose actlvities were responSible, in 
large measure, for Witte's final downfall. 
Bemobrazov and his followers 8aw in the Yalu timber co 
cessions a convenient jumping-off point for a future invasion ot 
Korea. As their plans unfolded, a bogus private company would be 
created for the ostensible PQrpose of operating the timber con~ 
cesslons. Actually, the "lumberjacks" would be soldiers ln dls-
gulse who, at the propitious moment, would strike out and invade 
the peninsula .58 This crack-brained scheme was favorably regard-
ed in high governmental circles and apparently had received the 
approval or the trlar himself. IIbe only stumbling-block in the 
path of the desired company was Wltte, who 8ucce8stul17 countered 
58 Romanov, Rossila ~ Manchzhurii, 386-388: cf. also 
Witte, Memolrs, 116-117. 
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all the initiaimoves to realize its creation. At last, however, 
Witte's opposition was broken through and, on July 1, 1901, the 
East Asiatic Development Company was established.59 From this 
time on Russia slowly but surely courted disaster in the Far 
East. 
The final seal was set ~pon Witte's defeat when, in 
August, 1902, he was relieved of his ministry and elevated to the 
innocuous and purely ornamental position of President of the Com-
mittee of Ministers. At approximately the same time as his po-
litical powers was reneered nugatory, his control of economic 
development in Manchuria was also broken through. In the now-
impending crisis a one-dimensional m1litary policy would lead 
Russia to throw all caution to the winds. Thenceforward, as 
Langer remarks, "Russian policy was being made by the soldiersWho 
had won over the Tsar. and who were, before long to March him 
straight into the disastrous confliot with Japan."60 
59 Romanov, Rossiya ~ Manchzhurii, 396-398. 
60 Di~lomaci ~ ImRerlalls~, 795. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSION 
Imperialism, as a concept of expansion, has carried 
various connotations in different periods of history. All his-
torians agree, however, in seeing it as one of ~he dominant fea-
tures of the period between the Congress of Berlin and the out-
break of World War I. Though nineteenth centruy imperialism was 
a protean institution which assumed many different shapes and 
forms, it can be in no way divorced from the political economy 
ushered in by the industrial revolution of the late eighteenth 
and early nineteenth centuries. The extension of terrItory over-
seas, extension of capital investments abroad, ever-increasing 
competition for overseas markets and control of supplies,--all 
these factors combined to impart a distinctive character to this 
"new imperialism." 
Russian "imperialism" under both the Tsarist and Commu-
nist regime has frequently been denounced. Rarely has it been 
praised; even more rarely has it been defined. To be sure, Rus-
sian imperialism would seem more difficult of definition than ot 
condemnation. One reason for this difficulty lies in the fact 
that from the time, beginning in the 1450's of the final unifica-
1M 
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tion of the principalities of Greater Russia around a single cor-
nerstone of power,--Moscow.-the Moscovite state itself was oon-
stantly expanding. l Russian history has been the epic of build-
ing a vast empire by penetrating thinly settled regions and ei-
ther destroying or assimilating the sparse native populations. 
The road of Amerlcan empire-buil~ing moved westward--over praiae. 
rlvers~ mountains, unt'11 it finally reached· the Pacific. The 
Russian frontier moved gradually eastward until it too reached 
the Pacific and at one time overflowed onto the American conti-
nent. 2 "Russian history," writes the Russian historian George 
Vernadsky, "is the history of the expansion over a vast continent 
of a vigorous people imbued wi th the pioneer spiri t."3 At what 
point, the student is prompted to inquire~ can "expansion" be 
said to end and "imperialism" to begin? 
A fu.rther difficulty of definition derives from the 
fact that Russian "imperialism" was, at one and the same time, 
similar to and different from imperialism as conceived and prac-
ticed by the nations of Western Europe and the United States. 
RUssia was Similar, for example, in her efforts to extend her 
1 Philip E. Mosely, "Aspects of Russian Expansion," 
~erioan Slavic Review, VII, 1948, 197. 
2 In addition to Alaska which was sold to the United 
States in 1867, the Russians also maintained Fort Ross approxi-
mately 60 miles north of San Francisco until the early 1810 f s. 
1936, 4. 
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'" sway in the Far East, where before 1890 she had made no sub-
stantial progress since her, acquisition of the Amur region with 
Vladivostok in 1860. She was different in that the Russian Em-
pire, like its Chinese neighbor, was territorially compact. Per-
haps even more significant, however, is the fact that Tsarist 
Russia was both a colonial power,and, as Lenin contemptuously 
styled her, a semi-colonial adjunct of Western European finance-
capitalism.' 
These perfunctory and admittedly very general observa-
tions as to the nature of Russian imperialism may seem beside the 
point, in view of the stated purpose of this thesis "to trace the 
historical backgrounds of Russian interest in Korea, to discover 
the considerations which motivated this particular interest, and 
to outline Russian ~tt.mpts to a "foothold in the Korean peninsu-
la."5 However, it is evident that such a study affords a unique 
vantage-point from which to view Russian expansion in the Far 
East. Without going into excess detail, it is possible to state 
here that from such a study of the per10d 1860-1904, several 
facts emerge qu1te clearly. F1rst and foremost among these is 
Russia's desire for an ice-free port on the Pacific, this having 
been one of the major considerat1ons in view ot which the vast 
Trans-Siberian Railway project was undertaken. Another fact of 
4 Sumner, "Tsardom and Imperia11sm," 26. 
5 Supra, 2. 
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major importance is Russia's constant encroachment on Chinese 
sovereignty, always carried out under the guise ot preserving 
China's territorial integrity. From the impotent Manchus, Russia 
obtained not only the right to construct railways across Manchu~1 
but also full extraterritorial rights to police the land which 
the lines traversed. Still anotper and no less decisive factor 
in the evolution ot the "Korean question" i8 the growing recog-
nition on the part ot Japan that if Korea were to fall into Rus-
8ian hands it would become a dagger pOinted at her ver.J heart. 
Hence Japan's determination either to have Korea for herself or 
to maintain there a tully independent "butfer" against Russian 
aggression. 
It yet remains to inquire into some of the reasons tor 
the breakdown of RQssian expansion in the Far East, particularly 
the breakdown of Witte's policy of "peaceful penetration" which 
had netted the Tsars some ot their most substantial gains in 
Asia. It has already been noted that there was, among st. Peter. 
burg foreign Circles, no little opposition to Witte.s program. 
Much of this opposition focused on the degree of intensity with 
which Russia was to pursue her imperialist aims in the East.-
While virtually all Russian statesmen of the p~riod accepted Rua-
sia'. "manifest destiny" in Asia as a matter:of course, there was 
no general agreement as to the best means of bringing about Rus-
" , 
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sian control. 
Wittefs policy, as has already been remarked, favored a 
gradual economlc penetratlon by means ot the bank and the rail-
way, rather than direct military aetlon. A comprehensive state-
ment ot his attltude and method is afforded by a remark he once 
made to a Dutoh journalIst: "My ~otto," said Witte, "is trade 
and industry always in the front; the army always in the rear. "7 
The military and naval men, on the other hand; and to some extent 
the Foreign Office as well, had adopted the dIametrically opposed 
position of takIng whatever could be taken whenever a convenient 
opportunity presented itself. ThIs group favored not only strens 
military measures against China, but also direct military inter-
vention in Korea. This ."tremist view was expressed by Minister 
of the Interior Plehve, when he said: "Bayonets, not diplomats, 
have made RussiaJ by bayonets, and not by dIplomatIc pens, must 
the F.r Eastern problem be solved. nS 
One ot the reasons for the failure of Tsarist Imperial-
ism as conceived by Witte was the fact that it involved a patien~ 
longrrange policy, and was dependent for its ultimate success 
upon a feeling of securi ty for the future. This feeling of secul'" 
ity yaq gradually being sapped and undermined by Japanese and 
other foreign action, and espeoially by the faot that, after 1900, 
7 Q.uoted by Sumner,· "Tsardom and Imper1a11sm," 34. 
e Quoted by Dallin, Ut" gr UM,at' ~ ,.t" 48. .' 
• 
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the growth of revolutionary conditions wi thin Russia were shak1~ 
general confidence in the government. A still further reason tor 
the breakdown lay in the fading away d the solid support which 
had been forthcoming during the 1690'8 from most quarters of the 
business world. Wi tte' 8 railway ploject had naturally been back$~ 
by. the heavy industries, and his general financial policies had 
been shaped with this consideration 1n mind. The general pros-
perity which marked the 90's was in part the result of, in part 
the reason for, support ot the government's Far Eastern adven-
tures. Consequently, after the 1900 slump and criSiS, whioh hit 
particularly the heavy industries and accentuated the rap1dly in-
creasin~ political and social unrest, Far Eastern projects became 
more and more open to attack. 
A further reason for the breakdown of Witte's type ot 
imperialism is purely personal to Witte himself and to the Tsar--
yet another instance of the personal equation at work. Through-
out the period from 1892 to his eclipse and tall from grace in 
1903, Witte had stood in glaring contrast, not only with h1s pre-
decessors, but also with the military leaders and the old-fash-
ioned routine circles in the Russian Foreign Office. During his 
tenure of office the Finaace Ministry had become the superior ot 
the Foreign Office and a ~1v~1 even of the War Office. The 1m-
mense concentration of power which Witte exercised for ten years 
came in time to arouse the jealousy and resentment of Tsar lUcho-
la8 himself. The particular role played by Wittefs Korean policy 
" . 
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in a ttenua ting'" his already strained rela tions with the mill tar,-
and naval clique headed by Bezobrazov has already been related, 
and this has been set down as one ot the main reasons for his 
tall from grace shortly betore the outbreak ot the disastrous war 
with Japan. 
Subsequently, with all ,the rancor and criticism typical 
ot the statesmen out ot office and unable to return to his former 
station, Witte composed his Memoirs. To be sure, all memoirs, 
because of their h1ghly subject1ve character, requ1re cautious 
hand11ng by the hlstorian, not the least ot these being Witte's. 
However, despite certain defects 1nherent in such writings, 
Wittets Memoirs enable us to see the more clearly the workings ot 
certain aspects of Tsarlst Far Eastern imperia11sm at its height. 
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for Its treatment of earlier periods. 
Joseph, Philip, Foreign D1plomaol in Ch1na, 1894-1900, London, 
1928. - - -- -
An excellent study, quIte conventional in approach, but de-
ficient, as Langer points out, in the use ot Russlan materiaL 
Marred also by several blunders--the practice of sometimes 
translating, sometimes failing to translate, old style dates 
to new, give rise to a rather oonfUsed chronology of events, 
thereby upsetting causal relatIonshIps. 
Langer, William L., The DiplomacJ ot Imperialiam, 1890-1902, 2nd 
ed., 2 vola. In-r; New York, i§5i. ----
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A scholarly work, excellently documented. If its treatment 
of the Korean problem ls not, perhaps, qulte as unlfied aa 
one might wlsh, lt does, nevertheless, enable the student to 
see the subject in the broad perspective of international 
affairs, The bibliograph1es at the end of each chapter are 
partIcularly helpful. 
Langer, William L., 1!!!. Franoo-Rus8ian Allianoe, ~-~, Cam-
bri<;\ge, 1929. 
A thoroughgoing and acholarly study of the alliance in ita 
origin and intent as well aa ita later development. Based 
in part on previously unpublished AUstrian archive material. 
Latourette, Kenneth S., A Short Hiato£l of the, Far East, New YOI' 
1946. - -----
A standard textual survey-h1st0I"Y of the Far East. 
Longford, Jpseph H., la! ~t0tl ~ Korea, London, 1911. 
A more 01' less popular treatment of Korean hlstory through 
the perlod of the Japaneaeprotectorate. Partlcularly help-
ful Gn the growth of the western refor.m movement, anti-
Japanese aotlvlty, and the assassination of the Korean quee 
A souroe not to be overlooked. 
Morse, Hosea a., and Mac Nalr, H. F., !!I Eastern International 
Relations, Shanghai, 19~8. 
A rather general survey, based on material avallable in the 
western language •• 
Morse, Hos~a B., The International Relations of the Chineae Em-
;eire, 3 vols7;-New York t91a. - - -
Discuases Korean forelgn relations rather sketchily in v. 2, 
in greater detail in v. 3. Vol. 2 covers the period 1861-
1893, vol. 3 deals with the years 1894-1911. Valuable also 
for its excellent treatment of Russian flnancial and econom-
ic penetratlon in Chlna. 
r '. ·;oaut t KG4. ,4 "a, 
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Nelson, M. Frederiok, Korea ~ tbe Old Order§, !!l Eaatem Asia, 
Baton Rouge, 1945. 
Originally prepared as a dootoral dissertation at Duke Uni-
verait" this volume contains an admirable exposition of 
Korea's legal status up to the time of the Japanese oocupa-
tion, alao of Korean relations with China, Japan, Russia, 
and the Uni ted States before 1910. Excellent17(documented. 
Homanov, Boris A., Rossila v Manchchu!1.i, 1892-190 •• (Russia in 
Manohuria), Lenlngrad,-19~a. 
The definitive work on the subject of Russian Far Eastern , 
policy and the Trans-Siberian, aa yet unavailable in English 
translation. Written by an old-school Russian h1storian, 
thi. work makes extensive use of the Moscow '"hives •. 
Ross, John, H1stol"l!l1 Corea, Ancient ~ Modern, London, 1891. 
Written by a Scottish missionary who visitod Korea before 
its "opening, It this is the first history ot Korea in the 
English language ~ While antiquated in style and approach .' 
and reflecting many of the same shortcomings of the Bulbe.-· 
work cited above, it is still ot value tor historioal back" 
ground. 
Sumner, B. B., ! Short Hiatorz of Russia, Revised ed., New York, 
1949. 
Contains a summary treatment of Russian Far Eastern policy 
and foreign relations. 
Treat, Payson J., D~lomatic Relations Between the United State • 
.!lli! Japan, 1..85 la05, 2 vols. J Stanford, l'§!l. 
Extremely valuable, drawing on previously unpublished Ameri-
can archive material, though reflecting so_thing of a pro-
Japanese bIas. 
Treat, Payson J., The Far East: A Political and DiplomatiC Hll-
~6 Rev18ed-ea.;-Iewr!Ork,-1~S5. --- . ---
A general survey of Far Eastern history. RefleetR the same 
pro-Japanese blas as Treat's earlier work. 
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Vernadsky, George, ! Poli tical ~ Diplomatic Ristorz .21 Russia, 
Boston, 1936. 
Though containing some reflections on the nature of Russian 
expansion, this' book has little to say of Tsarist Far East-
ern policy as such. 
Vinacke, Harold M., ! Ristor. .2.! Jm! m!.!.!l1!! _pdem 'l'1mea, 
4th ed., New York, 194 • 
Contains an interesting chapter (VI) on international rival-
ries in Korea It the turn of the century, also "References 
for further study." 
B. BOOKS 
Asakawa, Kanichi, ~ Russo-Japanese Conflict, Boston, 1914. 
Important, for the purposes of this ltudy, for its treatment 
of the causes and antecedents of the Russo-Japanese War. 
Though written from the Japanese viewpoint, and based chiet-
lyon Japanese sources, this work is remarkably objective, 
well b"lanced. 
Beveridge, Albert J., ~ .Ru-.s.s.i.a.n Advance, New York, 1904. 
A summary treatment of Russian expansioh written by the au 
or of the monumental Life of John Marshall. The Appendix 
of this volume contains £rans"iitTons of important d.ocuments, 
among them the spurious Cassini Convention of 1896. 
Bishop, Isabella L. (Bird), Korea ~ !!I Neishbors, London, 189 
Interesting descriptions and observations of Korea in the 
period 1894-1897, generally sympathetIc to Japanese influ-
ence and reforms in the peninsula. 
Bland, J. O. P., China, Japan, .!..!!S! Korea, London, 1921. 
An interesting and well-Informed though somewhat colored 
treatment, pro-China in orientation. 
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Bland, J. o. P.~ ~-Huns-ChaPi' London, 1917. 
A good biography ot the most outstanding of Chinese states-
men, now somewhat out-dated. 
Brown, Arthur Judson, 1h!. Masten 2.!. !h! ..f!!:.!!!.;£, New York, 191 
Subtitled "The StOI'1 of Korea's Transformation and Japan's 
Rise to supremacy in the Or1ent,· thls work is important fo 
its emphasls on the strategic positlon occupied by Korea In 
the Far East. 
Chirol, Valentine, ~ l!! Eastern guestion, London, 1896. 
An illuminatIng contemporary study, outspokenly Britlsh in 
1ts or1entation. 
Colquhoun, Archibald R., China !a Transformation, New York, 1898. 
A discussion ot the problem as it appeared at the time, par-
ticularly good for its dlscusslon of the southern aspects 0 
Russian penetration in Chlna. 
Curzon, George N., Problems 2.! ~ !!.!:!!.ll, London, 1896. 
First-hand observatlons of Korea dur1ng the 1880's and 90 t a 
made durlng a vlsit to the Far East, rendered more important 
because of the ofrlcial positlon of the author. Shews to 
what.extent Br1t~sh policy was dictated by her tradlng inte 
ests in the Far East and outllnes the growth of Japanese in, 
fluence In the peninsula. 
Dallin, David J., 1h!. !!!! 21. Rusala In!.!!!, New Haven, 1949. 
A scholarly, up-to-date study of the means ot Russlan pene-
tration In the Far East. The au'thor uses considerable Ru .... 
sian language materi,1. 
Denn~tt, Tyler, American! in Eastern Asia~ i e• York, 1922. 
A critical study of 19th century American policJ with refer-
ence to China, Japan, and Korea, based entire1J on western 
sources. 
:~ 
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Dillon, E. J., ~ Eclipse ~ Russia, New York, 1916. 
A personal friend of and apologist for Witte, D1110n sees 
Russia's "ec11pse" as stemming from the overthrow of Witte'. 
program of "peaceful penetration." 
Graddanze, Andrew J., Modern Korea, New York, 1944. 
Prepared orig1nally 8S a doctoral d1ssertation at Columb1a 
Univers1 ty, this volume prbvides a sketchy historical and 
geographical setting, placing greater emphasis upon the eco 
omic aspects of the later period of the Japanese protector-
ate. 
Griffes, William E., Corea, The Hermit Natlon, 9th ed., New York, 
1911. -
Based on Western and Japanese sources, this book first ap-
peared In l88S. Though its approach Is somewhat out-dated, 
it remains a reliable source, containlng discussions on the 
social and econome aspects of Korean life as well as illus-
trat10ns from Korean l1terature and folklore. 
Hamilton, Angus, Korea, New York, 1904. 
A disousslon of Korean customs and history, plaoing emphasia 
on internat10nal rivalries in Korea up to the t1me of publi-
oation. 
Hlshida, Seiji, George, Japan AmOng ~ Great Powers, London, 
An up-to-date revision of the author's ear11er work, The 
International Posit1on of Japan as a Great Power (New-YOrk, 
1905). WrItIng from the-Japanese-imperIa! poInt of view the 
author presents a systematic study of Japanese d1plomacy co 
oentrating mainly on the period of the Russo-Japanese War. 
Hulbert, Homel" '9., !!!!. Passing 2.! Korea, New York, 1906. 
Writt.n Qt tho time when Korea was losing its independence, 
this book, based largely on the same author's Histotl of 
Korea, already cited, was designed chiefly to fUrther the 
cause of Korean independence. 
I, 
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Hsu, Shushi, China ~ ~ Political Entitl, New York, 1926. 
A study of the Korean and Manchurian problems, based chiefly 
on Chinese sources. Quite valuable. 
Kent, Percy R., Railwal Enterprise !e China, London, 1907. 
In general, the best single account of the struggle for 
railway concessions in China. 
Korfr, (Baron) S. A., Russia 1!! ~ l!!~, Washi~lion, 1921. 
A survey in pamphlet for.m of Ruszian penetration into Si-
beria, with discussions of Russian relations with China, 
Japan, and Mongolia. 
Krausse, Alexis, ~ l!.!: !!..!!, .!!! Historz ~ 1l! Sue"stion, 
London, 1900. 
A substantial tre~tment of the question 98 it appeared at 
the time, now somewhat outdated. 
Krausse, Alexis, Russia in As1a: !. Record .!m! ! studl, .!§!?!-18QQ 
lew York, 1899. -- ----
Comment on preceding work also applies here. 
Lobanov-Rostovsky, (Prince) Andrei, Russia ~ Asia, New York, 
1933. 
Written by the son of the former Russian Foreign Minister, 
Alexis Lobanov-Rostovsky, this volume presents a general 
survey of Russian Far Eastern relations. Interesting and 
reliable, but not revelatory. 
Norman, Henry, ~ Peo!:!le • .!!.19. Poli tics .2! ~ l:!.!!!!.!:, New Yo~ 
1895. 
One of the best informed and most interesting analyses of 
the situation as it appeared at the time, written by a man 
widely traveled in the Far East. Contains rather acute pre-
dictions of things to come in the East, most of which have 
been borne out by history. 
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Owen, Davld E., Imserla1ism and Natlonallsm in the Far East, 
New York, 1§2 • - - - - -
A rather superficial survey, contains little that cannot be 
found in more substantial form elsewhere. 
Pasvolsky, Leo, Russia ~ ~ !!I!!!!, Hew York, 1922. 
Much the same account as offered by the Lobanov-Rostovsky 
work clted above. 
Rookh111, William W., Chlna's Intercourse with Korea from the 
~ Centua !2lm, 1::onoon, 1:§a5. - --
A treatment of Koreats tributary relatlonship to Chlna up t 
the time that relationship was destroyed by the Sino-Japan-
ese War. Based largely on Chinese sources. 
Sands, Willlam F., Undiplomatic MemorHts, New York, 1930. 
The author was secretary to the American Legation in Seoul 
1n 1894, later became advisor to the Korean emperor up to 
1904. The recollections contalned in this volume have 
11ttle to say on Russian pollcy in Korea. 
Skrine, Francis H. B., 1!!! Ex,pansion ~ RuSSia, l§l2-l900, Cam-
bridge, 1903. ' 
A substantial work, but rather o~tdated in its approach. 
Though treating Russian expansion in Slberia in 80me detail, 
bas little to say of Korea. 
Takeuchi, Sterling '1'., .War ~ DiJ210macl !!! ~ Japanese Empire, 
New York, 1935. . 
Prepared as a doctoral dissertation at Yale and based on 
Japanese sources, this volume presents an illuminating stud 
of Japanese internal organlzation after the 18e8 revolution. 
"Vladim1r," ~ China-JaRan !!£, London, 1896. 
On the whole, a quite reliable contemporary history of the 
war; uses oriental as .ell as western sources. 
j , 
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Yakhontoft, Victor A., Russia and the Soviet Union in the Far 
East, New York, 1931. - - - --
-
QUite good, but rather sketchy on the period here considered 
Zakr1skie, Edward H., American-Russian RivalrY in the Far Eastl 
A Study in Di210macI and Power POlitIcs, 1~5=I91~PhIIi. 
'!elphla,-r946. - - -
An excellent analysis of the American-Russian antagonism, 
drawing quite heavily on Russian sources. 
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